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ABSTRACT
FREEDOM, SOCIETY, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN EARLY MODERN WOMEN’S
THOUGHT

Patrick Ball

Karen Detlefsen

This dissertation describes and analyses several different approaches to
the relation between individuals and wider social groupings in the work of
Margaret Cavendish, Sophie de Grouchy, Gabrielle Suchon, Mary Wollstonecraft,
and other women of the early modern period in Europe. From these disparate
sources—Cavendish’s vitalist metaphysics, Suchon’s practical ethics,
Wollstonecraft’s polemical aesthetics—a unifying political concern can be drawn:
one of how individuals relate to their societies, and how this relation can be
distorted or outright controlled by existing power relations.
Each chapter approaches this subject from a different side: the tension of
individual freedom and universal order in Cavendish’s metaphysics; the problem
of autonomy for socially-constituted subjects in Suchon’s ethics and, by contrast,
in the ethics of contemporary relational autonomy theory; the revolutionary
solutions to the gendered traps of aesthetic ideology presented by Mary
Wollstonecraft; and the practical, activist route to the achievement of freedom in
the actions of the radical republican women of the French Revolution.
iii

In analysing the political bases of these questions I aim to provide new
interpretations of these works of the early modern era, many of which have been
unjustly neglected until very recently. But I also motivate changes in the
methodology of early modern philosophy that are ongoing and that, I hope, can
be pushed yet further. By focusing on the political in early modern women
philosopher’s work, and by reading that work politically, I argue, we can effect a
wider break with older methodologies and open up many new avenues of inquiry.
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i. Introduction

i.1 Early Modern Narratives

The four chapters of this dissertation are all concerned with examining how
individuals interact with larger social groupings of which they are a part—societies,
governments, even the universe itself—through the lens of the social and political
thought of women in England and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Each chapter explores this relation from a different direction and in a different context:
through metaphysics, ethics, revolutionary politics, and aesthetics. And though each
chapter contains its own strong central thesis, I do not aim to forge from them a single
grand claim about how individuals and societies relate, or how they ought to relate, or
how we ought to read the early modern women philosophers in the light of this question.
Such a claim would, I think, obviate the advantage to be had in using multiple
perspectives in the first place: their differences are as important as their similarities.
Rather, through the chapters I seek to illuminate again pathways through this subjectsociety relation that were visible at the time of Margaret Cavendish and Gabrielle
Suchon, Mary Wollstonecraft and Sophie de Grouchy, and to think along them again
with a view to, perhaps, looking newly at contemporary conditions. This search is
informed by, and in turn has informed, a number of methodological and philosophical
preoccupations that are present throughout the dissertation.
These preoccupations follow, and aim to expand upon, an unfolding change that
has been occurring in the study of the history of philosophy for the last few decades.
During this period historians of philosophy have sought to alter, challenge, or undo the
famous “standard narrative” of early modern philosophy: that narrative that sees the era
beginning with the spontaneous generation of René Descartes; constructs Spinoza and
1

Leibniz as his “rationalist” epigones; traverses the Channel to the “empiricist” Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume; then returns to the continent to crown Kant as the era’s synthesis
and apogee.
Like many historical stories, the standard narrative probably does not date from
the period it purports to describe, but achieved its form later. Knud Haakonssen locates
the beginning of the “epistemological paradigm” of the history of philosophy in the work
of, separately, Thomas Reid and Kant at the very end of the eighteenth century; this
paradigm was then standardised in textbooks, at differing rates in different locales, over
the course of the nineteenth century.1 Don Garrett claims that it was British Idealist
followers of Hegel that first developed the standard narrative “toward the end of the
nineteenth century.”2 Alberto Vanzo, against both Haakonssen and Garrett, argues that
the narrative was developed by Kantian historians in the first half of the nineteenth
century but only became “standard” later, noting key differences between “our” standard
narrative and the Hegelian ones that remained popular competitors into the twentieth
century.3
Whatever its provenance, the standard narrative does provide a useful structure
that makes one kind of sense of the emergence of Kant’s critical philosophy as the
bringing-together of rationalist and empiricist doctrines rather neatly at the tail end of
the eighteenth century. But when this becomes the only lens through which the thought
of the early modern period is understood it also becomes a severe limit on the potential
of contemporary thought and of contemporary historians. Certainly the early modern
period has more to offer us now than just this tale of the emergence of transcendental
idealism from the battle between “continental rationalists” and “British empiricists.”

1

Haakonssen 103
Garrett 49
3
Vanzo 259, 267, 274
2
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Clearly, one of the primary problems with the standard narrative is the poverty of
its representation of early modern thought. It presents us with seven European men as
the minds and faces of all the philosophy of a period of globalisation and revolution. By
now, much work has already been done on redressing this imbalance by focusing on the
work of the many women philosophers of the time: as I will discuss in more detail
shortly, this dissertation is one contribution to that process. Progress in contemporary
history of philosophy is also being made in considering the period from outside of the
small cluster of western European countries in which the seven legendary sages lived,
and in considering the ways that thought in Europe was influenced by growing
connections with the wider world—and vice versa.4
But the narrative is limited even beyond making seven men stand for all the
thought of the period. In its extreme form, it focuses exclusively on epistemology and
metaphysics: those questions relating to what is in the world and how we can come to
know anything of it. The narrative thereby even overlooks large portions of the work of
those figures it does consecrate, or shapes their ideas to fit itself. A dedicated vivisector
like Descartes is made to appear opposed to empiricism, and Berkeley is lined up
alongside Locke against a fellow idealist like Leibniz.5 Questions of politics, ethics,
beauty, education, sociality, and natural science are marginalised alongside the people
that sought to answer them.
Further, the particular focuses and preoccupations of the standard narrative can
also lead to methodological distortions in its consideration of texts. For example, Jorge
Secada has noted that even for Descartes’ Meditations, surely the ur-text of the entire

4

Shapiro 366
Vanzo 273. The alternative schema that sees Leibniz and Berkeley as “idealists” and Hume and Locke as
“realists” is what Vanzo calls the “Hegelian narrative,” and with this he differentiates that narrative from
the standard one. Of course it is just as much a constructed narrative, and no more representative of the
full gamut of the period. Hegel’s own comparison of Berkeley and Leibniz can be found in Lectures on the
History of Philosophy, volume 3, 366-7.
5
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narrative as it is now presented to us, philosophers’ “focus on argument and doctrine”
has caused them to overlook much that is of philosophical importance.6 Rather than
treating them as a philosophical treatise or set of essays, or—what may amount to the
same—mining them for rational arguments to reconstruct, Secada argues for a close
attention to the Meditations as meditations, as texts operating in a very particular
chosen genre and thereby with certain goals that treatises mightn’t share. Work such as
this moves us away from the strict paradigms of the standard narrative just as
considering little-known figures or texts does.
This move away from the standard narrative is now very much in progress, and
making strides. Lisa Shapiro places the beginnings of a serious challenge to the narrative
in the work of historians that sought to contextualise its metaphysical concerns within
the history of science more generally. This contextualism, Shapiro argues, began then to
shift the narrative’s rigid shape. Considerations of how bodies work and interact are
moved into view alongside the old question of what they are. This means that Descartes’
vivisections were no longer in vain and, more importantly, brings some new figures onto
the field of the early modern canon: Bacon, Boyle, Hooke, Hobbes, Newton, Cavendish,
and du Châtelet.7
As we look deeper into multiple historical contexts and try to undo the
homogenisation of the canon a great number of alternative narratives become possible—
just as they were possible before the standardisation of the rationalism-empiricism-Kant
narrative. Here, my focus on the relation between individuals and larger groups
traverses metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, but in all cases it leads me back to politics,
another area that was neglected in the history of early modern philosophy until fairly
recently. For the most part I do not focus on the crafting of theories or descriptions of

6
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Secada 201
Shapiro 371
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new societies of the kind put forward by Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau during the period.
Rather, the views on the freedom of individuals within groups that I find here are routed
more strongly in their immediate contexts: they seek to criticise existing structures and
systems, analyse those systems’ bases and causes, and consider possible routes out of the
present. Practical political work such as this is common in the writing of women
philosophers of the period, who in many cases were better placed than men to
understand the restrictions and incoherences of existing (and persisting) conditions.
This focus on politics, and especially a politics that pays attention to the present,
opens up fruitful ground for a philosophy of the early modern period that exceeds and
moves away from the standard narrative. There is a vast amount that could be done here.
Even if we limit ourselves to considering only Europe and the places it subjugated, the
early modern period was one of extraordinary political change and turmoil. It saw the
deaths of kings; wars of religion; revolutions; the expansion of slaveholding across the
Atlantic and its forcible destruction by the enslaved in Haiti; the zenith then decline of
the Dutch global empire and the earliest rise of the British. Its thought included
millenarians and religious dissidents and levellers, and—allowing ourselves anachronism
for a moment—feminists, anarchists, communists, anti-imperialists, and punks.8 Doing
justice to the narratives that could be drawn out of these ideas and the people that made
them will, and has, taken many lifetimes.
At the broadest scope, then, this dissertation is one of many attempts of recent
years to look at the early modern period of European philosophy afresh. This entails
looking for new questions and new figures—in my case especially I look toward women
political philosophers and the questions and concerns that, I believe, interested them.
But to look anew like this, especially in the face of an institutionalisation that has

8

For the classic statement on just the radical thought of the English Revolution, see Hill, The World Turned
Upside Down.
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proceeded along pernicious, oppressive lines—that has excluded people on the basis of
their being women, rather than for any other reason—also requires that we turn to new
genres of philosophy and develop new methods for dealing with them. As Shapiro notes,9
and as we saw in the work of Secada on the Meditations, not all philosophers wrote
treatises; as I shall come to argue in the course of this dissertation, not all philosophers
wrote at all. This is less controversial than it seems: think of Socrates. But it does require
different methods from those traditionally used by historians of philosophy.
Even reading texts contextually and with an eye to political content requires some
difference in methods. I have worked with particular political preoccupations in mind,
and have sought to place the work of the figures I read or consider within that wider
context. I do not think I have thereby done significant interpretative violence. But we are
each our own particularities, and one important commitment, I believe, in a contextual
study of the history of philosophy that admits of many narratives is forthrightness about
those lenses we look through.
So here I have tried to read figures that have not frequently been read, for the
political content that interests both me and them, using methods that have not
frequently been used. I aim to be one in a number of recent salvos that thereby seek to
destabilise and decentre the standard narrative. I will turn next to the specific ways I
have set about this task.

i.2 Freedom and Society

As I stated at the outset, I work to achieve this goal of bringing new figures, new
genres, and new content into the history of early modern philosophy through
investigating the general theme of individuals and their societies in the work of Margaret
9

Shapiro 379
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Cavendish, Gabrielle Suchon, Mary Wollstonecraft, Sophie de Grouchy, and other
women of the early modern period. This very broad theme has many facets, and in the
four chapters of the dissertation I work to illuminate the relations of individuals and
societies through several of these facets. Nevertheless, there are a number of common
theoretical positions that are articulated and defended throughout: a dynamic and
constructive approach to the understanding of individual freedom; a similarly dynamic
approach to charting the complexities of the ontological nature of individuals; and a
commitment to the primacy of politics in allowing us to understand both these issues
and the thought of the period more generally, as can be observed in the political readings
I give of the metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics of the philosophers on whom I focus.
In this section of the introduction, then, I will add meat to this skeleton,
illustrating the substance of the above positions through a summary of their treatment in
each of the dissertation’s chapters. This will serve to introduce the core arguments
specific to each chapter alongside their contribution to the project’s overall theme. In
this way, and through the project as a whole, I hope to build up a particular way of
thinking through the relation of individual to society as the problem is dealt with in
various forms—metaphysical, ethical, aesthetic, straightforwardly political—by some of
the women philosophers of the early modern period. I propose, that is, a separate, newer
narrative: one that looks to how societies treat their people, and vice versa, from the
perspectives of some of those that were mistreated.

i.2.1 Chapter One: Margaret Cavendish’s Sympathetic Metaphysics
Chapter One makes two arguments regarding the role of sympathy in Margaret
Cavendish’s metaphysics. The first is a historical argument about the place that
Cavendish occupies in the history of the development of sympathy as a concept, from an

7

animating vital force that permeates the universe to an individual affect experienced only
by humans. The second argument is that this unusual understanding of sympathy allows
Cavendish to explain how Nature appears mostly (but not entirely) ordered and
harmonious without having to contradict her other metaphysical commitment to the
freedom of all creatures.
For Cavendish, the capacity of all things to freely move themselves is a central
tenet of metaphysics. When a billiard ball strikes another, nothing is transferred, nor
does the first ball somehow force the other to move. Rather, Cavendish argues, the
motion of the second ball comes from within itself: the second ball, being composed of
the same rational and sensitive matter as everything else, senses the motion of the first
and then chooses to respond in kind by moving itself. All motion in the universe, then, is
free for Cavendish in the sense that the thing moving is always the principal cause of its
own motion—nothing is ever made or ‘forced’ to move by anything else.
A problem arises in this picture once we come to consider that the universe
appears, to us, to be largely orderly and harmonious. Certainly, things hold together
fairly well and move with some regularity: the infinite plenum in which Cavendish
believes is not just a chaotic primordial soup, as we might expect when we first hear that
all matter in the universe, down to its tiniest motes, is able freely to move itself as it
chooses. Contemporary scholarship is divided on how Cavendish can account for this
orderliness while not constructing a deified Nature that is able to overrule the free
choices of all the things that are her parts.
I argue that this can best be achieved by paying close attention to Cavendish’s
historically unique account of sympathy. For Cavendish, sympathy is distributed
universally within Nature, and she uses it to explain otherwise mysterious phenomena in
much the same way that it was used by earlier philosophers and chymists. However,
because for Cavendish everything is rational and everything is sensitive, sympathy is not
8

a mysterious force generated by God or a quasi-mystical kind: it is, as we might expect as
contemporary readers, an emotion felt by individuals for one another. The upshot of this
is that Cavendish can use the affective and affectionate bonds that hold between the
separate and free creatures of the universe to explain how orderliness prevails without
outside interference.
For Cavendish, then, freedom is a natural fact, an intrinsic quality of matter that
cannot be overridden, and that needn’t be overridden to explain how order can prevail.
We can move further than this, however. Chapter One also considers the work of Sophie
de Grouchy, who more than a century after Cavendish argued that sympathy could be
used to explain the positive foundations of civil society—justice and rights. De Grouchy
claimed that these values are the result of the development of a sympathy for others that
we acquire in early childhood. We arrive at the concepts of justice and right by
combining our inclination to care for the well-being of others with our ability to think
rationally. For de Grouchy, ordered societies are like the universe is for Cavendish: they
have sympathy at their very roots.
The well-ordered de Grouchean society, then, is one whose institutions of law and
order can be recognised as directly resulting from the sympathetic bonds its people have
for one another. (De Grouchy, having lived through the French Revolution, was clear
that existing societies were not well-ordered, and had institutions that suppressed rather
than encouraged sympathy). People then are ruled by themselves: the laws do not
constrain them, but are created by, and help to codify, their emotional and rational
needs.
Returning to Cavendish, we can see a more substantial account of freedom
developing—one that, in keeping with the positions of this dissertation, traverses the line
between the metaphysical and political. Nature herself, being made of matter, is a
thinking and feeling creature for Cavendish—an infinite one—and, like all her smaller
9

parts, she is made up of matter that itself thinks and feels. If, as Karen Detlefsen argues,
her “laws” are for ethical regularities—akin to human laws10—then, if my arguments are
correct, the laws of Nature are themselves the outgrowth of the sympathetic bonds of her
parts. Everything is material for Cavendish, including thoughts and communication:
Nature cannot generate ethical prescriptions from nothing any more than I can generate
new thoughts without the matter that makes my mind moving in particular ways. Nature
as a whole, then, could be just like the de Grouchean well-ordered society: an order that
arises from the sympathetic feelings of individuals for one another, and that thereby
generates its own ethical prescriptions. For Cavendish, we are not subject to the law of
Nature: we are participants in it.
This gives us a more radical and, I think, concrete image of freedom than the one
of simple lack of determination with which we started. All the creatures of Nature are not
just free because they may do whatever they want, but because they have the capacity to
participate in the functioning of the order in which they exist—because the laws above
them are nothing but their own collective activity. As we shall see, this participatory
vision of freedom is one that flows through all the chapters of this dissertation.
Finally, however, we should note that what constitutes an individual—which we
might, in other circumstances, wish to hold forth as the obvious subject of freedom—is a
profoundly slippery notion for Cavendish. She believes in an infinitely divisible plenum,
and in matter that is rational and sensitive down to the infinitesimal scale: it is thereby
very difficult to say where, for Cavendish, one individual stops and the next begins. At
times, for instance, it seems not just that all the matter of my body is co-operating to a
particular end, but also the matter of things around me, like a beer can and a chair. At
others, not even all the matter of my body works together, as when I am mentally or
physically ill. How then can I claim to be a separate and distinct individual?
10

Detlefsen 80-1
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I’m not sure that, in the Cavendishean framework, I can. But this needn’t be a
limitation—indeed, I believe it is a virtue. For Cavendish, individuals are complicated
things: forever shrinking, growing, turning to inner turmoil or finding bonds far beyond
their skins. Sometimes individuals resemble societies and sometimes societies resemble
individuals. If freedom is to be understood in this collective, participatory way then we
must look past notions that attempt to limit it to the capacities of the individual mind or
body. It will be helpful to have this thought in mind as we turn to the next chapter.
Chapter One, then, introduces and illustrates the interactions of the three
primary themes of the dissertation. Beginning with a view of freedom as the simple
unconstrained action of individuals, and noting the problem that this seems to raise for
Cavendish—that such freedom, if it really existed, would result in permanent chaos—it
offers a solution based on the expressly political thought of Sophie de Grouchy. In this
solution, not only freedom, but individuals themselves, are seen to depend on
sympathetic co-operation. In my view, the parts of Cavendish’s Nature are free not just
because their activity is unconstrained, but because in their unconstrained activity,
guided by their sympathetic affections, they create the orderly structures in and through
which they persist.

i.2.2 Chapter Two: The Limitations of Autonomy in Gabrielle Suchon and
Contemporary Philosophy
Chapter Two, then, looks closely at the relation between freedom and the
individual. It compares the analyses of contemporary theorists of relational autonomy
with that of the seventeenth-century nun Gabrielle Suchon. Both the contemporary
theorists and Suchon point to the limitations of conceptions of autonomy that constitute,
or posit, a socially-atomised individual as autonomy’s proper subject. Such conceptions
improperly ignore the effects, both negative and positive, that social circumstances have
11

upon the capacity of individuals to govern themselves: they falsely and immorally
assume that individuals can and should act in ways that proceed directly from some
asocial core of themselves.
For Suchon, that this is impossible is a fact, resulting from our fallen natures,
against which we—and especially women, who suffer the greatest of the deprecations of
heteronomy-generating ideologies—can struggle more or less successfully. For the
contemporary theorists, the impetus is to create a new conception of autonomy, for two
reasons. First, the possibility of political progress toward a better society—one not so
detrimental to the autonomy of its members—requires, it is asserted, that it is possible
for people to act in some way contrary to their social programming. If people are wholly
heteronomous, then the prospect of change, especially the destruction of patriarchy,
looks dim. Second, a conception of autonomy is necessary to make normative assessment
of individuals—judgements of their morality—possible, or at least possible without being
outright tyrannical.
Before I turn to my own intervention in this discussion, a brief but necessary note
on terminology. So far I have largely used the term “freedom” to denote my subject; in
Chapter Two, and my summary of it here, I use “autonomy.” This is largely because I
follow the lead of the relational autonomy theorists that use the term, rather than for any
more substantive reason. Nevertheless the two terms have different connotations. In my
usage, “autonomy,” following its etymological origins denoting self-government for
polities, largely emphasises the internal, psychological condition necessary for an
individual to shape their life and/or endorse their choices as speaking, in some way, of
who they are. It is hence less concerned with the external, concrete limitations or aids
that are also encompassed by the broader “freedom.” As we shall see, I think this entire
schema is severely limited. But it is helpful for the internal logic of the chapter to speak
of “autonomy,” and this is what I mean by it.
12

Chapter Two, then, contrasts Suchon with later theorists in feminist philosophy,
such as Catriona Mackenzie, Diana Tietjens Meyers, Paul Benson, and Natalie Stoljar,
who argue in various ways for the thesis of “relational autonomy.” These theses all
attempt to find a space for autonomy within the social, thereby opposing the overlyatomised patriarchal image of autonomy and taking into account the operations of
ideology and social pressure on individual psyches.
I argue that all these attempts fail to sufficiently account for the conceptual
incompatibility between autonomy and sociality. Following Mackenzie’s split of the
conceptual terrain, I consider first Meyers’ authenticity and competence-based account
that sees choices as proceeding from an authentic, true self when they are made using a
particular set of critical skills; Stoljar’s substantive, norm-based account that
understands autonomy as arising only when one acts according to norms that are not
false; and Benson’s account of autonomy as “normative competence,” the ability of
individuals to understand and endorse the norms by which they are judged in their
communities.
All these theories, I argue, describe qualities or experiences that are important to
have, and that far too few do have. But they also all seek to carve out a space for
autonomy within prevailing social conditions that are understood to be bad and harmful;
and to this extent, I show, they fail. If we understand ourselves as thoroughly and
perniciously structured by these conditions, then we cannot take for granted that our
self-authorisation and self-governance strategies even lead us in the direction of
autonomy: they could just as well lead us away, or in circles. Ultimately this is because
even the relational autonomy theories cleave too closely to the individual as the proper
subject of freedom: to be free, on these grounds, is to be an individual possessed of some
collection of qualities, strategies, and/or beliefs—and lacking external and internal
impediments—with which one can hack one’s way into autonomy. These qualities might
13

be impossible to attain as a totally atomised being, on the theories’ readings, and instead
be the result of social structures. To be autonomous might yet involve having
relationships with other beings. But autonomy remains an individualised property.
In Suchon’s account, social mores and ideologies are also understood to be
harmful to autonomy—what Suchon calls freedom—and to that of women in particular.
For Suchon this is because bad customs and attitudes structure our desires and influence
our emotions such that our God-given reason, by which we ought rightly be guided, is
clouded or suppressed. Suchon talks in some detail about how ideology operates in this
way: by forcing women into vocations to which they are unsuited (Suchon herself only
escaped the convent after many years), social structures not only directly impinge upon
their autonomy, but also constrain their reason and inflame their emotions such that
new autonomy-damaging mental states are generated. Material and psychic oppression
are hence utterly intertwined for Suchon, and once in this state she does not see any
conceptual or mental strategy by which women could escape. Rather, she advocates
education as the best route to improvement in the position of women in general, and
argues that society ought institute and allow a “celibate” or “neutral” life for women,
beyond marriage or the convent.
She thus advocates a more directly practical response to the contradiction than
do the relational autonomy theorists. At the same time, however, Suchon’s
acknowledgement of the contradiction is less fatal to her overall ethical project than for
the later theorists. This is the final move of the chapter: ultimately, Suchon can allow
that we are flawed creatures buffeted by the winds of society because her ethical system
does not require that our actions speak directly of our truest selves for the purposes of
moral judgement. God is the ultimate judge of goodness and badness; it would be
surprising and impious if we could easily make such judgements. Later ethical systems,
by contrast, require that a person’s actions reveal important truths about them, such that
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it might be proper to make judgements about that person as a result. This is the stated
goal of at least some of the relational autonomy theorists: to take into account that
society structures our choices in various ways while still preserving the idea that
individuals can and should be subject to normative assessment.
Chapter Two is therefore an argument against the idea of the autonomous
individual that is to be understood as both irreducibly structured by the social and the
proper object of ethical judgement. This is so even in the context of the theories of
relational autonomy that are far superior to the older theories that they set out to
replace. The chapter makes this argument by questioning those theories that attempt to
preserve the individual as an autonomous subject while widening their engagement with
the social. It aims to describe an incoherence, and does not present a positive framework
for understanding freedom. But in the context of the wider dissertation I think it can
more clearly be seen that freedom is better understood as a collective, participatory, and
political project.
A comparison with Chapter One will be instructive in showing how Chapter Two
contributes to the themes of the dissertation as a whole. In Cavendish’s Nature, I argue,
individual parts are free not just because they are individually unconstrained but because
they are participants in the communal project of the ordered universe. A similar view of
freedom in human affairs can, I think, lead us away from the incoherences of the
relational autonomy theories. As the relational autonomy theories note, to have one’s
choices structured by bad social forces is to be unfree. The solution, however, is not to try
to carve a space within the self that is isolated from those forces. It is to make those
forces themselves the product of one’s own activity as a participant in society, just as the
regularity of Nature is the product of all creatures’ sympathy in my reading of Cavendish.
Our societies now are unfree because almost everyone is locked out from such
participation in the direction of the forces that shape their lives. To change this will
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require the political emancipation of collectives, not the conceptual emancipation of
individuals.

i.2.3 Chapter Three: Patriarchy, Beauty, and Revolution in the Work of Mary
Wollstonecraft
Chapter Three similarly looks to chart the effects of social ideologies and their
impacts on the lives of women, but it does so through telling a historical story about the
development of the relation between women and beauty in eighteenth century Britain. It
argues that the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, right at the end of the eighteenth century,
can be read as rejecting the feminised view of beauty that had by then developed: not, I
argue, because of any misogyny on Wollstonecraft’s part, but because she sees this
ideology as an outgrowth of bad social trends that must be overturned at their bases. For
her, aesthetic ideologies and practices—self-adornment, charm, artistic appreciation, et
cetera—have radically deleterious effects on those that allow them to take precedence
over their “natural” rational capacities. Like Suchon more than a century earlier,
Wollstonecraft believes the position of women forces them to contort themselves into the
shapes demanded by aesthetic ideology; and like Suchon, she understands how
thoroughly this undermines the capacity of women to pursue independent, meaningful
lives.
With this understanding of Wollstonecraft in hand, earlier aesthetic theories can
be seen as part of this story of the association of beauty and femininity against which
Wollstonecraft argues. The second section of the chapter, then, concerns Anthony Ashley
Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and the artist Frances Reynolds, both of whose
aesthetics made use of gender to structure their accounts.
Shaftesbury closely links aesthetic taste with virtue, claiming that true virtue is a
love and appreciation of order, harmony, and proportion; especially as these are
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expressed in a well-functioning society. Shaftesbury’s aesthetics is centred on the
importance of taste in ensuring that people act selflessly and for the public good; greed
and private self-interest are to him unpardonable deviations, and it is with these
tendencies that he associates women. On the one hand, for Shaftesbury, an overly
private, overly sensuous appreciation—one that looks past harmony and proportion to
baser sentiments—is itself an “effeminate” form of taste. On the other, women
themselves might, with their enervating and distracting beauty, drive men to just such an
improper appreciation. To have taste is to be virtuous for Shaftesbury; and the right kind
of taste is one that is explicitly constructed in contrast to a kind that is associated with
women.
Reynolds also closely associates women with private, sensuous beauty, but she
changes its moral valence: it is no longer a threat to a more austere, manly virtue but the
highest expression of a different kind of virtue. She argues that the apprehension of
beauty is the apprehension of an inner virtue, and as, she says, women are the “sweetest,
most interesting image of beauty,” it is clear that women are the objects par excellence of
that inner virtue. Indeed, she argues that all our aesthetic sentiments derive from our
understanding of the essential virtues proper to each gender: when we judge non-human
objects to be beautiful, for Reynolds, we are anthropomorphising. The virtue of women,
grasped via their beauty, is hence the axis around which her entire aesthetic system
revolves. Reynolds also reserves an important role for women in the construction of
taste, since, as the proper arbiters of the domestic realm, it is they who must cultivate
good taste in the following generations.
It is in this milieu that we can situate Wollstonecraft’s two Vindications. Of
course, Reynolds’ positive association of women with beauty is better than Shaftesbury’s
negative one. But Wollstonecraft argues that these associations, far from being essential
aspects of nature, are themselves the products of society: in this case, the products of a
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society gripped by an oppressive malaise that praises weakness, indolence, extravagance,
and stupidity as beauty and taste. She sees these tendencies operating, in very different
ways, on both the aristocracy and the middle class women of her time. The aristocracy,
she argues, use what is charming and easily pleasurable to the eyes of their subjects as a
cover for their illegitimate and ill-gotten power: with opulence and luxury they add lustre
to their rule. At the same time, that very power, and the ease of acquiring pleasure that
comes with it, cramps their minds and virtues such that soon the aristocracy are no
longer capable of doing anything but appealing to the baser sentiments of the masses.
And hence a cycle turns that sees an increasing focus on beauty and taste to the
detriment, Wollstonecraft claims, of reason and virtue.
A similar cycle afflicts women, according to Wollstonecraft: not as a result of
power, as it is for the aristocracy, but of a lack of it. Without access to other avenues to
assert themselves and live their life-plans, women increasingly rely on becoming
beautiful objects and witty subjects of taste for the small amount of power this grants
them—over men, Wollstonecraft says, but also over other women. As with the aristocracy
these methods lead to an increasing focus on appearances and taste and a neglect of
reason and virtue; and as with the aristocracy this neglect forecloses any possible
avenues toward power other than beauty and taste. Beauty, then, for Wollstonecraft, is
one ideological method by which patriarchy perpetuates itself; and it is even able to
accomodate moves like that of Reynolds, which aim to change the moral connotation of
the link between women and beauty while keeping it alive. While this association
remains, Wollstonecraft argues, women will be harmed by it.
We can see here another facet of a collective account of freedom. Wollstonecraft
acknowledges that for certain women, for a short time, adherence to the oppressive
structures of aesthetic ideology might indeed grant them power, and with it a kind of
freedom: those women that have the resources and skills to play the game of manners
18

and beauty well will be able to achieve much of what they set out to do. But for
Wollstonecraft this cannot ever be a path toward liberation. To begin with, this method
of pursuing one’s life-plans can only ever work temporarily, as aesthetic ideologies (then
as now) skewed radically toward appreciation of youth and denigration of age. But more
importantly, the kind of life-plan that one is capable of realising in this way is one that
leads away from freedom, not towards it. Playing the game well requires a single-minded
attention on oneself only insofar as one is a beautiful object and a witty subject, and this
narrowness of focus leads to a narrowness of the horizons of the player’s potential.
Beauty and sentiment become ends for themselves in the minds of the players, and this
causes their rational capacities to fester through disuse. For Wollstonecraft, these
unreasoned creatures remain inevitably unfree. And of course, in playing the game well,
they are contributing to its persistence, and hence to the unfreedom of all around them:
other women, who are not as skilled as they, will suffer in their failure to compare; and
even men, whose overly sentimental desires are the clear cause of the situation, find
those desires encouraged and inflamed rather than questioned.
We do not need to agree with Wollstonecraft’s commitment to Enlightenment
rationality to learn important political lessons here. Freedom cannot be a matter of
individual advancement through otherwise oppressive structures. To make oneself more
free in such situations is both illusory and harmful: it requires the contortion of oneself
into a shape favoured by those structures. Nor, as we learn from the comparison with
Reynolds, can freedom be a matter of ideological finesse. Shifting the connotations of
oppressive structures might feel better, and this is valuable. Reynolds is surely better
than Shaftesbury, just as the relational autonomy theories are better than the patriarchal
ones they replace. But true liberation for Wollstonecraft lies in the practical expression of
political power: her famous “revolution in female manners.” Changing bad ideologies
like beauty, the chapter argues, following Wollstonecraft, requires changing the power
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structures on which those ideologies grow. In the final chapter, I turn to look directly at a
case study of practical action, its relation with freedom for the oppressed, and the
political and methodological lessons that we can learn from it.

i.2.4 Chapter Four: Women’s Militancy and Women’s Republicanism During
the French Revolution

In Chapter Four, freedom appears most explicitly as an object and goal of
collective action. The chapter aims to show how the philosophical ideas of liberty and
right have been shaped by political practice; and, in particular, by the direct political
action of the masses in the form of riots, insurrections, and rebellions. It also takes
suspicion of the ontology of the individual as a jumping off point for methodological
considerations regarding the relations between collectives and ideas, and begins to
sketch a framework for doing philosophy around or within mass movements.
The chapter is hence divided broadly between methodological and political
concerns, but both these sides take the actions of the militant women of Paris during the
French Revolution as model and inspiration. The goal of the first, methodological,
section is to begin to open up movements and beliefs that may have been under-studied
in philosophy because of their lack of central texts or other verbal expressions. The
militant Parisian women are a good example of this. Though they did write and make
speeches, their political efficacy and their later philosophical and historical impact was
dependent on their ability and willingness to assert themselves through collective
physical confrontation and insurrection. The chapter hence seeks to understand both
how political action and texts can interact in the development of political or
philosophical ideas and, perhaps more controversially, how even actions that take place
entirely without texts can be fruitfully investigated in philosophy. With this latter goal in
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mind, I consider the women’s march on Versailles of October 1789 in the light of the
work on the “moral economy” of crowds done by E.P. Thompson. If, as Thompson
argues, food riots can and often did result from a set of beliefs held by the working-class
regarding the duties of the state toward them, insurrections such as the march on
Versailles, I argue, can usefully be understood as important philosophical events. They
have antecedents, causes, and consequences in the world of abstract ideas as well as in
the political one.
In this sense, though they used force as the primary means to achieve their goals,
insurrections such as the march on Versailles cannot be dismissed as entirely arational
or outside the realm of ideas. During such events freedom is immediately visible as
inhering in the people as a mass, regardless of the pretensions of rulers that might codify
it—to this extent, that the event takes place beyond text is a large part of its point. It
serves to show that physical confrontation is a last resort of people for whom
institutional channels have been closed, while at the same time demonstrating that any
attempt to limit political expression to those institutional channels is provisional on the
sufferance of the people. If the insurrections were legal, then, they would not be the
same. On the other hand, however, the presence and success of the insurrection is itself
evidence for its legitimacy and for the truth of its central claim: that that the poor women
of Paris are one of the groups that has the right to use force when they feel that their
needs are unmet and the responsibilities of their nominal rulers have been shirked. The
first section of the chapter, then, works with these considerations, and with potential
problems, to begin to produce a methodology that can adequately capture the philosophy
of insurrection.
With these methodological considerations in hand, I then try to construct a
comparison of the militant republicanism of the women of the Revolution with
contemporary forms of neo-republicanism, along the three contemporary axes of
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freedom as non-domination, participatory politics, and civic virtue. I argue that in their
actions the militant women express and contest their own versions of all these features of
republicanism. They demanded that they be free in the undominated sense not only
when they rioted against dominative governments, even driving them to write a
constitution (that of 1793) that explicitly acknowledged their right to insurrection, but
also when they demanded that the national government institute and rigorously enforce
the Terror against the speculators and aristocrats that they saw as their enemies. They
demanded their right to participate in politics again through their insurrections, through
their petitions, through their direct participation in local assemblies, and through their
demand that they be allowed to bear arms, form militias, and defend the new republic. In
all these things they articulated their civic virtue; they also engaged directly in the
policing of civic virtue, prowling through marketplaces on the lookout for those less
patriotic or republican than themselves.
Not all these things are very nice, of course, but, as I argue in the chapter, they
represent a republicanism that was worked out by the practical and political action of
working-class women in the midst of a period of extraordinary political foment. It also
shows freedom in the light that I wish to consider it—the view of freedom that has been
an undercurrent of all the previous chapters and that I have brought forward here. As in
the sympathetic universe of Cavendish, freedom in the milieu of the Revolution’s radicals
was both the aim and basis of collective action. Freedom for them was the capacity to
engage directly in the shaping of the society that would itself shape them, and it could
not result from having the right laws or ideologies or even psychologies in place. For my
purposes, then, the radical women of the Revolution are a useful model for the image of
freedom toward which I have been working in the previous chapters.
Indeed, critics of the radicals—the chapter quotes Mary Wollstonecraft, who,
though she supported the Revolution, was sharply critical of the turn that popular justice
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took—were often quick to claim that the insurrectionary masses were frenzied or
manipulated: in the terms of contemporary autonomy theory, the claim was frequently
made that their desires and choices were inauthentic and thereby unfree. Chapter Four
provides some reasons for doubting that this is true. But on a wider scale, I argue,
whether it’s true is beside the point. As I have tried to show throughout the dissertation,
freedom does not proceed organically from an individual in possession of the right style
or shape of soul, the right suite of capacities, or the correctly equanimous mind. Rather,
freedom is a matter of the relation of individuals to the structures that shape them, and
this relation can be the object of political activity. During the French Revolution, if only
briefly, the working-class women of Paris saw that those structures could be moulded—
indeed, were moulded—by their action, not as individuals but as collectives with shared
interests. And it was by this method that they sought to make themselves free.

i.3 Some Assumptions

Though it shadows much of the preceding discussion, I have not yet much
engaged with the third of the major themes of the dissertation that I identified at the
outset: the primacy of the political in allowing us to understand new, non-standard
narratives—or even ideas beyond narrative—of the early modern period. Nevertheless it
is a concern that I have brought with me to all of my discussions, and it is visible in the
progression of each chapter’s individual narrative: metaphysical questions are brought
into the realm of the political in Chapter One; an ethical question in Chapter Two; the
entire practice and ideology of aesthetics in Chapter Three; and in Chapter Four, textual
political philosophy is juxtaposed with direct political action. In all these cases I
understand “the realm of the political” to mean that realm that is preoccupied primarily
with understanding or influencing the organisation of the social life of individuals and
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larger groups and with the distribution of power across those individuals and groups. In
Chapter One, then, the metaphysical question of universal order is understood in the
political terms of social order; in Chapter Two, responses to the ethical problem of
autonomy are critiqued on the grounds that they fail adequately to account for how
social organisation affects individual psyches; in Chapter Three, practices and beliefs
regarding beauty are discussed in the light of their function in the distribution of power;
and in Chapter Four a link between philosophy and violent attempts to shift that
distribution is explored. In each case, this movement toward the political is motivated by
the concerns of the chapter and of the figures whose thoughts, beliefs, and actions I
discuss: this concern to prioritise understanding philosophical issues politically is, I
think, present in different ways in the work of all of the figures of the dissertation, and so
it is not merely a methodological quirk on my part.
Nevertheless, looking through a political lens is also a significant concern of my
own, and so here I wish briefly to flag and justify this assumption and other corollary
assumptions that have informed my discussions. Reading politically means situating
texts both in their historical contexts and in the contexts, sometimes wildly different, in
which they have come to be understood since; searching for the effects of texts beyond
their intent, and the effect of political events on texts; excavating the power structures
that texts assume and attack, again beyond the singular intentions of the author; and,
not least, testing out how the text structures narratives, of its period and otherwise, and
how it can be used to form new ones. I have tried to use all of these methods in writing
the chapters of this dissertation. Doubtless there are many more approaches too that
would fall within the remit of a politicised methodology.
In some cases these approaches and techniques lie outside of traditional or
established methods in the history of philosophy. Historians of philosophy, for example,
are often concerned with finding out what a particular figure actually meant when they
24

wrote a particular text, and will look to letters, drafts, and notes to achieve this greater
intimacy with an author’s mind. This can often lead to quite different interpretations
than if we try to find out what a text meant in the world beyond the author, or what it
means now, or what it has come to mean in the context of a particular historical
narrative. All of these approaches are valuable and all have produced and will produce
important scholarship.
I believe that what I have called a politicised methodology can be robustly
defended in philosophical terms as a way of getting the history of philosophy “right.”
Doing so, however, would probably take an entire dissertation. Here, then, I just wish to
present a couple of reasons for granting these assumptions for the time being.
Of primary importance to me is that the contemporary attempt to destabilise the
standard narrative is a political project, and hence certain political viewpoints will
naturally inflect the work that is done for this project. The standard narrative is limited
in many ways, but one of the main reasons that challenges to it have proliferated recently
is that it ignores and marginalises the contributions to philosophy of anyone that is not a
white European man. Bringing in more viewpoints from women, people of colour, and
people beyond Europe exposes us to new ideas and allows us to more accurately
construct an image of the thought of the time, but the project is also important—and
accuracy and novelty are important—because of the impact that such work can have on
the contemporary world or on contemporary philosophy. By changing how we look to
our field’s past, we hope to make the field’s future more just and equal in both the people
and ideas that it includes.
This is, then, an avowedly political project, and as such it is open to the charge
that political motivations are incompatible with the search for uncorrupted truth. There
are many reasons to doubt such an opposition, but at the very least provisionally it helps
us if we acknowledge that we have these motivations in the background of our work. One
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reason for granting a politicised methodology, then, is itself political: reading for the
political symptoms of the contemporary world and their etiologies in our views of the
past helps orient us toward, hopefully, a better world.
The second reason to provisionally grant these methods is that I believe that their
worth is best demonstrated in practice; what’s more, the methodology I use has only
been developed in practice, in a conjunction between the political necessities above and
the interpretive restrictions brought by the texts (or riots, or insurrections) themselves.
Figuring out how to read politically is therefore not a matter of constructing a framework
that can thereafter be imposed, and presenting such a strict framework now would be
counterproductive. In this I follow methodologically one of the main philosophical
themes of the dissertation: that conceptual or philosophical questions can best be
thought through and addressed through practical work. Finding a new methodology,
then, is a matter of responding pragmatically to existing conditions while retaining
previous political commitments. In this, it mirrors in miniature the approaches of the
philosophers of the forthcoming chapters in their work on, and towards, freedom.

i.4 Concluding Remarks

With all preliminary pieces now on the table, I am able to finish by restating the
dissertation’s themes, and in particular its understanding of freedom, more concretely.
In this I am helped by the revolutionary republican women of the final chapter, whose
militant attempt to forge a freedom that worked for them has informed the
considerations of all the previous chapters: we can follow the logic of their insurrections
by beginning quite simply with freedom taken as non-domination and moving
pragmatically from there to a more positive conception. As the Parisian women saw, to
be undominated means more than having a written promise from authorities—in the
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form of a constitution or set of laws—that they will exercise their power wisely or gently.
It means ultimately that no such authorities exist, or at the very least that they are
understood by all to exist only as long as the people as a collective allows them to.
In this sense, real freedom resides in the capacity of individuals to form together
as a community and to exercise this sovereign power as they see fit—to shape the social
forces that, in unfree situations such as our own, might dominate them. It is important
then that we understand these communities not merely as made up of individuals but
also as shaping them to be the kind of individuals they are. It is inevitable that we are
made from the social structures and ideologies in which we live and grow: we cannot
strategise or critically reason our way out of this. Rather, we must be empowered to
shape ourselves by being full and equal participants in those social structures.
The women philosophers that I discuss in this dissertation are better placed to
understand this than many male philosophers of the time were. As repressed individuals
locked out of power, the social forces that beset them—that, according to Wollstonecraft
and Suchon, coerce their psyches into harmful shapes—are more alien to women than
they might be to men. And they understood, like the radical women of the French
Revolution, that to forge a collective freedom it would not do merely to replace kings
with parliaments or promulgate bills of rights. Those ideologies, practices, and material
structures that locked out particular people—women, people of colour, poor people, the
enslaved—from full participatory freedom had too to be destroyed. As the Society of
Revolutionary Republican Women noted, once kings were disposed of, speculators and
merchants sought to dominate them. Undoing all such domination was the basis of
collective political action. Or, as Wollstonecraft said, what was needed was a revolution
in manners—not just in governmental structures.
Opposed to this encompassing and pragmatic view of freedom are views that
focus on the internal qualities or possessions of the individual. As I noted in my
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discussion of Chapter Three above, it is doubtless possible for individuals to gain much
for themselves by personal advancement through the restrictive ideologies or structures
of an unfree society: Wollstonecraft noted that some women could gain an illicit form of
power by playing well the game of prettiness and wit that she saw enmeshing all women
as a class. Such power would make the successful player more free in a limited sense: she
would have more opportunity to fulfil her life-plans, she would be able to gain more of
her desires. But as Wollstonecraft shows us, such “freedom” is illusory and harmful. It is
contingent upon the vicissitudes of current aesthetic trends, and thus can never be said
to be freedom from domination, nor the capacity to shape oneself through society.
Worse, in playing the game well, the player reinforces those dominative ideologies all the
more, by giving them the sheen of validity or the players the illusion of autonomy: in this
she makes herself less free, as she retrenches those forces on whose largesse her
supposed freedom depends.
The same can be said of the procedural accounts of autonomy that I discuss in
Chapter Two, which seek to locate autonomy in the ability of individuals to organise their
thoughts in a particular way. Such strategies might provide solace or guide individuals to
make helpful choices, and these are not valueless. But they do not provide a route toward
freedom, as they leave those ideologies that dominate people in place. Destroying those
ideologies is not merely a species of negative freedom—a “freedom from” domination or
bad ideology. It entails people exercising collectively their “freedom to” shape themselves
via the world and the society around them.
With all these themes in mind, the more abstract and metaphysical Chapter One
might appear a puzzling inclusion. But the particular reading I give of Cavendish’s
sympathetic metaphysics is guided by these political considerations, as can be seen
explicitly in the engagement with Sophie de Grouchy. De Grouchy’s account of sympathy
allows her to develop a kind of image of collective freedom: for her, the laws and
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practices of a just society are ones that arise naturally and rationally from out of the
affections of its citizens for one another, and so in a truly just society everyone is ruled
not by alien forces but by the feelings that inhere in their own hearts—exactly the kind of
collective freedom I spend the next three chapters working out. From this I can develop
a reading of Cavendish, whose metaphysics is irreducibly sociopolitical, that understands
the entire universe as a similarly just society of individuals ruled only by themselves as a
collective. By beginning with this image of freedom in its most abstract, metaphysical,
and—perhaps—utopian sense I hope to provide a fruitful grounding for the
considerations of the human realm that follow. So it is to Cavendish that I will turn first.
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1. Margaret Cavendish’s Sympathetic Metaphysics

1.1 Introduction

For Margaret Cavendish, Nature is a living thing, and all her parts are living
things too: down to the smallest possible levels of description, sensitivity, animation, and
rationality will be found. This multiplicity of life and movement and consciousness could
have chaotic results, and indeed Cavendish devotes a lot of space in her philosophical
writings to consideration of what seem like disorders within Nature, such as disease,
madness, and the breakdown of the state. These appear like moments in which the living
parts of nature work against each other and move in contrary ways that produce
irregularity. For Cavendish, however, it is clear that this irregularity is deviation from a
more-or-less regular order; though Nature contains disease and war, it more often holds
together remarkably well. In this chapter, I argue that of particular significance in
explaining this holding-together is Cavendish’s account of sympathy: a unity, love, or
fellow-feeling amongst Nature’s creatures that can be found down into its microscopic
depths.
Cavendishean sympathy hence plays a historically unusual dual role in both its
character and function. It figures in her philosophy both as a causal explanation for
physical phenomena—in a way that is reminiscent of the sympathetic cures of Jan
Baptist Van Helmont and Sir Kenelm Digby—and, as already mentioned, a moral or
emotional accord between sensitive and rational beings.
Cavendish thus stands at an ill-explored, but significant, crossroads in the history
of the concept of “sympathy.” This is not an unusual position for Cavendish. Karen
Detlefsen convincingly identifies another historical crossroads at which Cavendish faces
in both directions: the slow change in the philosophy of science from “law” referring
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merely to human political constructs to the propagation of “natural laws,” out in the
regular inhuman universe.1 That sympathy is able to fill this dual role marks another way
in which Cavendish’s philosophy stands apart from the channels that history has taken.
In the second part of this chapter, then, I will provide the historical context for
Cavendish’s view of sympathy: the two roads at whose intersection I take her account to
be standing. The first of these is that of sympathy as a causal-explanatory phenomenon:
a force, divine or otherwise, perhaps permeating the entire universe, and holding
between similar beings, by which otherwise mysterious actions-at-a-distance such as
magnetism or the famous “sympathetic cure” can be explained. In her own account of
sympathy, Cavendish makes use of it to explain similar—and in places, the exact same—
phenomena.
The second relevant historical account of sympathy comes later, in the eighteenth
century. In the work of Sophie de Grouchy and Adam Smith, as well as other moralists of
the time, sympathy is no longer a spiritual or quasi-spiritual ordering force, but an
emotion held by human individuals for one another. I will look in particular at the work
of De Grouchy, who argues that though it is a personal emotion, not a spiritual
emanation, sympathy underlies much of the structure of the Enlightenment polity,
including—importantly—its orderliness. Cavendish’s account, I argue, has much to do
with this view, too; for though she sees sympathy as able to explain the actions of nonhuman beings, she still grounds it in individual emotion.
From there, Cavendish’s own view of sympathy can be elucidated in more detail.
And with this view in hand, a new account of the order of Cavendish’s Nature, over which
there is much debate in contemporary scholarship, can be given. This new account takes
the order of Nature to be the result of the affective responses—the sympathetic
motivations—of her autonomous individual parts.
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The debate regarding the order of Nature for Cavendish has two strands. First,
there is the question of whether the irregularities that we observe in Nature are ‘real’
disorders, or illusory artefacts of our own limited understanding. David Cunning and
Lisa Walters argue that any observation of disorder that we make is a result of our
ignorance as mere parts of Nature, necessarily incomplete, and if we were to describe
Nature from her own point of view then we would see that she is, in fact, perfectly
ordered. On this view, the lower-level disorders of Nature’s parts—disease, war, et
cetera—contribute to a perfectly-ordered whole.
Karen Detlefsen argues that disease, war, and other forms of breakdown or
corruption are real disorders for Cavendish, and that they therefore detract from the
orderliness of Nature as a whole. The infinite parts that make up Nature all have their
own consciousnesses and their own motions and their own epistemic limitations; in
these circumstances it is inevitable that without some external guiding hand the parts
will act at cross-purposes with each other and do things that result in real disorder.
This difference continues into the second strand of the debate, which regards the
method by which Nature is ordered—whether this resolves itself into a perfect order or
one with possible deviations. Walters, here, suggests that Nature acts to balance the
actions—orderly and disorderly, antipathetic and sympathetic—of her parts such that
everything works out perfectly ordered at the highest scale. Detlefsen has convincingly
argued that the suggestion that Nature guides all her parts to produce order is in conflict
with Cavendish’s basic metaphysical tenet that everything is the principal cause of its
own motion - that is, that everything is self-moving.2 If Nature guides all motion so as to
produce order then Cavendish’s commitment to this principle of occasional causation is
undermined. Instead of this direct intervention, then, Detlefsen argues that Nature’s law
of order manifests itself to her parts as a rational suggestion or prescription: an
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instruction to act in an orderly fashion, that can be more-or-less successfully followed
according to the stupidity, sympathy, or antipathy of individual creatures.
There is an ambiguity here of which we ought be aware. When we say that
“Nature acts,” what is the character of the agency that we are ascribing to her? Does she
intend to produce order, or is this a mere effect of her action? There is a risk here of
incorrectly anthropomorphising or deifying a being that—for Cavendish—was patently,
and importantly, neither human nor divine. I believe that a description of Nature that
understands her agency and wisdom as arising from the ordered, sympathetic action of
her constituent parts avoids either of these risky paths. It allows us to explain the order
of Nature without making her a divine tinkerer or an abstracted, law-giving empress.
Order, I shall argue, necessitates neither a law imposed from above nor the quasispiritual guidance of every moment of motion. In fact, Nature’s being and her wisdom
depend, it seems to me, on an already-existing order among her parts.
In this chapter I will argue that even while holding fast to this principle,
Cavendish’s sociopolitical view of the universe gives her the resources to explain why
Nature is ordered, though not necessarily so: why, that is, the guiding hand of Nature is
an invisible one. In particular, I argue that Cavendish’s unique usage of sympathy as
both a moral-political and causal power allows her to explain how an infinite community
of willful and ignorant parts can come together to form an ordered (but not perfectly
ordered) whole. In this sense Cavendish presages Smith and De Grouchy in explaining
higher-level social phenomena by the bubbling-up of individual actions and attitudes
within a community; though that, for Cavendish, the relevant community is not the
Enlightenment polity but the infinite universe separates her significantly from these
thinkers too. This allows us to explain the order of Cavendish’s universe using neither of
the positions found in the second strand of the debate: neither direct intervention nor
rational suggestion. Rather, like the political communities of De Grouchy, the
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community of Nature is self-ordering. From each creature’s freedom to move itself,
which has sympathy amongst its effects, an entire universal community is made,
regulated not from above but by the creatures themselves.

1.2 Sympathy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

1.2.1 Sympathy as a Causal Explanation

I begin, then, with an excursus on the two historical tendencies that can be found
within the concept ‘sympathy.’ The first of these accounts is the older, and in a sense
more alien, idea of sympathy as being—or resulting from—a metaphysical force or spirit
that, in one way or another, permeates all reality and contributes to the ordering,
harmony, or mutual functioning of its creatures. In her account of this “universal
sympathy” of the seventeenth century, Christia Mercer describes the development of
sympathy from an “‘occult power’ treated mostly by thinkers on the periphery of
philosophy” to a “central component of mainstream philosophical systems” such as those
of Conway and Leibniz.3 Alongside this development, and intimately related with it, was
an effort made by philosophers such as Kenelm Digby and Jan Baptist Van Helmont to
describe the effects of sympathy as though it were an observable and explainable part of
nature, rather than a hidden, occult power essentially closed to investigation.4 This
occult power, however, played a major role in causal explanations of apparently
mysterious phenomena for many centuries: Pliny the Elder makes quite frequent use of
antipathy and sympathy— “the hatreds and friendships of things deaf and dumb, and
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even without feeling”—in the explanations and observations of his Natural History,
where he attributes this affective ordering of nature to “the Greeks.”5
Of particular interest to physicians and natural philosophers at the beginning of
the seventeenth century was the “weapon-salve,” which could, it was said, be applied to a
bloody weapon or bandage to cure a wound, though the weapon or bandage was at a
distance from the wound itself. This cure was the cause of significant controversy in both
England and continental Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century.6 In a 1637
translation, into English, of Daniel Sennert’s attack on the salve, we read that “most men
attribute [...] to Paracelsus” an “Unguent” of skull moss, mummy (i.e., preserved human
flesh), man’s fat, man’s blood, linseed oil, rose oil, and bole Armoniack (Armenian bole, a
kind of iron-heavy clay). This ointment, applied to a stick dipped into blood from a
wound, would cure the wound.7
“Moreover,” writes Sennert,

The Patrons of this Oyntment doubt not, but naturall causes may be given
of this action; and Crollius [Oswald Croll, another partisan of the salve],
calls them ignorant fooles that doubt of its efficacie, or referre the cure to
Sorcery. And to make it appeare that the cure may be done by a naturall
way, they prove at large, that first there are actions which no corporall
touch interceding, are done by an hidden Sympathy or Magnetisme as
they call it. And so the Loadstone draweth Iron, although it touch it not
with its body, and maketh it move toward the Pole; the Starres also worke
upon inferiour things, which they touch not bodily [ …] There be some
that cannot endure to be where a Cat is, though she bee lock’d up in a
Chest that they see her not; and unlesse the Cat be removed, or they goe
out of the place they fall into a swoone. Dogs know the foot-steps of their
Masters, and of wilde Beasts too, and follow them by their track. The
shade of the Ewe-tree is hurtfull to many … 8
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Examples of this kind—from, it seems, astrology to cat allergies—were, in
Sennert’s words, “heape[d] up” by the patrons of the salve as examples of “hidden
actions” taking place at a distance. If cats could make people uncomfortable from within
a box, or the shade of a yew cause an ache, there was no in-principle reason why an
ointment applied to a bloodied stick could not cure the wound whence the blood came.
Such things were attributable to the essential unity and interconnectedness of the
universe—a sympathetic relation that exists between all things. As Sennert puts it:

Another thing they presuppose is, that there is a spirit of the world,
diffused over the whole Universe, which is the conveyor or conveyance of
all occult vertues and actions; and conjoyneth all the parts of the World,
and effecteth a wonderfull harmonie between them. 9
This “spirit of the world, diffused over the whole Universe” was indeed taken by
believers to account for sympathetic or “magnetic” relations between distant objects such
as the cure of the salve. One such patron of the weapon-salve was the English Paracelsian
physician and astrologer Robert Fludd, who in his 1638 Mosaicall Philosophy defines
sympathy to be a “consent, union, or concord, between two spirits, shining forth, or
having their radical emanation from the selfsame or the like divine property.”10 Fludd
explains the functioning of the weapon-salve by means of these emanations, or “beamy
spirits,” and a complex web of immaterial and “magneticall” interactions between the
ointment, the blood on the weapon, and the wound.11 As Allen Debus writes in his 1964
paper on Fludd and the weapon-salve controversy, for Fludd “the world is pictured as a
unified living whole and the magnetic cure of wounds becomes only a special instance
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and consequence of this vitalist universe where all things have correspondences based on
sympathetic or antipathetic action.”12
On this picture, sympathy is a hidden, occult, and immaterial connection, or
tendency toward union, between created beings: “that concording and vivifying love,
which ariseth from the benigne emanation of the Creator, which desireth to be joined
with his like, and seeketh to preserve his like by union,” as Fludd puts it, taking a
Neoplatonist tack against the prevailing Aristotelian opinion that forbade action-atdistance. This sympathy is opposed by antipathy, “that discording, privative, and hatefull
affection” which springs, also in created beings, from “darknesse and deformity.”13
Effects like that of the weapon-salve or the lodestone were explicable as arising from
these spiritual forces.
A large part of the controversy surrounding the weapon-salve was about the
nature of these forces. Action-at-a-distance of the kind apparently seen in the weaponsalve was more easily seen as magic, or the work of the devil, than as something natural
and benign. Fludd’s earlier writings on the weapon-salve were vociferously attacked on
these grounds by one Parson William Foster in 1631, in the splendidly titled treatise
Hoplocrisma-Spongus: or, a Sponge to wipe away the Weapon-Salve, which bore the
only slightly less splendid subtitle “A Treatise, wherein is proved, that the Cure late taken
up amongst us, by applying the Salve to the Weapon, is Magicall and unlawfull.”14
Some time earlier, on the continent, Van Helmont had sought to explain “that the
Magnetick Cure of wounds, is the single, and ordinary effect of Nature.”15 He attempted
to clarify the position of Rodolphus Goclenius the Younger, seemingly the progenitor of
the new controversy surrounding the salve, who had explained the action-at-a-distance
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at work in the cure by way of universal sympathetic and antipathetic forces that were
supernatural and “magical.” Goclenius became embroiled in a long debate with the
Jesuit Johannes Roberti for his troubles.16 In fact Van Helmont, too, ended up in trouble
with the Jesuits; he was investigated by the Spanish Inquisition and imprisoned under
house arrest, most likely for suggesting that the magnetic cure was analogous to the
curative effects of saints’ relics.17
Van Helmont sought to defend the weapon-salve from Goclenius’s own
inopportune, and plausibly heretical, defence. In so doing he invoked his own
understanding of sympathetic action: it was caused by “the universal spirit, the Common
Mercury, inhabiting the middle of the universe, [...] the faithful executor and adjutor of
all natural actions.”18 There was, hence, no reason to “tremble [...] at the name of
Magick”; the same magic that explained the weapon-salve explained all natural activity.
Sympathy was spiritual, but that did not make it unnatural or diabolical. Elsewhere, Van
Helmont describes the universal spirit (“the grand and sole causant of all sympathy”)
thus:

… in real verity, it is a more and vital breath of Heaven, a Spirit which
comprehends and cherishes within it self the Sun, and all the herd of
lesser Stars, a minde or intelligence which diffused through all the limbs
or parts of this great Animal, the World, doth inform and regulate the
whole; and so by a certain commerce, communion, and conspiracy of
otherwise-discordant parts, and an harmonious marriage of the distinct
virtues of single essences, doth order and govern the vast engine of the
Universe, according to the unanimous consent of all, who have read and
commented on the true History of Nature. To example, the Solissequous
flowers sensibly observe the travel of the Sun: and the Sea conforms to
either Lunestice, and swells her obsequious tides high in the full, but
shrinks them low again in the Wane of the Moon. In sum; all Creatures by
their life, (let us, the master-piece, and abridgment of all, do homage to
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the Majesty of that King, to whom all things live) essence, existence and
sensation visibly attest the majesty, liberality, and presence of the great
Creator.19
Sympathetic action, then, the visible concord of the activity of creatures even over
a distance, is explicable because all creatures are participants in, and infused by, the
universal spirit of God. As Mercer notes, this explanation of sympathy as arising from the
vital activity of God in every creature resembles the Stoic notion of pneuma. It also
entails that for Van Helmont, all creatures “stand in sympathetic attraction and concord
with everything else and so [are] active.”20 The harmoniousness of the universe is
therefore explicable by this universal perception, activity, and sympathy. This sympathy,
as Mercer notes, varies depending on the similitude of creatures with one another; but it
holds to some degree universally, as all creatures recognise their similarity as beings
imbued with the divine spirit.21
Cavendish, as I have already mentioned and as I will expand upon in far greater
detail later, expounds a view that is in many ways similar. But in her doggedly materialist
hands the position of universal (or near-universal) harmony amongst sensitive creatures
takes on a very different complexion.
To cap off the strange story of the weapon-salve, while it still runs along the same
tracks as the story of sympathy, we return briefly across the Channel to the English
natural philosopher (and sometime privateer) Sir Kenelm Digby. In his Late discourse of
1658, Digby describes his own success at curing the wound of one James Howell. He did
this, he claims, by bathing a bloodied garter that Howell had used to bind his wound in a
basin of water, in which he had dissolved his “powder of sympathy”—a powder of a single
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ingredient (green vitriol, or anhydrous iron (II) sulphate22), rather than the gruesome
bits-and-pieces of human corpses called for by the previous Paracelsian recipes. Digby
describes what happened once the garter touched his solution:

… [Howell] started suddenly, as if he had found some strange alteration in
himself; I asked him what he ailed? I know not what ailes me, but I find
that I feel no more pain, me thinks that a pleasing kind of freshnesse, as it
were a wet cold napkin did spread over my hand, which hath taken away
the inflammation that tormented me before; I replyed since then that you
feel already so good an effect of my medicament, I advise you to cast away
all your playsters, onely keep the wound clean, and in a moderate temper,
twixt heat and cold.23
Digby distinguishes himself from the other true believers of the weapon-salve
because he attempts to give a mechanistic and atomist account of the functioning of his
powder: “there is no need,” he says, “to admit of an action distant from the Patient.”
Rather, there is a “real Communication twixt the one and the other [i.e., the patient and
the bloody garter], viz. of a Balsamical substance [the powder], which corporally
mingleth with the wound.”24 Digby describes how atoms (or “spirits”) of the blood on the
garter, now with the much lighter atoms of the powder adhering to them, are thrown into
the air by heat; at the same time, the wound itself (being inflamed) constantly emanates
spirits which agitate the air around it, causing a constant circulation of new air across
itself. By these mechanisms the vitriol-enhanced blood atoms in the air eventually find
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themselves back at the wound, where they settle back into “their naturall beds, and
primitive receptacles,” healing it.25
There is a kind of sympathy at work here: these atoms, for Digby, are attracted to
others that they resemble—“if it happens that within the air there be found some
dispersed atoms of the same nature, with the body which draws them, the attraction of
such atoms is made more powerfully, then if they were bodies of a different nature.” But
again there is nothing spiritual about this operation. Rather, Digby explains that this
“same nature” consists of physical properties; in the Late discourse he explains that
bodies of the same weight, the same rarity or density, and the same figure or shape are
drawn together and stay together, giving mechanical explanations for how this occurs.26
“It is a poor kind of pusillanimity,” he concludes, “and faintnesse of heart, or rather a
grosse ignorance of the Understanding, to pretend any effects of charm or magick
herein”; “we need not have a recourse to a Demon or Angel” here.27
So in Digby’s hands sympathy and antipathy cease to be real explanatory causes.
In his earlier text Of bodies and of man’s soul he says that “with the bare sounds of
which words most men pay themselvs, without examining what they mean”—these terms
cannot provide explanations, but are themselves in need of explaining by “downright
material qualities.”28 And so when, with all the flourish of an inveterate self-promoter,29
he speaks of the powder of sympathy or the sympathetic cure, he is speaking of a kind or
character of mechanical action—one in which like unifies with like, by means of their
physical similarities—not a mysterious, universal affinity that can only be explained in
spiritual or immaterial terms.
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We have dwelt in some detail on the story of the weapon-salve because, for
Cavendish too, sympathy plays an important role in physics, biology, and medicine—in
fact, in everything. At times, with their emphases on universal feeling, Cavendish’s
explanations resemble the Stoic-influenced vitalism of Van Helmont; at others, with
their zealous and pedantic materialism, they resemble the kind of explanation given by
Digby. But for Cavendish sympathy is not the product of an immaterial force, an
emanation from the Creator; nor is it just a way of characterising the apparentlyaffinitive movements of unliving atoms. Instead, on my reading, it is a feeling of living
matter, born out of itself.

1.2.2 Sympathy as Individual Affection

Before we can turn more fully to Cavendish, however, there is another side to
sympathy that bears investigation: its ethical side. Of course for the likes of Van Helmont
and Fludd a divine emanation from God above could not help but be, all things
considered, a good thing. But for other philosophers sympathy played an important role
in producing ethical goodness. In the seventeenth century, for Gottfried Leibniz and
Anne Conway, sympathy contributed to the ethical ordering of the entire universe—its
presence and action made the universe better than it would otherwise be.30 For our
purposes, however, the more significant development in the concept of sympathy into an
ethical principle was in the eighteenth century. Then, political thinkers tore sympathy
from the heavens and installed it in the human heart, whence it was used as an
explanation for the ethical ordering of human polities. It is to these thinkers, and
particularly Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy, that I will now turn.
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In the eighteenth century, as Ryan Patrick Hanley argues, the shift in the context
of sympathy from the physical to the ethical realm that we noted above is “cemented.”
Sympathy transitioned, Hanley says, from being “a principle primarily dedicated to
explaining connections between substances to a principle dedicated to explaining
connections between human individuals.”31 These connections are perhaps more familiar
to us now under the much-later term empathy: the feelings we associate with imagining
ourselves in another’s place, feeling their pains and joys as our own.
Hanley argues that this change in the usage of sympathy occurred due to the
creation in industrialised nations—the sorts of nations that were producing the sorts of
philosophers we read in those same sorts of nations now—of new social forms that
required in turn new ways for fellow-feeling to exist between people who were part of
larger, and hence less intimate, social units than had previously existed. Sympathy on
Hanley’s thesis is a new force in maintaining the social order, able to replace Christian
love, which—Hanley says—had become less viable following “the secularizing and
skeptical tendencies” of the eighteenth century.32 Sympathy is also, in many cases, less of
a strident ethical requirement than full-fledged love, and thus more suited to the
urbanising and estranging societies of the Enlightenment.
Indeed, sympathy, already a phenomenon with ethical import and power for
Conway and Leibniz, is a preoccupation for many of the big names of eighteenth century
moral theory: Francis Hutcheson, in his Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy of 1742,
harkens to sympathy’s roots in medicine by likening it to a “contagion or infection” by
which our pleasures and joys demand to be shared33; in the Treatise Hume puts
sympathy at the base of our moral sentiments, analogising the similarity of human
minds to “strings all equally wound up,” by which motion—or emotion—can be
31
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communicated from one to all others.34 Sympathy, it seems, is now to be understood as
the propagation of feeling from one human being to another, and it can be leveraged to
explain our moral sentiments and to provide force to political calls for more open, cooperative societies.
In this section, I will look in some depth at two more of the eighteenth century
theorists of sympathy: Adam Smith and Sophie de Grouchy. De Grouchy’s Letters on
Sympathy, published in 1798 as a commentary to her French translation of Smith’s
Theory of Moral Sentiments, constitute a century-capping defence of the ethical primacy
and political importance of sympathy, both in explaining our current societies and in
helping determine our thought about better ones. At times this can seem to resolve itself
into a starry-eyed, though heartening, faith in the moral virtue inherent within
humanity:

What do we not owe to sympathy, even in its faintest glimmerings, since
from that moment sympathy is the first cause of the feeling of humanity,
the effects of which are so precious. It compensates for a portion of the
evils issuing from personal interests in large societies, and it struggles
against the coercive force that we encounter everywhere we go and that
centuries of Enlightenment alone can destroy by attacking the vices that
produced it! Amid the shock of so many passions that oppress the weak or
marginalize the unfortunate, from the bottom of its heart humanity
secretly pleads the cause of sympathy and avenges it from the injustice of
fate by arousing the sentiment of natural equality.35
To see how she reaches these conclusions, and to fully excavate the bases and
workings of sympathy in de Grouchy’s political thought, a comparison with her
interlocutor will be instructive.
Smith describes how sympathy operates at the very beginning of his Theory of
Moral Sentiments. For him, it would seem, in contrast to Hutcheson and Hume—and, as
34
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we shall see shortly, in partial contrast with de Grouchy—sympathy is an operation of
our imaginations. While Hutcheson and Hume see sympathy as a kind of contagion or
harmony, more-or-less naturally propagating between receptive human hearts, for Smith
the mechanism of sympathy is more intellectual.36 “Though our brother is upon the
rack,” he writes, “as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us
of what he suffers.” They are a separate person from us; for Smith their pain does not,
without mediation, leap from them to ourselves. Nevertheless, “that we often derive
sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances
to prove it.”37
Instead of the immediate propagation of feeling, which might hew closer to its
spiritual, quasi-Stoic forebears, then,

it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are
his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than
by representing to what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the
impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our
imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation,
we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were
into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him,
and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something
which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His
agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when have thus
adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then
tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain
or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or
to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in
proportion to the vivacity or dullness of the conception. 38
We are here a long way from sympathy understood as a kind of pre-existing
affinity or connection between similar creatures. Presumably, of course, a condition of
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this imaginative exercise—and perhaps of its degree of vivacity—is still our perception of
our similarity with the person in whose situation we place ourselves. We do not usually
imagine ourselves in the place of a kicked stone or swatted fly, though of course we may;
and that it is a less frequent and surely much weaker feeling than sympathy for the pains
of other humans can be explained by the relatively greater distances in kind that our
imaginations have to cover to do so.
In fact, though, our imagination never covers any distance: sympathy, for Smith,
has no ‘spatial’ character. It is not spread out between feeling individuals; it is not a
relation. As Karin Brown notes, Smith’s concept of sympathy is “individualistic.”39 It is a
feeling for others, but it is generated entirely within ourselves, by ourselves; not given to
us by others or by a relation in which we are both participants.
“Sympathy, therefore,” Smith writes, “does not arise from the view of the passion,
as from that of the situation which excites it.”40 We can sympathise with people on the
basis of their situation, even if the emotion we thereby feel diverges from the real
emotions of the object of our sympathy:

We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be
altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that
passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in
his from the reality. We blush for the impudence and rudeness of another,
though he himself appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his own
behaviour; because we cannot help feeling with what confusion we
ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner.41
Smith goes so far as to say that we can even feel sympathy for the dead in this
manner (“it is miserable, we think, to be deprived of the light of the sun”).42 Though he
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doesn’t say it, this view of sympathy also entails that there is no in-principle reason we
cannot feel sympathy for rocks or flies, if we’re imaginative enough. I think these effects
of Smith’s view grant it a certain intuitive plausibility: it seems we can feel sympathy (or
empathy, we might say now) for people more on the basis of how they might feel than
how they do—and such a tendency does not always have positive effects. But Smith is
able to explain these effects because his view of sympathy as an imaginative exercise
taking place within the individual is one that—as Brown evocatively puts it—“assumes we
are alone first.”43
De Grouchy, instead, starts from the view that “before everything we are similar
and connected.”44 Her resulting conception of sympathy is one that, like those of
Hutcheson and Hume, stays closer to its occult ancestors, rooted as it is in mutuallyrecognised similarity.
Unlike Smith, who—as de Grouchy herself notes—observes the obviousness of the
existence of our feeling of sympathy against having to explain its origin, and is content
just to explain the mechanism by which sympathetic feelings are generated by the
imagination, de Grouchy is concerned to explain whence the tendency to have such
feelings comes. “I regretted,” she writes, “that he did not dare to go further, to penetrate
its first cause, and ultimately to show how sympathy must belong to every sensible being
capable of reflection.”45
Even here, at the beginning of the first of her Letters, de Grouchy carefully yokes
together intellect and affect in her account of sympathy: “every sensible being capable of
reflection.” She explains the necessity of sympathy to all such creatures with reference,
first, to an investigation of the workings of pain. She notes that the immediate moment
of pain contains two separable sensations: a “local” pain, in whatever part of our body is
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currently afflicted; and “a painful general impression in all our organs, an impression
very distinct from the local pain and that always accompanies the latter, but that can
continue to exist without it.”46
This general impression appears to be the emotional aversion or unpleasantness
that we feel alongside specific, localised pains—hence its ability to persist beyond the
existence of those pains. De Grouchy describes a “general feeling of malaise” that can
often last for a long time after the cessation of particularised pains, “because the organs
that are the principal seat of that general impression are the most essential for vital
functions as well as for the faculties that make us sensitive and intelligent”—again
suggesting that this general impression of pain is an emotional response.
This general impression returns to us whenever we remember our particular
injuries and pains. And, as soon as we have become sufficiently acquainted with this
feeling and its causes, we can come to feel it even apart from our own pains:

In the same way as the memory of an injury we have felt reproduces the
painful impression that affected all our organs that formed part of the
local pain this injury caused us, so, too, we feel this painful impression
again when, being in a position to note the signs of pain, we see an
impressionable being suffer or whom we know suffers.
In effect, as soon as the development of our faculties and the
repeated experience of pain permit us to have an abstract idea of it, that
alone renews in us the general impression mady by pain on all our organs.
47

Here, there, lies the root of sympathy, at least insofar as it pertains to the physical
pains of others: one part of our own sensation of pain—our general impression of it—is
reproduced when we encounter its mere idea. This idea, as long as our sensibility is
sufficiently acute and our intelligence attuned to the outward signs of pain, can be
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generated easily enough at the mere sight of pain in others. An analogous, though
weaker, process explains our ability to sympathetically feel the pleasures of others too.48
The distinction between Smith and de Grouchy here is subtle but significant. For
Smith, we feel the pains of others indirectly—by imagining ourselves in their place. From
this it follows that we can feel even pains that are not felt by others, if we imagine that we
would if we were in their place. For de Grouchy, by contrast, we feel the pains of others
directly, albeit lacking the localised pain of their particular affliction. As for Smith, our
capacity to feel sympathy is dependent upon, and responsive to, our reflective faculties:
physicians and surgeons, de Grouchy says, are able to block the sympathetic propagation
to themselves of the pains of their patients by their knowledge that such pain is all to the
good.49 In this we are no more strings wound to the same note, moved by the same
vibrations, for de Grouchy than we are for Smith. But the “general impression of pain”
that we feel when observing the pains of others is precisely the same general impression
that we have of our own. Though there is no mystical force at work here, we are hence
much more intimately connected with one another on de Grouchy’s picture than we are
on Smith’s—sympathy spreads among us along the channels of our affective and
intellectual machinery, which are of the same kind, if not of the same degree of
sensitivity or control, in every person.
De Grouchy explains that our capacity to sympathise with others begins “in the
crib,” at our first realisation of the dependency of our happiness and well-being on the
care, and therefore happiness and well-being, of others.50 As Brown notes, in this respect
de Grouchy’s ethics resembles a feminist ethics of care avant la lettre.51 And this
sympathy, induced by the care of others for us, causes us—as we become more sensitive
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and reflective as we age, if properly nurtured—to extend our sympathetic feelings yet
further. In large societies, we rapidly come to understand our similarity to, and
dependence on, a great many other people, and our sympathy follows behind this
realisation.52
From this basis, much follows. For our purposes, most important is the role that
sympathy plays in the creation and maintenance of ethical and political order. Our
principles of moral goodness and badness are derived from sympathy: our ability to feel
the pains of others is compounded and intensified by our own pains when we grasp that
we are the cause of those others’ misfortunes; likewise our capacity to feel pleasure in the
happiness of others can be joined by a pleasure in having been the cause of that
happiness.53 These second-order pleasures and pains can also persist beyond the
immediate moment of their cause and can be reignited by memory; and, like sympathy
itself, with adequate intellectual reflection and generalisation we can derive from these
sentiments our moral principles:

This more lasting feeling of satisfaction or pain connected to the
recollection of the good or harm we have done to others is necessarily
modified by reflection. And the modification which reflections entails lead
us to the idea of moral good or evil and to the first and eternal rule that
judges men before the laws, a rule that so few laws have consecrated or
developed, that so many others have violated, and that prejudices have so
often and absurdly stifled!54
We are hence, thanks to our sympathy, naturally good creatures, at least in
potentia, and it is only where social institutions have stifled our sensitivity and perverted
our reason that we become cruel and selfish. Further abstraction through reason leads us
to rights, as “preference[s] commanded by reason itself in favor of a particular
52
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individual,”55 and thence to justice, which is merely the character of actions in
conformity with right.56 The moral correctness of all this abstraction is confirmed to us in
our sentiments, which are more greatly pained by an injustice than by “a simple
wrong.”57 Sympathy, then, beginning just as the pain we feel on observing the pain of
those that nurture us, underpins—through a rigorous rational progression—morality,
human rights, and justice. And yet despite this progression, confirmed as much by our
sentiments as it is by reason, it is easy enough for us to be led away from all these things
in irrationally organised societies.
As we saw in the quotation that opened this section, de Grouchy sees sympathy as
an important—the important—counter to “the evils issuing from personal interests in
large societies.” It is notable that she specifies that it is in large societies that these
personal interests arise. Selfishness is not a natural human disposition, against which
sympathy must function as a salutary check to an increasing degree as societies grow
larger and more urban and egoistic beings increasingly rub up against one another.
Rather, selfishness is a socially constructed phenomenon, and we, in our modern urban
polities, would be in an even worse position than we are were not our natural sympathy—
arising, originally, from the apprehension by our affective-cognitive faculties of our
dependence on others—struggling gamely against this younger threat.
“In society,” she writes in the fourth letter,

A vicious system of legislation, instead of uniting the interests of
individuals, has set them at odds. Human greed has led men to the point
where they all cannot satisfy these social fantasies at the same time, social
fantasies that, turned into habits, have usurped the name of needs. From
childhood these men tacitly acquire the habit of perceiving misfortunes
and the goods of others as a given which fortune has bestowed on them
for their own enjoyment. Civilized man, if he is governed by prejudices
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and bad laws, is thus naturally envious and jealous—and increasingly so,
as vices of social institutions separate him further from nature, corrupt
his reason, and make his happiness depend on the satisfaction of a greater
number of needs.58
Bad institutions hence create incentives for us to be selfish, possessive and
envious, suppressing our natural tendency to sympathy. De Grouchy is a strong advocate
of an education that would nurture the affective sensitivity and abstract thought
necessary to work from our own sympathetic feelings to the principles of justice and
right as she does in the letters:

What an immense labor remains for education, not to develop or direct
nature, but only to preserve nature’s beneficent inclinations, to prevent
them from being stifled by prejudices that are so well accepted and
common and that totally corrupt any sense of humanity and equality.
These sentiments are as necessary for the the moral happiness of each
individual as they are for maintaining fairness and security in all relations
in the social order!59
In addition to education, however, undoing human beings’ socially-implanted
selfishness requires extensive political reform for de Grouchy. She claims that the four
artificial needs that have been implanted into us by society, and that are the cause of all
unjust action, are jealous or possessive love, desire for money, ambition, and vanity.60 All
these things are encouraged and sparked by existing social structures, and would
dissipate in a society with rational institutions— impoverishment, for instance, caused by
laws that at present “favour the inequality of fortunes,” silences or overrides the natural
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sympathy of the poor and makes them more likely to act unjustly from sheer need:
“conscience,” she writes evocatively, “soon fades when entangled by chains.”61
Law and other social institutions, therefore, must be rationally constructed such
that they encourage, rather than suppress, our natural sympathies and desire to do good.
Punishments under law must not be so nasty or disproportionate that we are blocked by
our sympathy from administering them or from turning wrongdoers into the authorities;
nor must they be applied unequally due to social privileges, wealth, or status. Under the
current conditions of brutality and inequality, people distrust and dislike the law, which
causes crime to propagate, rights to be threatened, and suspicion, fear, and envy to
overrun sympathy. If the law is consistently applied and punishments are made
reasonable, then people’s increased security will reverse the degradation of their
sympathies:

The social order, in preserving man his natural rights, would put men in
the optimal position to lead them to mutually respect these rights, and
then these rights would be guaranteed by the interest in each individual’s
happiness and tranquility even more than by the laws.62
Here we can see the finer mechanics of de Grouchy’s firm belief in the connection
between sympathy and order. To the extent that contemporary societies are ordered at
all—and for de Grouchy, writing only a few years after her husband died in a prison of
the Terror, this is a questionable proposition—it is in spite of existing laws and
institutions. But she is no anarchist. Rather, she believes that in an ideal and reasonable
polity laws are a catalyst rather than a cause of order. Order arises from our perception
of the rights of others, and our natural, strongly-felt disinclination to override those
rights, both of which arise in turn from our sympathy: order arises, that is, from our
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capacity to feel the emotions and even sensations of others as our own, through our
recognition of our essential similitude, interconnectedness, and mutual dependence.
Though she is a political thinker, writing only of the affective connections
between humans and their consequences, there is much in de Grouchy that echoes the
distant earlier voices of sympathy. Sympathy is an affinity, an emotionally-felt
connectedness and similarity, and it grounds the capacity of otherwise wayward beings
to work together and produce a harmonious social order, even without the direct
intervention of gods, spirits, or lawgivers. For Van Helmont sympathy explains how a
salve can work to cure a distant wound; for de Grouchy it explains how I can desire to aid
those that I’ve never seen in distant places.
In the eighteenth century, thus, sympathy is internalised by humanity, taken out
of nature at large and confined within the individual psyche. It becomes a check upon
our own most selfish desires, making possible (if Hanley is right) the kinds of states and
societies that were developing at the same historical moment. The cost, of course, is that
sympathy ceases to be the kind of relation that can hold between the non-human
elements of nature; while human actions can be explained by these fine (and less fine)
moral sentiments, the actions of the brute matter of the universe must be explained in
mechanistic, lifeless terms.
But for Cavendish no such cost is incurred. It is with all these parallel threads in
mind that we can finally turn to her, and to the question of just how and to what extent
order is manifested in her image of Nature—an image that is, as much as that of the
polity is for de Grouchy or Smith, irreducibly a social one.

1.3 Cavendish’s Sympathetic Universe
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1.3.1 Cavendishean Nature

De Grouchy, then, in fine republican tradition, is able to show that social order
needn’t necessitate top-down legislation or control. Rather, it can bubble up from the
mass of the polity itself, thanks to a natural emotional and reflective endowment held by
each individual within that polity. In the forthcoming I will argue that this model is the
best way for us to think through the orderliness of Nature in Margaret Cavendish’s
metaphysics; and in so doing I hope also to show how her conception of sympathy can be
read as standing at a unique, and complex, historical intersection. To get there, I will first
sketch the building blocks of Cavendish’s metaphysical system, and then turn to the
contemporary debate regarding how this system is to be ordered.
Cavendish is a thoroughgoing materialist. In the early Poems, and Fancies
(1653), she appears to be an atomist, as described in many of her poems:

Small Atomes of themselves a World may make,
As being subtle, and of every shape:
And as they dance about, fit places finde,
Such Formes as best agree, make every kinde.63
I say “appears” because there is much controversy regarding how seriously to
take any of Cavendish’s metaphysical claims, particularly in this avowedly fanciful early
work, in which, as Jay Stevenson notes, much of the text is presented by Cavendish as
being digression, distraction, idle imagining, or the therapeutic discharge of unruly
thoughts.64 Stevenson argues that all this is to Cavendish’s favour in her presentation of a
true vitalist atomism, in which even thoughts may be made from the contrary moments
of independent atoms. He gives a Straussian reading that suggests that her later
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disavowal of atomism (beginning, it seems, in her Philosophical and physical opinions of
1655) is not as strong as it appears, and more strategic than substantive.65
For my part, I am persuaded by Detlefsen’s argument against this reading of
Cavendish,66 and will proceed taking her later rejection of atomism, and endorsement of
plenism, at face value—as expressed, with more or less consistency, in the Philosophical
and physical opinions, the Philosophical letters (1664), the Observations upon
experimental philosophy (1666), and the Grounds of natural philosophy (1668).
Significant, however, for my purposes is Stevenson’s emphasis on Cavendish’s belief
that, however matter is organised or divided, it always carries the potential for
dissolution, disorder, and conflict: “order,” he writes, “for Cavendish is not absolute, or
even rational in a Hobbesian sense, but contingent on the interplay of autonomous,
independent forces.”67 This is true whether Cavendish endorses atomism or plenism; and
I think that my forthcoming sympathetic explanation for the inherence of (some)
orderliness in Nature can equally apply to either reading.
Nevertheless, let us understand Cavendish as endorsing the view that all of
Nature is comprised of an infinite, and infinitely divisible, material plenum, without
interruption or vacuum. Everything, hence, is material: there may be spirits and there is
certainly a God, but—as material beings with material brains within which are material
thoughts—we cannot even think of such things. Everything that we experience, and
indeed everything that happens, must be explicable in terms of matter and its motion—
and indeed, perhaps, matter and motion are ultimately the same thing.68 All matter
contains, or has, three aspects or “degrees”—inanimate, sensitive, and rational—that are
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infinitely commingled; that is, mixed such that no part of matter, however divided, is
small enough that it does not contain all three.69
Inanimate matter is brute matter, dumb and (of course) immobile; sensitive
matter is animate, able to perceive other parts of nature around it, and able too to move
inanimate matter when it moves; and rational matter is rarefied, agile, and able to move
the most freely; so rare and agile, in fact, that it cannot move inanimate matter with it.
All motion in Nature is hence explained by the free self-generated motion of matter
itself; because everything is animate, there is never any transfer of motion between
different bodies. This is most strikingly illustrated in the Philosophical letters, where
Cavendish explains that a body falling into snow does not, itself, move the snow to create
its own imprint. Rather, the rational and sensitive matter which constitute the snow
perceive the falling body and pattern out themselves—the sensitive matter hauling
inanimate matter with it—into the body’s shape.70 All changes and processes in Nature,
from learning to medicine, can be explained thus.
As both the sensitive and rational forms of matter have life and knowledge, all of
Nature has life and knowledge.71 The creatures of Nature are, of course, formed by the
free self-motion of their constituent parts:

All Creatures are Composed-Figures, by the consent of Associating Parts,
they joyn into such, or such a figured Creature: And though every
Corporeal Motion, or Self-moving Part, hath its own motion; yet, by their
Association, they all agree in proper actions, as actions proper to their
Compositions: and, if every particular Part, hath not a perception of all
the parts of their Association; yet, every Part knows its own Work.72

69

Ibid 3-5
Cavendish PL 104
71
Cavendish GNP 6-7
72
Ibid 17
70

58

At this early juncture in the Grounds, then, Cavendish seeks to explain the
persistence and consistency through time of the bodies of natural creatures with
reference to the rational agreement and “consent” of their constituent parts. A
“Composed-Figure”—such as you or I, a partridge or a hawk, a chair or a desk, a rock or a
tree—here resembles nothing so much as a social organisation, an organic collective or
commune of self-moving, freely associating parts. Indeed it is striking that Cavendish
explains here how a rock or partridge or I can exist and hold together (albeit imperfectly,
as shown by disease and death and the like) without recourse to any kind of top-down
authority. But as the controversy among contemporary Cavendish scholars regarding
orderliness demonstrates, she does seem to resort to such an authority at times—
understanding Nature, it seems, either as an imperial lawgiver, giving commands from
on high that have more or less efficacy, or as a kind of tinkerer that reaches directly into
the motions of all her parts to guide them.
The character, extent, and—importantly—provenance of this ordering authority is
the central concern of this section of the chapter, a concern with which a deeper
contextual understanding of Cavendishean sympathy can help us. Once we have an
image of how sympathy functions for Cavendish, one that can be illuminated by the
historical context of the preceding sections, it will be possible, I think, to show that
neither of the conceptions of the authority of Nature given above are necessary to explain
her orderliness. It is, hence, to how Cavendish presents sympathy that I turn next.

1.3.2 Cavendishean Sympathy

Fixing precisely what the terms sympathy and antipathy mean for Cavendish is a
complicated endeavour. One of the central theses of this chapter is that Cavendish, by
virtue of the unique affective-vitalist character of her metaphysics, exhibits both the early
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causal-explanatory and the later ethical-ordering tendencies of sympathy in her own
usage of the term. Naturally, given her own position in the history of the term, she never
states this explicitly. Coming to this conclusion is therefore a matter of reconstruction
from the available textual evidence.
The most overt statement about sympathy in Cavendish is in the fifteenth of the
third section of her Philosophical letters.73 The letter is striking for numerous reasons.
Like the other letters in the third section, it is addressed to a hypothetical female
interlocutor (“MADAM”), but it concerns the work of Van Helmont, referred to by
Cavendish as “your Author”74:

MADAM, [...] Concerning Sympathy and Antipathy, and attractive or
magnetick Inclinations, which some do ascribe to the influence of the
Stars, others to an unknown Spirit as the Mover, others to the Instinct of
Nature, hidden Proprieties, and certain formal Vertues; but your Author
doth attribute to directing Ideas, begotten by their Mother Charity, or a
desire of Good Will, and calls it a Gift naturally inherent in the
Archeusses of either part: If you please to have my opinion thereof, I
think they are nothing else but plain ordinary Passions and Appetites.75
There is an undeniable, and doubtless self-conscious, bathos in the precipitous
fall from the divine Archeus of Van Helmont—that spirit that comes from God and
grounds the sympathetic connection of all creatures—to the “plain ordinary Passions and
Appetites” of Cavendish. Wacky as her metaphysics may appear to contemporary
readers, with its sentient snow and the like, Cavendish is a hard-nosed realist in her own
idiosyncratic way. She will have nothing to do with the spirits of Van Helmont. After all,
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who is able to conceive all those Chymaeras and Fancies of the Archeus,
Ferment, various Ideas, Blas, Gas, and many more, which are neither
something nor no-thing in Nature, but betwixt both, except a man have
the same Fancies, Visions and Dreams, your Author had?76
Such things are hallucinatory nonsense for Cavendish. “Nature is easie to be
understood,” she writes, “and without any difficulty, so we stand in no need to frame so
many strange names, able to fright any body.”77 Understanding sympathy, then, like
understanding anything else, oughtn’t be a complex matter, and we certainly can’t help
ourselves to spiritual emanations or hidden properties where our understandings falter.
Hence we should should emphasise the plainness and ordinariness of the passions and
appetites that, for Cavendish, comprise sympathy.
The bathetic juxtaposition of the seemingly magical, the scientific, and the plainly
human is a frequent literary technique of Cavendish’s, and she deploys it with notable
effect in the letter on sympathy. In comparing the “many sorts of Sympathyes and
Antipathyes, or Attractions and Aversions,” she brings in the famous weapon-salve, in
comparison to magnets and compasses:

In some subjects, Sympathy requires a certain distance; as for example in
Iron and Loadstone; for if the Iron be too far off, the Loadstone cannot
exercise its power, when as in other subjects, there is no need of any such
distance, as betwixt the Needle and the North-pole, as also the Weaponsalve; for the Needle will turn it self towards the North, whether it be near
or far off from the North-pole; and so, be the Weapon which inflicted the
wound, never so far from the wounded Person, as they say, yet it will
nevertheless do its effect.78
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The diversity of examples of sympathetic action arrayed by Cavendish is
reminiscent of that of Sennert, above, dismissively noting that the believers of the
weapon-salve seek to explain everything from cat allergies to the effectiveness of
astrology with reference to a “hidden Sympathy or Magnetisme as they call it.” As well as
magnets, compasses, and the weapon-salve, Cavendish explains sympathy with reference
to infectious diseases, the feelings of men for one another, “good Cheer draw[ing]
abundance of People,” the attraction of predators to prey, humans and animals’ food
preferences, flowers turning toward the sun, “faithful Servants watch[ing] and wait[ing]
for their Master,” “hungry Beggars at a rich man’s door,” the migration of birds, the
feelings of herself (Cavendish) for her hypothetical interlocutor, and, surely to be saved
for last:

I have seen an Ape, drest like a Cavelier, and riding on Horse-back with
his sword by his side, draw a far greater multitude of People after him,
then a Loadstone of the same bigness of the Ape would have drawn Iron;
and as the Ape turn’d, so did the People, just like as the Needle turns to
the North; and this is but one object in one kind of attraction, viz.
Novelty: but there be Millions of objects besides.79
While Sennert gathers his menagerie with the aim of showing the presumption of
those, like Van Helmont, that would seek to ground the effectiveness of the salve in a
force that pervades all Nature, Cavendish—apparently herself a believer in the salve—
gathers hers to show the wide variety of effects that are explicable by her own, nonmystical, conception of sympathy. As well as emphasising the mundanity of sympathy by
showing that, even in the cases of the weapon-salve or the movement of flowers, it is just
the same feeling that humans—including Cavendish herself—sometimes have for one
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another, she also explicitly reiterates its “ordinariness” and “plainness” twice more in the
letter:

As I said in the beginning, Sympathy is nothing else but natural Passions
and Appetites, as Love, Desire, Fancy, Hunger, Thirst, &c. and its effects
are Concord, Unity, Nourishment, and the like: But Antipathy is Dislike,
Hate, Fear, Anger, Revenge, Aversion, Jealousie, &c. and its effects are
Discord, Division, and the like.80
The regularities—with the inclusion of the weapon-salve, the precise same
regularities—that for Van Helmont and Fludd are explained by a quasi-spiritual force
permeating the firmament are hence explained by Cavendish as arising from
commonplace emotions. Indeed, in the above quotation we see that for Cavendish
sympathy is not a single thing at all, but a name for a set of emotions that have concord
and unity as an effect—with antipathy being the converse. It is notably strange, however,
that she includes hunger and thirst—not obviously positive feelings—amongst the
passions of sympathy. What they have in common, of course, with love, desire, and
fancy, is that they too draw creatures toward other creatures: “the Wolf’s stomack,” she
writes, “hath a sympathy to food, which causes him to draw neer, or run after those
Creatures he has a mind to feed on.”81
Perhaps this shows that sympathy is still a confused notion for Cavendish: the
mixture between physical explanation and individual feeling that is evident throughout
her account of sympathy, as well as in her metaphysics more widely understood, includes
little quirks like this one that elides love and hunger. But, though we might think of
hunger as being a generalised feeling that does not always have a particular object, for
Cavendish to hunger is clearly transitive. She writes that sympathy needn’t be a
reciprocated feeling:
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Neither is it required, that all Sympathy and Antipathy must be mutual, or
equally in both Parties, so that that part or party, which has a
Sympathetical affection or inclination to the other, must needs receive the
like sympathetical affection from that part again; for one man may have a
sympathetical attraction to another man, when as this man hath an
antipathetical aversion to him; and the same may be, for ought we know,
betwixt Iron and the Loadstone, as also betwixt the Needle and the North;
for the Needle may have a sympathy towards the North, but not again the
North towards the Needle; and so may the Iron have towards the
Loadstone, but not again the Loadstone towards the Iron.82
With an understanding of this unreciprocated sympathy in hand, Cavendish’s
inclusion of hunger and thirst alongside love makes more sense: to hunger for something
is surely to have a motivation to positive action in its direction, even if—as in the case of
the wolf’s stomach—it’s a stretch to imagine that the object of that attention feels the
same way.
The above-quoted passage, however, is remarkable for other reasons. It shows
the distance of Cavendish’s departure from Van Helmont and his ilk in her
understanding of sympathy. Like the later eighteenth century writers, she has decisively
torn it from the heavens, broken it up, and propagated it out into the mass of individual
creatures, with all of the contradiction and disagreement that such an action entails. No
longer a peaceful unifying force suffusing all things, sympathy becomes the individual
possession of individuals; causing them, to be sure, often to act in one another’s
interests, to imitate one another, to draw close to one another—“proceeding,” as
Cavendish puts it, “from an internal sympathetical love and desire to please”83—but with
no hard-and-fast rules and certainly no requirement of balance or equality. As passions
and appetites, sympathy and antipathy can have chaotic, unpredictable, unbalanced
effects.
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Unlike the eighteenth century theorists, however, who also see sympathy as an
individual feeling, Cavendish does not confine sympathy to the human or even to the
animal world. She helps herself to sympathy as a causal explanation for a great many of
the phenomena of the natural world, from magnets to flowers to magical cures. Indeed,
as I shall argue shortly, I don’t believe that the (imperfect) order of Cavendish’s material
universe is explicable without reference to the individual sympathetic passions of its
creatures. So once again Cavendishean sympathy is brought closer to that of de Grouchy:
for both women, a feeling within separate individuals is the cause of self-ordering and
self-organisation.
Before moving to order as such, however, it will be helpful to consider briefly
what the claim that sympathy is a passion or appetite entails for Cavendish. A clue is
visible at the end of the letter on sympathy, where she restates its ordinariness:

And thus, to shut up my discourse, I repeat again, that sympathy and
antipathy are nothing else but ordinary Passions and Appetites amongst
several Creatures, which Passions are made by the rational animate
Matter, and the Appetites by the sensitive, both giving such or such
motions, to such or such Creatures; for cross motions in Appetites and
Passions make Antipathy, and agreeable motions in Appetites and
Passions make Sympathy, although the Creatures be different, wherein
these motions, Passions and Appetites are made; and as without an object
a Pattern cannot be, so without inherent or natural Passions and
Appetites there can be no Sympathy or Antipathy.84
Her remark about “inherent or natural Passions and Appetites” suggests that they
are essential qualities of, respectively, rational and sensitive matter. This would mean
that all matter in the universe, containing as it does both rational and sensitive aspects,
has the capacity for passions and appetites and hence, also, the capacity for sympathy. I
think this is the correct understanding of Cavendish’s metaphysics. If so, then her tight
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integration of passion and appetite with rationality and sensitivity is another wrinkle in
Cavendish’s thought that sets her apart from a dominant intellectual tradition that sets
rationality as separate from, and often superior to, emotion.
To confirm this reading, however, we should turn to precisely what Cavendish
says about the passions elsewhere in her work. The fifth and sixth parts of the Grounds,
about human beings, contain a remarkable materialist account of the passions in which
Cavendish associates different emotions with different kinds of motion amongst the
rational parts of the human creature, or of motion of the rational parts with respect to
the sensitive parts:

When some of the Rational Parts move sympathetically, to some of the
Sensitive Perceptions; and those Sensitive Parts sympathize to the Object,
it is Love. If they move antipathetically to the Object, it is Hate. When
those Rational and Sensitive Motions, make many and quick repetitions
of those sympathetical actions, it is Desire and Appetite. When those
Parts move variously, (as concerning the Object) but yet sympathetically
(concerning their own Parts) it is Inconstancy. When those Motions move
cross towards the Object, and are perturbed, it is Anger. But when those
perturbed Motions are in confusion it is Fear.85
And so on and so forth, down to the passions associated with dilation (joy),
contraction (grief), contraction plus attraction (covetousness), dilation plus sympathy
(generosity), et cetera. It will be noted, first, that this is another wonderful example of
Cavendish’s commonsensical approach to materialism; but it will be noted, also, that in
all this great list sympathy appears not as its own particular passion—as do pride, pity,
horror, good-nature, et al—but rather alongside contraction, dilation, and attraction as a
kind or character of motion from which the ‘higher-level’ passions can arise. This is
reminiscent of Digby’s account of sympathy, in which it is again just a way of
characterising a kind of harmonious motion that has a mechanical-atomist explanation.
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Sympathetic motion, as we have seen multiple times, is for Cavendish agreeable motion:
it is the kind of concord of motion that occurs when separate parts decide to move with
one another, in unity or harmony. And if this unity or harmony of motion occurs
between the rational and the sensitive parts, and between the sensitive parts and an
external object, we call it love.
Does this mean that Cavendish is just confused or incoherent when she describes
sympathy as resulting from love in the Letters while describing love as resulting from
sympathy in the Grounds? I don’t think so; I think there is a deeper explanation that has
the virtue of being properly Cavendishean.
First, we must ask what causes parts to move together in sympathetic ways—what
motivates them to do so. In the letter, Cavendish—in speaking of reciprocal sympathy in
particular—says that agreeable sympathy, “a conforming of the actions of one party, to
the actions of the other,” proceeds from “an internal sympathetical love and desire to
please.”86 If Cavendish were an atomist, the parallelism of this explanation would be
pernicious circularity: at some point, she’d have to decide whether sympathy causes love
or love causes sympathy. In the Poems, and Fancies, indeed, when she is an atomist, she
does suggest that atoms just have sympathy innately: “By Sympathy, Atomes are fixed
so, / As past some Principles they do not go.”87
But circularity of this kind is not a problem for Cavendish the theorist of the
infinitely divisible plenum. Recall that for her as far as one divides matter one will find
rational, sensitive, and inanimate aspects; and as far as one divides matter one will find
corporeal motion. This means that the very idea of differing levels of description does not
apply in Cavendish’s universe; any bit of matter, no matter how small, can be understood
simultaneously at all levels of description; it is always a moving part and always made up
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of moving parts. Indeed everything in Nature is both citizen of a society and a society
itself. One can explain sympathetic motions by love, and love by sympathetic motions,
because one can always penetrate deeper into matter and always find both. If I wish to
explain the love that I feel, I can point to the sympathetic motions of my rational parts; if
I then wish to explain that sympathetic motion, I can point to the love those parts have
for one another; if I wish to explain that love, I can point to the sympathetic motion of
their own parts; and so on into the infinite guts of the universe. There is no level of
complexity necessary for passions that we cannot find in the thinnest imaginable slices of
being and beyond.
This also explains another seeming contradiction. Digby argued that sympathy
was just a name for a particular kind of motion that was explicable in physical-atomist
terms. Cavendish frequently suggests both that sympathy is innate to matter and that it
is a kind of motion between separate parts. Again, for an atomist this is a contradiction.
But for a plenist it is no problem at all. Sympathy can be both innate to matter and a
characteristic of the motor interaction of separate parts of matter because to be made of
the motion of separate parts is, itself, innate to matter. It’s motion, interaction, and
therefore agreement (and disagreement) all the way down. If this is incoherent, the
problem lies in the idea of infinite divisibility itself.
Sympathy, then, along with the other passions, must be innate to matter as a
consequence of the innateness of rationality, sensitivity, and motion. As far as we
penetrate into the plenum we will find agreement, love, and sympathy—alongside their
negative converses. As I stated at the outset, for Cavendish sympathy is both a
particularised feeling of love or connection that individuals have for one another and a
phenomenon suffused into every corner of the universe, there to explain all kinds of
physical processes. It is not put there by God or by any of his vicegerents—it is already
there in matter. And, I argue in the forthcoming, it can explain how that universe can
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appear so ordered without necessitating any such top-down rule; including from Nature
herself.

1.4 The Order of Cavendishean Nature

I contend, therefore, that for Cavendish Nature is societies all the way down, and
all the way up. Explaining how Nature appears ordered is then as much a political
question as a metaphysical one—it is as much a question for political theorists like de
Grouchy as it is for physicists like Van Helmont. And as we have seen, at the beginning of
the Grounds Cavendish does explain how “figures”—that is, individual creatures like
hawks and partridges, rocks and trees, you and me—come to be “composed” by the
“consent of Associating parts” and their “agree[ment] in proper actions.”88 This consent
and agreement is explained by Cavendish, particularly in the Letters, as arising from the
sympathy that individual parts have for one another. It is clear, then, that for Cavendish
sympathy plays an important role in explaining how Nature can appear organised,
coherent, and orderly.
In fact, I argue, sympathy—and its corollary positive emotions, such as
agreeableness and love, with which Cavendish sometimes takes sympathy to be
synonymous—can be used to explain much, or all, of the order that we observe around us
in Nature. The parts of Nature have their own individual sympathetic motivation to act
in orderly fashion, one that is generated from their own parts and not imposed from
above or without. This allows us to assess and intervene in the contemporary debate
regarding the order of Nature in Cavendish from a new direction.
As I noted in my introduction, this disagreement in the contemporary literature
on Cavendish regards the extent to and the method by which Nature is ordered.
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Doubtless this debate in part arises from what appear to be inconsistencies of
Cavendish’s own. She suggests both that real disorder is possible in Nature—we have
already seen that her discussions of sympathy and love are very frequently accompanied
by discussions of antipathy and hate—and, at other times, that Nature is perfectly
regular. On the latter point, David Cunning points to this passage in the Letters:

And as for Irregularities, properly there is none in Nature, for Nature is
Regular; but that, which Man (who is but a small part of Nature, and
therefore but partly knowing) names Irregularities, or Imperfections, is
onely a change and alteration of motions; for a part can know the variety
of motions in Nature no more, then Finite can know Infinite …89
Our judgements of the disorder or irregularity associated with war, disease,
death, et cetera are hence, for Cunning, to be understood as arising from our own
ignorance as limited parts of Nature; looking, perhaps, from her own point of view, we
would see that these changes or alterations in motion were no more disorderly than any
other—as Cunning puts it, “there is no such thing as disorder; instead there are events
that run counter to our parochial expectations and concerns.”90
Of course, this does not entail that there is no conflict or disagreement in Nature;
we have already seen that for Cavendish antipathy and hate are almost as important
explanatory feelings as sympathy and love, that Nature contains cross motions as well as
agreeable ones, discord as well as concord. It just means that those motions that result
from hatred and antipathy, and that run across one another rather than move together,
are—strictly speaking, at the universal level—no more disorderly than those motions that
are agreeable, loving, or sympathetic.
This view is also given by Lisa Walters, who points out that “oppositions which
occur in Nature are necessary for the creation of a variety of figures” and that irregular
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motions are not true disorders but are “necessary aspects of how matter is balanced into
a peaceful order.” “While Nature herself cannot make mistakes as she is a whole, infinite
body,” Walters writes, “the individual parts within her make local errors of perception
because they lack the capacity to comprehend Nature in its entirety.”91
There are, I think, a number of problems with this view, and in particular with
the notion that disorders are balanced out in creating a perfectly regular universe. The
first problem is that Cavendish at times suggests that the perfect regularity of Nature is
just the result of her being a single, infinite individual. Walters, for instance, cites a
passage in the Observations upon experimental philosophy in which Cavendish says,
explicitly, that all Nature’s actions “are ballanced by their opposites; as for example,
there is no dilation but hath opposite to it contraction; no condensation but has its
opposite, viz. rarefaction,” et cetera, “All which produces a peaceable, orderly, and wise
Government in Natures Kingdom.”92 She then goes on to say that

although the actions of Nature are opposite, yet Nature, in her own
substance is at peace, because she is one and the same; that is, one
material body, and has nothing without her self to oppose and cross her;
neither is she subject to a general change, so as to alter her own substance
from being Matter, for she is Infinite; but because she is selfmoving, and
full of variety of figures, this variety cannot be produced without variety of
actions, no not without opposition; which opposition is the cause, that
there can be no extreams in particulars; for it ballances each action, so
that it cannot run into infinite, which otherwise would breed a horrid
confusion in Nature.93
The first half of this long sentence implies that the orderliness of Nature is a
trivial point in that it results just from her being a single individual, with “nothing
without her self to oppose and cross her”; that is, nothing with respect to which she can
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be disordered. If this is right, Nature can no more be disordered than can a helium atom
in an infinite vacuum; disorder requires interaction, and Nature, from her own infinite
viewpoint, interacts with nothing. This would also explain why Cavendish qualifies the
passage about the regularity of Nature in the Letters with “properly”: it is a technical
point, trivially true but substantively false.
This is a minor point, and not one that I believe can take much interpretive
weight, especially as later in the same sentence Cavendish says that things balance out
within Nature’s body in some way too. The deeper and more troubling problem for this
view is the question of how this balancing occurs. Nature, we know, is infinitely wise by
virtue of her being an infinite plenum of rational and perceptive matter. But the
centrepiece of all Cavendish’s metaphysics is that that matter is able to move itself, which
means that—individual parts not being infinitely wise, but limited and made stupid by
their finitude—it should be possible for them to move in ways that contradict this fine
balance.
What’s more, if Nature herself somehow acts to keep this balance, we must limit
ourselves to explaining that action strictly in terms of matter and its motion, which for
Cavendish constitutes the full extent of the contents of the universe. If Nature reaches
into her own innards to ensure that a big outbreak of discord here is balanced out by a
concordant pressure there, we cannot turn for aid to a tinkering God or to the spiritual,
sympathetic emanations of Fludd or Van Helmont to explain how she does this. My
concern is that Nature’s balancing act cannot be explained without improperly deifying
or spiritualising her, attributing to her a power that extends beyond the limits of
Cavendish’s physics.
The most substantive problem here was identified by Karen Detlefsen, who
argues that this image of Nature as perfectly and wholly self-organising at the universal
level contradicts Cavendish’s commitment to occasional causation—that is, the thesis
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that all parts of Nature are the principal causes of their own motion, with other creatures
acting only as occasions for that motion.94 Allowing that Nature’s parts are their own
causes allows that they can act freely95; and allowing that they can act freely allows that
they can make moral and epistemological mistakes based on their limited knowledge.96
Such mistakes inevitably manifest themselves as disorders within Nature. This explains
Cavendish’s apparently strong commitment to the real evil and disorder of civil wars and
disease.97 In her explanation in the Grounds of how “cordials” function to rid the body of
disease, she combines these two preoccupations:

… in Disputes between Two different Parties, a Third may come into the
assistance of one Side, more out of hate to the Opposite, than love to the
Assisted. The same may Cordials, or such like Applications, do, when the
Corporeal Motions of Human Life are in disorder, and at variance: for,
oftentimes, there is as great a Mutiny and Disorder amongst the
Corporeal Motions, both in the Mind and Body of a Man, as in a Publick
State in time of Rebellion: but, all Assistant Cordials, endeavour to assist
the Regular Parts of the Body, and to perswade the Irregular Parts. As for
Poysons, they are like Forrein War, that endeavours to destroy a
Peaceable Government. 98
This is a particularly useful example of Cavendish’s frequent combination of the
natural or physical and the political or social. And though the passage does not prove
that the balancing-act view of Nature’s order is false—the disorder of disease is
rebalanced by the use of cordials—it does suggest that she thinks such disorders are of
real ethical import. Indeed, Cavendish expends an inordinate amount of energy in
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explaining how diseases, madness, and other bodily disorders occur, which would be odd
for someone who considers such things to be parochial perceptual mistakes. This, also,
suggests that if there is a perspective from which Nature is perfectly orderly, it is not
ultimately an important one.
Nevertheless, the most significant counter to the balancing-act view is
Detlefsen’s: it is difficult to see how Nature could physically intervene in the actions of
her parts to ensure that order is produced without compromising the freedom of those
parts. This is complicated yet further when we consider that Nature is made up of those
parts, and has no being separate from them. If an act proceeding from Nature’s wisdom
is to be propagated through her infinite body, it must be through the consent and
through the sympathetic motion of the parts that constitute that body, and not through a
unilateral force that cannot exist in Cavendish’s universe. But this would mean not that
Nature acts to balance out order and disorder within her body, but that she suggests or
asks of her parts that they act to balance it out; much as when I raise my arm, a chain of
suggestions, reciprocations, agreements, and sympathies proceeds from the rationalmaterial spark of my brain through all the moving matter of my nerves and muscles to
cause my arm to move in a particular way. It is the principal cause of its motion; my
desire that it move is merely the occasion for it to move itself. (Presumably, when my
arm loses feeling after having been slept upon, and my desire is unable to occasion my
arm to move, it is because somewhere this chain of sympathies is broken—some part of
me is distracted or stroppy.)
This is precisely the view of Nature’s orderliness that Detlefsen proposes.99 She
argues that Nature prescribes regularity within her parts, and that this comes about not
because Nature herself acts as the principal cause of orderly movement—that would
contradict Cavendish’s foundational metaphysical views—but because, being rational
99
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and perceptive, the parts understand this prescription and act in accordance with it. As
Detlefsen notes, the law of Nature is hence closer to the laws of human societies than it is
to the tight mathematical regularity that the term was coming to mean at the time.100
Disorder is real, then, and can be explained as the result of limited and ignorant
creatures misinterpreting or ignoring Nature’s rational prescription toward regularity:

So infinite Nature, as infinitely wise, knows what all the parts of finite
nature ought to do in order to follow the one peaceful law, but finite parts,
which are the source of both the occasional cause and principal cause in
any given interaction between two finite parts, will and act upon their
volitions to either follow or to dissent from the overall, peaceful law, and
what law prescribes in individual causal interactions.101
I think Detlefsen’s critique is correct and her reconstruction of order as resulting
from affective and rational interaction between perceptive parts, rather than as a topdown imposition, is much closer to both the spirit and letter of Cavendish’s metaphysics.
Detlefsen also notes, importantly, that a key plank of Cavendish’s methodology is to use
social interactions between humans—of which we have direct knowledge—to explain how
things work in Nature.102 Or, as Boyle puts it—though perhaps in the opposite direction—
for Cavendish “the mode of organization and values appropriate for human societies can
be found in the natural order itself.”103 This is borne out by passages like those regarding
sympathy in the Letters, where Cavendish moves smoothly from magnets and compasses
to her own feelings for her recipient; further, this is a core insight on which a central
thesis of this chapter—that sympathy for Cavendish is both a personal feeling and an
explanatory power—rests.
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Detlefsen’s position is also given support by other passages, such as this one in
the Letters, which emphasises that individual parts of creatures are free to do as they
please:

… it is impossible, that one single part should be King of the whole
Creature, since Rational and Sensitive Matter is divided into so many
parts, which have equal power and force of action in their turns and
severall imployments; for though Nature is a Monarchess over all her
Creatures, yet in every particular Creature is a Republick, and not a
Monarchy; for no part of any Creature has a sole supreme Power over the
rest.104
Nature then stands in relation to her parts as a queen to her subjects, able to
hand down pronouncements that have power, and have effects, but are not completely
binding or causally determined. Let us reflect on this image for a moment. An important
difference between a monarch and Nature is that a monarch is a separate person from all
her subjects, an individual in some way invested with power, while Nature, it seems, is
entirely and only the sum of her parts. In this sense she resembles more the artificial
person of Hobbes’ commonwealth than an ordinary individual. When Nature prescribes,
of me, that I act regularly or in an orderly fashion, I receive a prescription from an entity
of which I am a constituent part. If there is a law of Nature, I am a participant in its
creation and propagation, and not merely subject to it—though Cavendish mightn’t
accept it, an extreme consequence of this view would be that Nature and her laws are just
the general will of the infinitely divisible (and divided) universal community.
We needn’t run to this extreme, however, to reflect further on this line of thought
about the composition of Nature. If, as Detlefsen persuasively argues, the law of Nature
is a rational suggestion or command, we should ask ourselves how this command is
communicated and, indeed, what it’s like to receive it. Though Cavendish emphasises the
104
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explanatory power of ordinary human experience, we oughtn’t trust our own perceptions
too closely for this reflection; humans, after all, seem to act in much more chaotic and
unpredictable ways than other creatures, like rocks or planets. Perhaps those creatures
have a more direct or clear experience of Nature’s law towards order than we do—Boyle
notes that, for Cavendish, humans differ from other creatures in that we suffer from
ambition and pride, which may well cloud our perception of the law.105
We should, however, work with what we have: and from our perspective, I think,
any motivation toward regularity we have seems to come more from within than without.
We do not feel an external pressure from an infinitely wise being to act in a harmonious
and orderly fashion; rather, much in the vein of Hume or Smith or, especially, de
Grouchy, our motivations to create order and ameliorate disorder seem to arise from our
own feelings. If we were to attempt to describe our moral phenomenology in eighteenthcentury terms, we might indeed say that it is because of our sympathy for the individual
creatures immediately around us that we act in roughly orderly ways, and not because of
an ethical commitment that we have to orderliness writ large across the universe. As
Cavendish emphasises in her letter, sympathy is the individual possession of individual
creatures, and it seems to be that possession that motivates them to act in orderly ways,
not any kind of external commandment.
From this observation there are three paths that can be taken. We might say that
the sympathetic desire to act in orderly ways in one’s immediate surroundings is,
precisely, the universal law of Nature that Detlefsen identifies. Nature the monarchess,
then, propagates her law not through external commands but through the emotional and
rational motivations of her creatures. In de Grouchean fashion, we might even note that
when we fail to act harmoniously it is still because of an ignorance that causes our
natural rational and emotional tendency in that direction to be obscured or co-opted;
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perhaps we might even construct, in Cavendishean terms, social critiques that can
explain such ignorance, in the way de Grouchy critiques the sympathy-cancelling effects
of her own society.
The second path turns out to be closely related, for if the motivation to act in
orderly ways comes from within we can return to the balancing-act, interventionist view
of Natural order while dispensing with the troubling incompatibility with the freedom of
creatures. If Nature acts directly on the motivations of her parts, then she can balance
herself into an orderly whole while still allowing those parts to be the principal causes of
their own motion—she doesn’t force them to move in particular ways, but tunes their
feelings so that they choose to act in those ways. This is, admittedly, an attenuated view
of freedom, and—as I have argued elsewhere—one that, politically, we ought reject in the
sphere of human relations. But it is not implausible to say that I am the principal cause
of my action even when my motivation to act comes from elsewhere.
Bringing the phenomenological experience of sympathy into the picture, then,
can bring these two explanations of Natural order a little closer together. There is,
however, still a problem with both. We still need a physical, thoroughly materialist
explanation as to how sympathy and its corollary order-creating feelings (including, at
times, negative ones) come to be inscribed into the hearts of creatures by the infinite
intelligence of Nature of which they are, themselves, constituents. This is not a
persnickety or arcane technicality, either. Recall that sympathy itself is a kind of motion
for Cavendish. If, as Cavendish consistently maintains, all parts are the principal causes
of their own motion, then sympathy cannot be implanted into creatures by Nature,
because this would entail that Nature orchestrates or forces certain motions to ensure
that sympathy arises. This is another consequence of Cavendish’s belief in an infinitely
divisible, self-moving plenum: there is no way for Nature to act on her parts that does
not contradict something’s self-motion. If I act from my sympathy, it is true that I am
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still the principal cause of my motion even when my sympathy is implanted; but for my
sympathy to be implanted at all, something at a lower level has to be moved rather than
self-moving.
We might, then, reject this phenomenological picture of Nature’s law that sees it
expressed by our own sympathetic feelings. Perhaps Nature has some other way to
propagate her laws, a chain of communications and consents and sympathies that
involves no over-running of individual creatures’ freedom. This is a complicated
proposition, given that Nature is not an individual part but, it appears, and unlike
everything else, only a community of parts; we would have to identify a space in which
she can act without tyrannising, and the location or articulation of that space is not
obvious to me. This would also ignore what seems to be phenomenologically true for us,
and textually supported in Cavendish: that our own felt sympathy does cause us to act in
roughly orderly ways.
To be sure, ignorance remains possible, and at times sympathetic action might
have disorderly effects; in the Grounds, for instance, she describes how the sympathy of
sensitive matter for rational matter in the minds of mad people causes their disorderly
thoughts to find outward expression, causing more disorder than if their madness was
confined to only their rational parts.106 In general, however, sympathy creates order, and
Cavendish frequently avails herself of this fellow-feeling to explain what would otherwise
be mysteriously harmonious behaviour—most obviously in the letter that I discussed in
detail. We ought not throw out this effect of sympathy too hastily.
A third path here becomes visible. This path puts sympathy at the centre of an
account of the orderliness of Nature. It also emphasises what we might call the
communitarian image of Nature, the view that holds that it is central to our
understanding of her that she is a society of rational and emotional individuals. We can
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say, then, that Nature is not orderly because of any top-down ethical imposition, but—
following de Grouchy—because of the intrinsic sympathetic motivations of her creatures
and their positive, loving feelings towards one another. As such feelings are imperfect,
and as their converses are also possible, disorder is a real and constant presence. But in
general, and most visibly in their capacity to persist through time—some, like stars, for
much longer than others, like butterflies—creatures freely create their own order.
Taken as a whole or as an individual, Nature might indeed have, or manifest, or
even prescribe a general ethical commitment to order. She might yet be, as Cavendish
describes her, a monarchess. But in such things, I think, she must be posterior to the
sympathetic order of her parts. Following de Grouchy, who explains how conceptions of
right and justice follow rationally from sympathy, we might say that the universal ethical
prescription towards order is a result of the sympathy that creatures innately feel for one
another, rather than vice versa, or rather than a view that relegates sympathy to a
handmaiden or helper for a law that Nature generates herself. If I do feel an external
Natural pressure to act in an orderly way, that pressure is in part the result of my own
motion, a growth from my own sympathetic motivations, alongside those of every other
thing in the universe; it is the self-generated law of a community of which I am,
inescapably but freely, a part. Again following de Grouchy, while it cannot be its cause,
perhaps that law is a catalyst of orderly behaviour. And if I choose to act according to
that law, it is because I already have, as an essential function of my being a society of
living matter, an affective motivation to create order—with more or less success.
Sympathy, or agreeable motion, or love, as Cavendish will sometimes call it, is thus the
individual possession of individual creatures while remaining, still, the power that orders
the universe.
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1.5 Conclusion

Sympathy, therefore, allows Cavendish to explain why Nature can appear so
orderly without compelling us to see Nature herself as the sole creator of her own
ordering and, thereby, contradicting Cavendish’s commitment to occasional causation.
For Cavendish the creatures of the universe, just like the citizens of the Enlightenment
polity, are free and self-moving. But, just as de Grouchy hopes for citizens of the polity,
the creatures of Cavendishean Nature are imbued with a sympathetic fellow-feeling that
constrains their baser motivations and causes them to work together to further one
another’s interests. The quantitative aggregate of these sympathetic relations causes the
qualitative order that we see when taking a higher-level perspective on Nature. Order is
not, therefore, generated by Nature ruling as absolute monarch over her constituent
parts and running roughshod over their own self-motion; rather, Nature is herself a
sovereign generated by the free association of her parts. Her orderliness is an emergent,
bottom-up property of the sympathy that her parts feel for each other.
In many ways, therefore, the picture we get of sympathy in Cavendish is one that
has more in common with the eighteenth century sociopolitical views than the
seventeenth century metaphysical or occult ones. Sympathy is an individual feeling of
individual parts; they may all come together in a single whole from Nature’s perspective,
but sympathy is not itself a feeling acquired through the intervention of an external
being, as it is for the likes of Van Helmont and Fludd.
On the other hand, of course, Cavendish differs greatly from the eighteenth
century theorists in that, for her, sympathy is not merely something that obtains between
human beings. It really does permeate all of Nature, in the same way that the
seventeenth century philosophers thought. It has an important explanatory role to play
in everything from the existence of animals to the operation of diseases to the
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functioning of magnets to, of course, the attraction of large crowds to the sight of an ape
on horseback. Sympathy, for Cavendish, is significantly both sociopolitical and natural,
because in her philosophy everything is always both. Nature acts like our political
institutions, made up of feeling, rational parts, with their own agendas, running up
against each other, and occasionally or often finding ways to work together.
She thus resolves a tension between individual and universal in the Natural
sphere in much the same way that later political theorists would in the smaller social
sphere. Sympathy is a universal or near-universal ordering force because it is an
individualised feeling spread universally throughout a collectivity. As Lisa Sarasohn puts
it, for Cavendish “harmony should be the state of natural and manmade entities, and it
cannot be imposed from above but must be the product of the constitutive parts of the
whole.”107 That she was able to reach this sociopolitical view of metaphysics before most
theorists had even managed to reach this view of politics is remarkable, and worthy of
further study; but for Cavendish, sympathy has an important role to play in explaining
physical interactions in nature because it has an important role to play in explaining
social interactions in human life. In this sense, she represents a reversal of the trend
taken by history itself, where what began as a supernatural force was dragged from the
heavens and placed into the mind. Cavendish instead studied her own mind and
propagated the results out into Nature herself, filling her entirely with all the emotional
and political life that we usually reserve for ourselves. Again, Cavendish’s philosophy
leaves her standing outside the processes and paths that led us to the moment we now
occupy.
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2. The Limitations of Autonomy in Gabrielle Suchon and
Contemporary Philosophy

2.1 Introduction

The problem of autonomy for feminism is usually construed as one of how
autonomy is conceptualised. In its traditional philosophical and political images, the
ideal autonomous agent is sketched as one whose actions are not influenced by
circumstances or conditions external to themselves, but only by reason—which is, of
course, something wholly belonging to, and internal to, the agent. These images are of an
individualistic, atomised, self-interested, rational choice-maker, and these
characteristics—feminist critics contend—are all ones that are coded as masculine in
Western patriarchal societies. In the reciprocally reproductive mental and material
realms of these societies women have, by contrast, been constructed as more relational,
dependent, altruistic, and emotional; which is to say that, under patriarchy, women are
both thought to be more essentially and naturally relational than men and are forced into
roles that make them more so, not least by the thought itself.1
Under the traditional conception of autonomy, one is heteronomous to the extent
that one is moved to act by factors external to reason—including one’s own emotions,
desires, and relations to others. While autonomy retains this atomistic connotation,
then, and women retain their relational one, their exclusion from the category of
autonomous agents is conceptual as well as historical.

1

This account of ‘patriarchal’ autonomy is perhaps somewhat caricatured, and not necessarily reflective
of any particular philosopher’s considered views. Nevertheless it captures the view that, as an adversary,
animates much feminist thought on freedom. A useful summary of feminist critiques of autonomy, as well
as responses that seek to rehabilitate it, can be found in Mackenzie and Stoljar 5-12.
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In this chapter I will consider some attempts by contemporary feminist
philosophers to take into account these critiques while preserving a conception of
individual autonomy. Preserving this conception is seen as important for at least two
reasons: first, having some idea of autonomy allows for the articulation of critiques of
gender oppression that might otherwise be submerged, and any emancipatory politics
seems to require a belief in the capacity of people to act autonomously beyond the norms
and algorithms that have been coded into them by oppressive social contexts.2 Second, it
is necessary to hold on to the idea that people’s actions in some way bespeak who they
are so that we can make normative assessments on the basis of those actions. If we
abandon autonomy it is difficult to see how this ordinary ethical practice is possible
without being tyrannical.3
Attempts to rehabilitate individual autonomy, therefore, contend that
“autonomy” needn’t connote a coded-masculine, perniciously atomised agent. These
arguments claim that a more accurate and more morally fruitful image of autonomy
would make clear its essentially relational and social nature, and take into account
subjects’ status as socially situated—perhaps even socially constituted—beings. They seek
to build a conception of autonomy that is intrinsically relational.
In the forthcoming chapter I compare these relational theses of autonomy to the
work of the early feminist nun Gabrielle Suchon, who also recognised that the social
reality of women’s lives undermined both their well-being and their ability to act
autonomously. This wasn’t just a matter of the circumstances and ideologies that kept
women fettered in roles that severely limited their ability to do as they pleased. For
Suchon, these social circumstances affected the way women thought, believed, and
desired; they produced structures of thought that caused women to constrain
2

Mackenzie 7
Benson 55. Benson uses the term “free agency” rather than autonomy, but his normative competence
view is taken (e.g. by Mackenzie 5) to be a part of the relational autonomy literature.
3
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themselves, and made impossible the rational use of the freely-willing soul that is God’s
universal gift. In these senses she is a clear forerunner of the feminist critiques of
autonomy; she shows that people are not self-regulating and self-transparent atoms.
But if we follow the consequences of Suchon’s arguments a little further a
significant problem arises. Once one allows the social to glom onto a person’s identity—
to come between them and their vision onto the world and into themselves—one
introduces opacity into the self and into any possible faculty of self-scrutiny. And if we
take the totalising effects of sociality seriously then we acknowledge that one cannot tell,
easily, which parts of oneself derive from oneself and which come from outside—from
one’s oppressive social milieu. There is thus an epistemological-phenomenological
problem looming for any theory that introduces sociality into the soul while still hoping
to preserve a space for autonomy.
I aim to show that this problem is insoluble both for the seventeenth century
theorists of women’s freedom and for the contemporary theorists of relational autonomy.
Any foundation for autonomy that is erected within a socially-constituted self will
collapse—either into heteronomy or into the old rationalist image of an autonomy
immune to the social. And the idea that there was ever an autonomy immune to the
social was, always, a socialised heteronomy by a different, ideologically constructed
name.
Though the problem stands for both Suchon and the contemporary theorists, it is
fatal only for the later thinkers. Suchon has religious beliefs that allow her to skirt the
problem of self-knowledge for social beings. Both of the contemporary reasons for
holding onto autonomy—its apparent centrality to emancipatory politics and to
normative assessment—require a kind of self-knowledge or self-transparency that cannot
be generated from relational conceptions of autonomy. I do not believe this necessarily
leaves us in a dim spot with regards to liberation. And if an ethics grounded in the
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normative assessment of individuals by their actions is rendered impossible without
autonomy, I contend, then we have a good reason to reject that individualistic ethics. In
this, as shall be seen, I follow Theodor Adorno in his critique of Kant, the almost-sole
object of his lectures on the Problems of Moral Philosophy. As will perhaps also become
obvious, I am moved—and somewhat guided by—Adorno’s frequent assertion that “in
the bad life a good life is not possible.”4
So it is in the effects of the apparent unknowability of the autonomous self that I
think an encounter between Suchon and the contemporary theorists is instructive.
Ultimately, the solution to the problem of the contradiction between autonomy and
society is not to be solved by any kind of conceptual reworking of autonomy. It is to be
solved by the revolutionary reworking of society—that is, by politics.

2.2 Three Axes of Relational Autonomy

Before I go on, a quick note about liberation. Resistance to the oppressive
structures of patriarchy is, of course, the primary animus of feminism. I have already
given away that this chapter ends with the repudiation of the ability of the agent to ever
know that she is acting autonomously under current conditions, but I do not mean by
this to repudiate the possibility of resistance to oppression. I do not endorse
hopelessness. At the same time, however, I do endorse a grim realism about the extent
and nature of the task that confronts us. Patriarchal structures have been influencing the
mental and material conditions of society for thousands of years. They have conditioned
and determined the ways that all of us think about ourselves and each other, and they
4

Adorno 167. I don’t provide any argument for the persuasiveness of this formulation. But I take it that,
even if we do not share Adorno’s world-beating pessimism, the readers of this chapter will agree that the
world and society are currently beset by a great number of harmful structures and conditions. This seems
to me to be a prerequisite for feminist philosophy and political philosophy in general. I believe my
arguments are persuasive using this as a starting point.

90

have structured thought and language to such an extent that, in many places and for
many centuries, the catastrophe of its own existence was almost impossible to express
despite its horrendous consequences.5 Our present position is one of several centuries of
hard-fought struggle, but we are still very much within patriarchy, as we are within white
supremacy and imperialist capitalism and other structures yet unnamed. The reciprocal
mental and material effects of these structures are totalising or very close to totalising;
we shouldn’t imagine that there are easy ways out, and should be suspicious of any that
present themselves. Resistance to patriarchy is a vital political duty, but it is also one that
is extremely difficult—not just to achieve but to articulate. In our theorising we should
face up to this difficulty.
Nevertheless I believe that there are ways to express the goals and impetus of
emancipatory politics without recourse to the language of autonomy. In many cases, the
forthcoming qualities that are taken to be important to autonomy, and that are
systematically denied to marginalised populations, can be understood without the
implantation of the concept of autonomy; the harm of their denial can be understood as
harms that are not necessarily grounded in the restriction or limitation of an
autonomous soul. Charting the hopes of emancipation beyond the limitations of
patriarchal language and concepts is a big project, for another day. I hope here merely to
militate against despair.
With all this in mind, I turn first to the contemporary theories of relational
autonomy. In doing so I follow the taxonomy of theories used by Catriona Mackenzie in
her excellent multidimensional analysis of relational conceptions of autonomy.
Mackenzie argues that the usage of the concept of autonomy shifts according to
“different social and normative contexts,” and that any unitary notion of self-governance
fails to capture everything that we want autonomy to be. She therefore identifies three
5

For a moving discussion of this, see Rowbotham 29.
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“distinct but causally interdependent” axes of autonomy: self-determination, selfgovernance, and self-authorisation.6 Many of the preceding decades’ theories of
relational autonomy can be grouped along these axes.
I will deal only briefly with one of these axes. For Mackenzie, self-determination
is defined as “having the freedom and opportunity to make and enact choices of practical
import to one’s life.”7 It identifies “external, structural (social and political) conditions
for individual autonomy.”8 These include basic political and personal liberties and access
to an adequate array of opportunities to instantiate one’s life-plans. Mackenzie
references the capabilities theories of Martha Nussbaum, Elizabeth Anderson, and Ingrid
Robeyns as providing relational autonomy theorists with a “useful vocabulary for
articulating the opportunity conditions for self-determination,” including importantly
relational ones.9
I agree with Mackenzie about the importance of amenable external structural
conditions necessary for people to live lives that they can endorse as meaningful to
themselves, and find little to criticise in the substance of her depiction of the selfdetermination axis. Paying close attention to the extent to which these structures limit
self-determination, and how these limits fall unevenly across different social groups, is a
significant part of any political liberation movement. The self-determination axis of
autonomy hence gives us a useful tool in analysing—and hoping to overcome—
oppression. It’s worth noting, of course, that under present conditions the great majority
of people on earth are some distance—some a much greater distance than others—from
being able to autonomously self-determine in this way. Insofar as autonomy is taken to
be self-determination it is therefore mostly impossible at present—and this is a fact that

6

Mackenzie 17
Ibid 17
8
Ibid 25
9
Ibid 28
7
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we should loudly and repeatedly express, not one that we should submerge within other,
more internal accounts of autonomy. The solution to this global lack of self-determining
individuals is political change, and such change has most frequently been fought for by
the very people who face external impediments to their flourishing. That autonomy,
understood as self-determination, is impossible for many people, does not render
political emancipation impossible. Indeed, it makes it morally, if not historically,
necessary.
As it is, autonomy is not just taken to be the absence of external structures hostile
to one’s life-plans, or the presence of ones that move in sympathy to them. It is also
taken to be a freedom from, or within, those structures’ influence upon the self. It is the
construction of an autonomous self from the pieces of the socialised self that I take to be
the substantive aim of the relational autonomist project—without it, our world that is
radically hostile to self-determination would render individualistic ethics impossible.
This substantive aim is instantiated by the self-governance and self-authorisation axes. It
is to these that I turn next.

2.2.1 Self-Governance

Mackenzie says that the self-governance dimension of autonomy “involves having
the skills and capacities necessary to make choices that express, or cohere with, one’s
reflectively constituted diachronic practical identity,”10 referring to the Korsgaardian
notion of one’s identity as a “description under which you value yourself … under which
you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.”11
According to Mackenzie, the self-governance axis identifies conditions of competence

10
11

Mackenzie 17
Korsgaard 101
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and authenticity for autonomy.12 Many of the other conceptions of relational autonomy,
including those of Meyers, Stoljar, Barclay, and—in some lights—Benson, can best be
described as falling under the self-governance axis and as articulating conditions for
authenticity and/or autonomy competences.
Autonomy competences are sets of skills that “a person must possess, to a certain
degree at least, to be self-governing.”13 On relational accounts these competences are
ones that agents develop or acquire (or not), partly or wholly, through their social
situation. Autonomy competences can be content-free critical or self-reflective skills or
they can be substantive normative competences requiring that an agent understand
particular norms in particular contexts.
Authenticity conditions are those that, in Mackenzie’s terms, specify “what it
means for a choice, value, commitment, or reason to be one’s own.”14 An action that in
some way proceeds from one’s true or authentic self—with which one’s true self
identifies—is an autonomous one, and agents who have the capacity to programmatically
perform such actions are autonomous agents. Perhaps the best-known example of an
authenticity condition for autonomous action is Harry Frankfurt’s account of the
endorsement, by a second-order volition, of a first order desire.15 A person is thus
autonomous if, in their action, there is some agreement between their self-reflective lifeplans or self-images—their authentic self—and their desires or reasons. For Frankfurt,
this is a matter of the higher-order volitions ruling hierarchically over one’s otherwisewayward lower-order desires. Marilyn Friedman proposes an integration model wherein
one’s lower- and higher-order motivations reciprocally inform one another.16 Under a
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Mackenzie 31-2
Ibid 32
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“It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-order volitions [...] that a person exercises
freedom of his will.” Frankfurt 15
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relational conception it is understood that this authentic self, choosing whether or not to
endorse its desires and actions, is itself constituted or strongly influenced by social
forces.
These two ways that one can self-govern are not unrelated—on Diana Tietjens
Meyers’ account, for instance, the authentic self is one that is formed by the effective
exercise of one’s autonomy competences. To possess an authentic self, for Meyers, is to
be within a dynamic process of self-definition guided by one’s autonomy competences.
The authentic self is not in a fixed state; it is defined by an ongoing activity of constant,
reflective, autonomous re-constitution. In Meyers’ own terms, the authentic self is
“nothing but the evolving collocation of attributes - analogous to a musical ensemble’s
sound - that issues from the ongoing exercise of this repertory of skills.”17 She identifies
seven—though there may be more—areas of competence that are “needed” for selfdefinition: introspective skills, imaginative skills, memory skills, communication skills,
analytical and reasoning skills, and interpersonal skills.18
Meyers is guided by intersectionality theory. A large part of the self-knowledge
required to define one’s authentic self, she argues, is of the subject’s situation within
intersecting planes of oppression and privilege, as defined by that subject’s social milieu.
When one accepts one’s intersectional identity as a “feature of one’s authentic self,”
according to Meyers, one acknowledges one’s placement at particular intersections, and
understands and analyses how this placement has influenced one: one “disclos[es] to
oneself the ways in which associated norms have become embedded in one’s own
cognitive and motivational structure, appreciat[es] how entrenched they are, and
assum[es] responsibility for the ways in which one may enact them.”19 When one’s

17

Meyers 173
Ibid 166
19
Ibid 159
18

95

process of self-definition is guided by this knowledge of one’s intersectional identity, one
is able to define an authentic self.
Meyers gives the example of a “young, white, middle-class, heterosexual (let us
suppose, recently married), Italian-American woman” who is trying to decide whether or
not to become a mother. Through her knowledge of her social placement, and her
knowledge of the history of maternal norms within her identity-groups, she is able to
bring resources to bear on her decision to which she would not otherwise have access.
She might, for instance, observe that there is a long history in the United States of
encouraging white women to procreate ‘for the good of the race’; this knowledge might
cause her to pause while considering if she is motivated by such racist norms. Attending
to one’s group identities in this way, and their histories and interactions and tensions,
“authorizes individualized reflections and choice.” “In the end,” Meyers writes,

a woman might refuse on principle (antiracist or ecological) to reenact
the maternal norm, but alternatively she might conclude that the
satisfactions of motherhood would probably outweigh the negatives and
decide to have children.20
Her knowledge of herself, her constitution by intersectional identity, and the
history of her own social situation, combined with the seven (or more) critical
competences that Meyers identifies, allows the woman to autonomously define how she
relates to the motherhood norm: to what extent it is constituted within her historically,
what it means historically, to what extent this meaning contradicts or accords with her
values and desires. And an authentic self is one that is self-defined, in the light of its
social situation, by this sort of dynamic, never-ending process.21

20
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Meyers’ conception has a strong intuitive pull. We are tempted, I think, to believe
that a woman who decides to become a mother without any knowledge of the ways that
femininity is intertwined with motherhood within patriarchal culture does so less
autonomously than a woman who thinks hard upon the norms surrounding motherhood;
we might also then conclude that a white woman who also reflects upon the ways in
which white motherhood is inflected by white supremacy acts more autonomously than a
white woman who does not. Alongside feminist standpoint theory, Meyers also argues
that an authentic self and autonomous agency “may be more accessible” to more
oppressed individuals: for those on the dominating or privileged sides of these axes,
acknowledging one’s social situation entails acknowledging that much of the good in
one’s life does not proceed from within the self, which may be more threatening to one’s
self-image than the knowledge that much of the bad in one’s life comes from an external
oppressive structure.22
We are then left with the satisfying conclusion that the better one understands
one’s oppressive milieu, and the better one applies this knowledge self-reflexively and
critically, the more autonomous and authentic one is able to become. As we shall soon
see with Suchon, for Meyers knowledge begets freedom, even within systems of
suffocating oppression. And it is an important insight that autonomy—or freedom—is
birthed from a struggle in which we are all intertwined through our different subject
positions. But I am doubtful that it is the kind of struggle that people can undertake
within themselves, even when those selves are understood to have help from outside in
the form of education—the learning of competences—and emotional support.
For Suchon the epistemological problem for autonomy posed by society is that of
differentiating the autonomous parts of the self—which she knows exist—from those
constituted heteronomously. When taking an outside view upon the self, these two
22
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separate realms are not easily differentiated. Meyers and most of the other contemporary
theorists avoid this problem by denying that there is some unsocialised part of the self to
be distinguished—“autonomy unfolds in situ,” as Meyers puts it, “and autonomous
individuals must work with whatever material is at hand.”23 This material is one’s
oppressive milieu and the self that it constitutes.
Nevertheless, Meyers’ view of autonomy and others that rely upon the
autonomous action or creation of an authentic self do not successfully circumvent the
opacity of the social self. When one engages in the reflexive activity of self-definition that
Meyers describes, one takes oneself as an object of knowledge—with all the situatedness
and vulnerability to external forces that that implies—but one also sets oneself up as an
opposed subject of knowledge, reflecting on that object. Acknowledging the extent to
which we are constituted by the social requires acknowledging the extent to which we are
constituted as perceiving subjects, and not just as objects. But it is difficult to see how
one could have the kind of objective knowledge required of one’s own subjectivity; one
cannot make judgements about one’s subjectivity without immediately constituting it as
an object, and generating a new, still abstracted subject.
This matters for autonomy because if—as both I and the relational autonomists
think we should—we accept and allow that we are creatures shaped in heteronomous
ways by oppressive social forces, then we must also accept and allow that our judgements
about our own and others’ autonomy could be so shaped. When we look upon ourselves
we do not know the whole etiology of the thing observed but we know even less the
etiology of the thing observing, except to know that both have origins in a catastrophic
and oppressive society. We do not know, to borrow an evocative turn of phrase from
Donna Haraway, with whose blood our eyes were crafted.24 So when I engage in the
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activity of self-definition described by Meyers I could just as easily be using a
heteronomous subjectivity to denounce “authentic” parts of myself, and to lionise
heteronomous parts, as vice versa; more likely I am heteronomously denouncing other
heteronomous parts, and nothing resembling authenticity enters into the picture. Saying
that these authentic parts of the self are themselves the products of social forces does
nothing to solve the problem of telling them apart from inauthentic parts when using an
opaque subjectivity. Though Meyers and others assert that authenticity and autonomy
are matters of degree, not absolutes, and that we are thus never wholly free from the
social, our constitution by the social prevents us from ever even apprehending the scale.
Even allowing the possibility that we sometimes look along heteronomous lines rules our
the possibility that we could ever know the extent of our autonomy.
For her part, Meyers is careful to problematise the visual metaphor of which I
have been making such use above. “People cannot be expected to cast their gaze inward,”
she writes, “behold their intersectional identity, and intuit its import, for culturally
transmitted cognitive schemas and emotional scripts organize introspection, and those
frameworks are not hospitable to intersectional self-definition.”25 She thus readily
accepts that there is some nugget of heteronomy within our powers of self-scrutiny.
Instead of armchair introspection she describes a spate of heterogeneous critical,
intellectual, emotional, and social strategies of which subjects can make use in their selfdefinition. She advocates curiosity about other people and cultures and attentiveness to
one’s emotions in different situations as well as “critical thinking skills” as important
directions toward self-definition. But all these activities presuppose an autonomous
subjectivity that is able to make free decisions about the information it gets from itself,
from its emotions and its cultures—decisions about how to sort this information, how to
weigh it, what to keep and what to reject. This autonomous subjectivity looks a lot like
25
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the old masculinist one of the abstracted and rational observer. It resembles the soulpart of the self immune to the social in which Suchon believed. And if this asocial
homunculus is removed from the picture, we are left with a self buffeted by information
from all sources, making choices in the dark. This self is not free.
Take Meyers’ example, above, of the white woman who decides that, in spite of
her close knowledge of how white supremacy and patriarchy structure her decisions, “the
satisfactions of motherhood would probably outweigh the negatives” and she should
therefore have a child. The “negatives” of patriarchal and racist norms are not
weightless, of course; they are assigned a weight in decision making. They are not only
assigned that weight by the woman in question, but by the social force of the norms
themselves, or by other norms generated in the woman’s milieu. Even when she does
seem to assign a weight herself she is affected from the outside. So generated, too, is the
relative weight she gives to the satisfactions of motherhood, which are themselves
handed to her by social forces that are far from innocent. Given all this, there is, I think,
no reason for us to think that a decision that takes all these things into account is more
autonomous than one that does not, though doubtless it is still better in other ways. To
do so we must either suppose that the standpoint from which that accounting is made is
already more autonomous—which begs the question—or suppose that accounting as such
somehow generates autonomy, even when it is done from a heteronomous standpoint.
But even in this second case we need an autonomous observer who can judge that
autonomy, rather than disguised heteronomy, has indeed been generated— again
begging the question.
As much is true, I think, of any conception of autonomy in which an authentic self
organises the heteronomies in its experience—be it Frankfurt’s hierarchy of desires or
Friedman’s reflective equilibrium of desires and life-plans. Any procedural conception of
autonomy is vulnerable to the critique that there is no way, in a world of socially100

constituted subjects, to apply a procedure that generates autonomy without first
presupposing autonomy—or at least, no way to apply the procedure and then make an
autonomous judgement about its results.
More substantive competence conceptions of autonomy, like Natalie Stoljar’s,
perhaps provide a way out of this. For Stoljar, being autonomous is not merely a matter
of reflectively endorsing one’s actions as having emerged from an authentic self, or as
resulting from a sound procedure: “even women socialized through stereotypical
feminine socialization will often have developed good capacities of critical reflection and
hence [according to procedural views] autonomy.”26 But, Stoljar argues, there is a
“feminist intuition” that “preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity
cannot be autonomous.”27 She therefore proposes a content-thick account of autonomy—
what she calls a “strong substantive theory of autonomy”—which holds that a subject
cannot be autonomous if she has internalised, and acts upon, a norm that is “false.” “And
because of the internalisation of the norm,” she writes, “they do not have the capacity to
perceive it as false.”28
Stoljar uses the example of women surveyed by Kristin Luker in a California
abortion clinic in the 1970s.29 In many instances, these women had decided not to use
contraception, and this decision was reflectively endorsed in ways similar to the
endorsement provided by the authentic self of procedural theories like Meyers’. But,
Stoljar argues, feminists have the intuition that their decision was not an autonomous
one, as the women’s reasons for endorsing their action to forgo contraception were
predicated on false (and patriarchal) norms, such as that women shouldn’t initiate or
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plan for sex or that bearing a child increases a woman’s worth or femininity.30 Hence
autonomy requires a strong and substantive idea of normative competence—that is,
autonomy requires, at the very least, that one not be motivated by false norms.
Stoljar’s account might be termed ‘externalist’ in that it is used to make
judgements about when other people act heteronomously, unbeknownst to themselves.
They presumably perceive that they act according to a true norm or just according to
some kind of natural order of things. The account can thus skirt the phenomenological
problem by making autonomy or heteronomy objective features of people’s actions
rather than ones constituted in their subjective perceptions of endorsement or nonendorsement. There is just a fact of the matter about whether someone acts
heteronomously or not, and how they or anyone else feels about it doesn’t matter.
(Stoljar says that not acting according to false norms is a necessary, but not necessarily
sufficient, condition for acting autonomously.31 It is thus less clear if on her account
there is also just a fact of the matter about whether someone acts autonomously or not.)
The problem arises, of course, in how we are to make use of this account. All
structures of domination and oppression operate by the propagation of false 32 and
harmful social norms which appear as socially useful, necessary, or just true. Given how
totalising the structures that beset us are, we can assume that we have all internalised
many more of these norms than we know—and, as Stoljar points out, internalisation
disables our ability to perceive these norms’ falsehood and harm. So there is a fact of the
matter about our heteronomy too, and it’s one that’s inaccessible to us; but we can safely
assume that a great many of the norms that underpin our actions are false. There is an
arrogance in presuming to impugn the actions of others as structured by false norms
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from a position itself structured by false norms. Even our action of judging another to
have acted heteronomously may be motivated by our internalisation of a false norm—
and again, there is no way to know one way or another. So even a substantive, objective
account of heteronomy faces this same knowability problem.
But, it could be argued, there do seem to be some false norms that we know about
and that do properly seem to disable autonomy. The “feminist intuition” is well-named.
There are even more uncontroversial-seeming examples than Stoljar’s of the women who
forgo contraception: a sexual assault survivor, for example, who structures her choices
according to a belief that she is responsible for her assault, has surely internalised a
harmful, morally reprehensible, false norm. Surely, too, we can rightly say that choices
that proceed from this norm are heteronomous, even if there are many cases where we
cannot.
Perhaps we can say these choices are heteronomous. It could even be a central
feminist strategy to point out the harm of such choices—a case where we do not allow a
sceptical worry to impede political action. As subjects constituted by harmful structures
we cannot know much about what a freer world would look like, but we can at least
demand that it not include such terrible social phenomena as victim-blaming and
internalised victim-blaming. It is a harrowing and obvious manifestation of a
heteronomy that pervades many more of our actions than we realise. But it should be
noted that in labelling her actions heteronomous we do not thereby gain a coherent or
usable account of autonomy appearing in opposition. It may well be that in our current
condition heteronomy is sometimes easy to identify and autonomy always impossible.
We don’t recognise it by denouncing the autonomy of others. (This suggestion—that we
can constitute autonomy from the recognition of heteronomy in others—is not one made
by Stoljar. To this extent we are in accord.)
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This should give us reason to militate our paternalism, or the impulse toward
purity or righteousness that underpins it, in instances where—perhaps due to sheer
rage—we insist that no free person could ever act in such ways or believe such things.
Such an insistence is proper and right, but it should be accompanied by an insistence on
a humility motivated by our recognition that we, too, are not free from socialisation by
harmful structures. I think mutual recognition of this kind should push our responses in
such clear-cut cases of socially-constructed horror closer toward solidarity, or shared
suffering, than the paternalist intervention implied by the abstracted impugning of
another’s autonomy. The horror of anyone coming to believe that she is responsible for
being sexually assaulted is a severe indictment of the society that would cause that belief;
that it might cause her to act in ways that will further harm her is a more severe
indictment still; it is this fact upon which we should reflect and act, not the authenticity
or autonomy of her choices. We can express the badness of this state of things without
recourse to the language of heteronomy.
The self-governance theories of relational autonomy, therefore, must either
resign themselves to the result that the governor is as unfree as the governed, and is
hence no source of autonomy at all, or arbitrarily declare some part of the self to be the
source of autonomy despite its potential infection by the heteronomies of a bad society.
But the arbitrary exaltation of a socialised part of the self as the seat of autonomy was
just what the old patriarchs of autonomy did with reason, for which they were rightly
criticised. Just acknowledging that that part of the self is socialised is more honest, but is
not enough to reconcile the contradiction between autonomy and society if we still have
to make normative assessments predicated upon the autonomy of ourselves or others. A
normative assessment—a moral judgement—requires both an object and a subject; but if,
as the relational autonomists presuppose, both are constituted by social forces whose
own normative character is at best suspect then any assessment made by the subject is,
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itself, open to insoluble charges of hypocrisy or tyranny. The judging subject collapses to
become as much an object as the judged. There can be no free moral judgements on this
account.

2.2.2 Self-Authorisation

For Mackenzie, the self-authorisation axis of autonomy “involves regarding
oneself as having the normative authority to be self-determining and self-governing.”33
It is thus a self-reflexive attitude in which one regards oneself as a competent moral
agent in a community of other moral agents: as someone who can account for, explain,
and take responsibility for her actions, and who is “authorized” to expect the same from
others. Hence, being self-authorising requires that an agent think of herself as capable of
explaining her actions to others in ways that are at least in principle acceptable to those
others. Self-authorisation is thus relational in two senses: because it involves an agent’s
perception of herself in the light of others, and because it involves reasons,
commitments, and values that are themselves socially constituted within the agent.34
Mackenzie writes that “regarding oneself as accountable involves having a sense
of one’s epistemic and normative authority with regard to one’s life and one’s practical
commitments.”35 The points I have raised above regarding the opacity of the self and the
ubiquitous badness of the social that constitutes it serve to undermine the sense any of
us could have of ourselves as normatively or epistemically competent in an authorityconferring way with respect to our own actions. Mackenzie herself observes the apparent
demandingness of self-authorisation, saying that these self-evaluative attitudes “may
seem to assume an unrealistically high level of confidence in oneself.” She emphasises in
33
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response that it only requires “appropriate” self-evaluative attitudes, and that—like the
other relational theorists—she takes autonomy to be a matter of degree.36
But there are other interesting questions raised by Mackenzie’s characterisation
of self-authorisation as involving a sense of one’s normative competence. There is a
question, for instance, about whether successfully navigating social norms—and taking
oneself to be capable of doing so—really confers or constitutes any form of autonomy in
situations such as ours in which a large part of the norms are hostile to one’s well-being
or self-image. For people in oppressed groups, confidence in expressing one’s reasons
and one’s ability to account for oneself involves confidence in speaking the language of
the oppressor. Certainly someone who feels a sense of dislocation, alienation, or
incompetence within their social milieu—who finds themselves unable to find the words
to account for themselves in an oppressive tongue, and who is conscious of that—is
robbed of a kind of well-being and respect. They will find the world to be a hostile place
largely arranged against them. But they are right about this, and from their position of
dislocation they have the potential to articulate some opposition to that world that
someone who navigates it with confidence is likely to miss.
Mackenzie might simply respond that all this is true, but that someone who
misses this self-confidence is nevertheless in some sense less autonomous than someone
who has it. But this implies that someone who internalises bad norms, and thinks of
themselves through these norms, is more autonomous than someone who cannot. This
flatly contradicts Stoljar’s “feminist intuition” that internalising false norms harms one’s
capacity to act autonomously. It also strikes me as a bad conception from which to
attempt to construct a resistance to oppressive structures.
In his relational theory of autonomy as normative competence, Paul Benson
raises a similar question regarding the norms with respect to which an agent’s autonomy
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is to be judged. Under Benson’s account, the “norms which, in fact, we must be capable
of recognizing and appreciating in order to act freely are those that actually play a part in
the particular personal and social relationships in which we are involved.”37 A person’s
freedom is thus always judged according to the particular normative domain—made up
of the people around them—in which they act, and they are free to the extent that they,
themselves, appreciate and recognise those norms. “Apart from specific norms,” Benson
writes, “freedom is vacuous, since those norms set the terms in which free actions may
reveal pertinent features of agents.”38 And as Benson himself points out, this gives the
account a supple approach to oppressive normative contexts:

If one’s freedom seems irremediably splintered because the norms that
one is expected to comprehend in order to be minimally respected as a
free and accountable agent are themselves contradictory or incoherent,
then one is not at fault for feeling alienated from one’s agency. The cause
of one’s feeling need not be some gender-specific defect in one’s inner
volitional machinery. Rather, it can be attributed to the alienating,
gender-bound expectations of oppressive social institutions and
practices.39
Benson’s normative competence account hence allows the expression of an
important feature of oppressive social structures: that they can not only frustrate one’s
autonomy but can also, paradoxically, invoke one’s autonomy as a weapon to be used
against one. The common norm of victim-blaming, in which a sexual assault survivor’s
autonomy is invoked just so that she can be subjected to blame for her assault, is a good
example of the paradoxical nature that autonomy can take on under patriarchy. The
survivor is subjected to blame because she used her autonomy to flout oppressive social
norms regarding modesty in women—survivors are told, sometimes by a person invested
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with significant institutional authority, that the way they were dressed, or that they were
drunk, or that they invited someone in for coffee, makes them at least partly culpable for
the subsequent attack. In all these ways she failed to act as someone who is
fundamentally a passive object of outside forces; she is expected always to be thinking of
herself as something potentially acted upon, rather than as an agent with her own ends
to pursue. She is thus blamed for failing to use her autonomy in essentially autonomynullifying ways.
I take contradictions like this to be a good reason to be suspicious of the utility of
the concept of autonomy within current social conditions. It can easily be pressed into
the service of those conditions, and turned against their most vulnerable victims.
Benson, too, thinks that prevailing social norms confront women and other oppressed
people with contradictory and alienating judgements regarding their freedom. He is,
however, more optimistic about the possibility of moving into other normative realms in
which one can be judged in less hostile and alienating ways: “many persons’
relationships,” he writes, “give rise to ways of understanding the meaning and value of
human activity which diverge sharply from values predominating in the society at
large.”40
I’m not sure that these alternative ways of understanding can give rise to a
workable conception of autonomy as normative competence. It is certainly true that
there are interpersonal relationships that appear to diverge from a large part of the
oppressive social norms that structure society at large. But these alternative normative
domains are subject to the same knowability question as the norms with which one
identifies or one’s application of an authenticity procedure: the most insidious ways in
which they are structured by the oppressive milieu in which—despite everything—they
are situated are likely to be the ones that are most difficult to identify and express. For
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Benson, so long as we feel competent—are confident in our competence—within a
normative domain, and our agency does not appear “irremediably splintered” within it,
then our actions can rightly be taken to “reveal who we are,” and we are free.41 As I’ve
said, I don’t think that confidence in navigating an oppressive normative context can be
taken to track one’s freedom or autonomy, and nor do I think that one’s feeling of
confidence within a particular normative context is necessarily a sign that it is not
oppressive. Nevertheless, Benson’s account does give us a useful way to express an
important operation of oppression, and a standpoint from which to internally critique
societies that take themselves to promote autonomy while constituting it in hostile and
contradictory forms.
With all this in mind, however, self-authorisation is cut adrift. Under current
conditions one’s confidence in one’s ability to account for oneself to others does not lead
to anything resembling autonomy. Confidence in one’s own normative competence is an
important part of well-being, and we should fiercely criticise all the structures that rob
people of it, but this doesn’t entail arguing that people within those structures ought to
feel confident in this way. It entails that those structures ought to be destroyed.
Confidence can be misplaced; one can be wrong about one’s competence—one’s ability to
self-govern or self-scrutinise—or one can be confident in the usage of the wrong norms.
Self-confidence alone cannot confer or constitute autonomy. Like Stoljar, I believe that
the content of the norms with which one explains oneself is important. But I am doubtful
about our ability to access or know when we are using good norms within a society so
thoroughly constituted by bad ones. To see how the contradiction between society and
autonomy could—potentially—be reconciled, we turn next to a far older account of
freedom, based upon a different conception of ethics entirely.

41

Ibid 55

109

2.3 Society and Freedom in the Philosophy of Gabrielle Suchon

To a certain extent, of course, it is anachronistic to include a discussion of a
seventeenth-century nun in a chapter about autonomy, a term which extended only to
polities until a hundred years after Suchon wrote. But as Lisa Shapiro has pointed out,
there is a remarkable consonance between Suchon’s theorising about freedom and later
depictions of autonomy: in particular, Shapiro says, Suchon’s views on freedom could be
cast as a “prototype” of the Kantian view of autonomy as self-governance.42 What’s more,
Suchon recognised the threat that an oppressive society poses to the achievement of selfgovernance, as it conditions lives without real choices and conditions minds unable to
imagine other choices. On the other hand, she articulated a rationalist theory of
autonomy similar to the one that was later repudiated as antifeminist.43 She thus stands
in a hazy position with respect to the history of autonomy that she presaged, answering
some of its problems and instantiating others. Ultimately, I think, the ethics of obedience
to and identification with God that Suchon espouses tempers some of the force of the
contradiction between society and autonomy that becomes so fraught for later theorists.
Suchon begins her 1693 Treatise on Ethics and Politics with a long discussion of
the nature of freedom, which she places deep within the essence and nature of the
rational soul. She defines it as “a precious gift that divine generosity bestows on rational
and intelligent creatures [...] by which they become mistresses of all their actions,”44 preechoing later theorists that would locate autonomy in self-mastery and selfaccountability. She also identifies free action with action guided by or “conduct[ed]” by
reason, and says that freedom is the differentiating principle of an “intellectual
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substance” like the human or angelic soul. We are ourselves, then, only to the extent that
we act freely—and to act freely is to act according to reason (“animals”, she says, “have
no freedom because they can neither speak nor reason”45). In contrasting “the reason of
man” to “the intelligence of angels,” however, she already acknowledges a potential
threat to this rational autonomy:

[Angels] are endowed with contemplative reason; in other words, they
comprehend without language only through their vision and
understanding of the ultimate good. But man’s reason is discursive and
consists exclusively in reasoning. He achieves an understanding of all he
wants to know through specific acts and operations that depend on
external and internal senses.46
The “bod[ies] full of corruption and misery” with which we are saddled muddy
the waters for reason and tempt the will toward acting upon base inclinations that pull us
further from our essential freedom. But it is especially noteworthy here that Suchon
writes of reason’s dependence on “internal senses” to gain understanding, as it suggests
that reason must work with what it is given in directing action; and what it is given is a
psyche partly conditioned by the limitations of the body with which it is unified and—as
we shall see later—by the society in which it is formed. This raises a question about just
how trustworthy we ought to consider the actions that appear to us to be dictated by
reason; couldn’t they, just as easily, be the deceptive rationalisations of a disordered and
desirous body?
Compounding this so-far inchoate problem is Suchon’s strong endorsement of a
Hellenistic conception of freedom that sees it residing only in a soul that is untroubled by
intemperate emotion and the vicissitudes of desire. “We will never be free if we have
desires in abundance,” she writes, “because they completely undermine the freedom of
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our hearts and tear them apart unceasingly.”47 Desires produce strong emotions that can
pull our motivations away from those mandated by reason and make us less free.
Suchon differs from other philosophers interested in the untroubled soul in her
insistence upon the ways that troublesome desires and emotions are propagated and
maintained by bad social circumstances and norms. Unfreedom in society can instigate
unfreedom in the psyche for Suchon as much as for the later feminist theorists of
autonomy. Women’s subjected social position, Suchon writes, closes off opportunities for
them to rid themselves of troublesome emotion and move toward freedom:

Desire is a sign of neediness and poverty. And because the most
disadvantageous traits are most eagerly ascribed to women and girls,
they are always said to have a multitude of desires [...]. To this we can
respond that it is extremely unfair to attribute such faults to women,
while at the same time to deprive them of the means to get rid of them.
Achievement and possession are tried and true means of stifling and
extinguishing all desires that are both rational and proper. Why are
women not allowed to satisfy their desires and achieve their goals, when
these goals are just and gratifying?48
That Suchon suggests one method of dealing with desires is just to satisfy them
marks her as a more socially-minded thinker than other philosophers that advocate
desire’s subjugation to the clinical operation of reason. But it is not just by closing off
this opportunity to satisfy one’s “just and gratifying” goals that society propagates
unfreedom within the minds of women. By forcing women into vocations to which they
are unsuited, and making them dependent upon the whims of others, society generates
new and yet more troublesome emotions that can only serve to constrain them further.
As creatures essentially characterised by freedom, anything that constrains us and denies
our ability to act according to this nature “gives birth to tempests and to the most
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pernicious storms of passion”49; these storms will, themselves, serve to cloud the
judgements of reason and estrange us still further from our essence as free and rational
beings. And, of course, it is “persons of the fair sex [...] who suffer the deprivation of the
greatest advantages of moral and political freedom” and who are thus most likely to be
subject to these freedom-denying emotions. Society perpetuates the unfreedom of
women by externally constraining them in ways that generate the internal constraints of
passionate emotion and unquenchable desire. She thus has an image of the reciprocity of
the social and the mental in the construction of heteronomy, but—unlike the relational
autonomists—she does not imagine that there is any space within this cycle to build a
foundation for autonomy. To the extent that society acts to constrain you, for Suchon,
you are just not free—you are estranged from your essence.
This might make surprising the harshness with which Suchon condemns the
behaviour of other women. But there are moments in the Treatise on Ethics and Politics
where she is strikingly critical of (what appears to be) women’s own complicity in their
unfreedom. She writes, for instance, that

The vanity of women’s dress, the flirtatiousness of their gestures, the
affectation of their compliments, and the fakery that infects their
kindnesses, along with several other behaviours, can rightly be called
puerile and artificial constraints. They provide evidence that women are
their own enemies, opponents of their own freedom, which they
unfortunately manacle by themselves. To be sure, those little amusements
I mentioned above appeal only to society people, for wise and judicious
women do not display these base behaviours, which are the daughters of
constraint and the enemies of true freedom.50
Acknowledging as Suchon does that these behaviours are the “daughters of
constraint” ought, one would expect, temper any harsh criticism of those that fall into
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them; they are, after all, not the result of free action. But Suchon sees these
counterproductive behaviours as arising out of an ignorance that at least some women
are capable of overcoming even in their subjected state, and she later confines her harsh
judgement to only those women who “have the means to escape ignorance, but who are
occupied with weak-minded vanities and pernicious friendships.”51
Suchon thus advocates education as a method to break the cycle of unfreedom in
which the subjected women of her time found themselves. And she also advocates
widespread social reform to enable women to receive education: in the Treatise on
Ethics and Politics she advocates the creation of “colleges, universities, and academies”
in which women could study the human sciences and from which men would be barred.52
Her later On the Celibate Life Freely Chosen is devoted entirely to arguing that women
should be permitted, in law and custom, to live “Neutral” lives outside of the convent or
marriage in which they could dedicate themselves to study.
Until these institutions are in place, Suchon writes, women

are obliged to wage war against their passions without knowing where
they are seated or being able to differentiate passions that reside in the
lustful appetite from those that dominate the irascible. And women enact
habits without knowing if they are inborn or acquired, and practice virtue
without knowing whether a virtue is moral in general or Christian in
particular.53
Suchon therefore anticipates the potential objection that I articulated earlier—
that of not knowing which of our motives inhere in bad desires and which in our true
freedom, the operation of reason—and prescribes education, via social reform, as a
solution. We might ask whether, from within this position of ignorance, one is capable of
fooling oneself into believing one is really free; and if so, whether any amount of
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education is enough for us to really know that our actions are free. If, as she seems to
allow here, it is sometimes impossible to differentiate inborn and acquired habits, it
could be the case that it’s possible to confuse the actions of reason with actions
motivated by the pernicious effects of the social. Certainly Suchon does not want to
undersell the power of the negative forces that beset us, saying at one point—though with
reference to original sin—that “corruption inheres in us and we carry it everywhere.”54 By
arguing that some women remain in their position of ignorance despite having the
opportunity to leave Suchon also closes off the possibility that the emotional turmoil of
unfreedom is, itself, a sufficient cue that we are ignorant and dependent and should work
to self-improve. If we agree with Suchon, we agree that we are in essence free and that
we have this capacity as a gift from God; but we also agree that a great many of our
actions are born of unfreedom. How do we tell them apart from the ones that proceed
from our nature?
Suchon would probably just respond that there is no mistaking the contentment
that results from the agreement of one’s essence with God’s purpose. We might find this
an unsatisfying response. But it is here that the temporal gulf between us and Suchon
makes itself known. She may be surprisingly modern in her treatment of freedom and
society, but ultimately her ethics is grounded in obedience to God and fulfilment of our
natural commitments to him.55 We are free when we fulfil our true nature by exercising
our reason and obeying God. This is also when we are good. As a result the problem of
the opacity of the socialised self is somewhat tempered, though not outright cancelled:
for Suchon’s purposes it doesn’t hugely matter if we cannot know precisely how free we
are, as God knows the extent to which we fulfil his purpose for us. Her ethics does not set
out to give us a standard by which we judge ourselves or others according to the
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character of our, or their, actions; it tells us how to live in a way favourable to God. It is
thus not fatal to her project if her account of freedom and its social opponents makes it
difficult or impossible for us to make such judgements. As we saw, however, if we
estrange ethics from God, and instead locate it in the interpersonal actions of
individuals, matters change considerably.

2.4 Conclusion

In the lectures on the Problems of Moral Philosophy, Adorno criticises Kant for
(as he saw it) failing to adequately reconcile necessity and spontaneity—from which
freedom could be derived—in the third antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant
fails, Adorno says, because in our current society—and he takes Kant to be the exemplary
thinker of that society—moral philosophy is “necessarily a theory of private ethics,” an
ethics centred around the interpersonal actions of individuals in an individualistic
society. Adorno claims that the “highest point” of such an ethics is the “antinomy of
causality and freedom which figures in Kant’s philosophy in an unresolved and for that
reason exemplary fashion.” And, importantly, Adorno notes that “what appears in Kant
as the intertwining of man and nature is also the intertwining of man and society.”56 An
individualistic ethics, for Adorno, cannot reconcile freedom and society any more than it
can reconcile freedom and causality.
I believe that this problem is visible in the difficulties into which the
contemporary accounts of relational autonomy run in their attempts to hold onto both
the socially-constituted self and an idea of autonomy. As I noted at the outset, in his own
account of autonomy as normative competence Paul Benson takes the significance of free
agency or autonomy to be “the power of our actions to reveal who we are, both to
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ourselves and to others, in the context of potential normative assessments of what we
do.”57 Alongside the necessity of autonomy to political emancipation, this need for
normative assessment is the motivation for preserving a concept of autonomy against the
social. Allowing that we are thoroughly socialised would seem to render confused the
ideas that what we do reveals who we are in some stable or uncomplicated way, and that
who we are is the kind of thing that is properly subject to normative assessment.
Procedural conceptions of relational autonomy attempt to resolve this confusion by
installing within the self a place from which a critical perspective can be taken upon the
ways in which that self is socially constituted; with this critical perspective in hand, one
is properly the subject and object of normative assessments. But as we have seen, this
location within the self must either be a homunculus implausibly immune to the social,
and subject to all the same critiques that feminists levelled against the old masculinist
conception of autonomy; or we must nihilistically accept that it is just whichever one of
our numerous heteronomous parts is currently most powerful in our subjectivity.
Substantive conceptions allow that we are unfree when motivated by bad norms, even
ones that are reflectively endorsed by the critical procedures of authentic selves. But
without some account of how to identify these bad norms, given that they press
themselves upon us as insistently as good ones, we are not left with anything from which
autonomy could be constructed.
As we also saw, Suchon’s admittance of the social into the self—if not the soul—
was not as problematic for her ethical project. She does not need to ground a standpoint
from which normative judgements of ourselves or others are possible and that is not
itself vulnerable to charges of hypocrisy or inhumanity. A perfect standpoint for
normative judgement exists in God; to expect that we too could have such a standpoint is
not just overly optimistic, given our vulnerability to society, but impious. For Suchon,
57
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ethics is not a matter of our accountability to others but our accountability and closeness
to God. The social exists within her philosophy as a threat to women’s freedom that is to
be overcome through institutional and social reform, but it does not have to be
conceptually overcome, as the unknowability of the social self does not render ethics
itself impossible for Suchon.
The problem for the relational autonomists, then, is that their critique of the
masculinist atomised conception of autonomy does not go far enough. They recognise,
correctly, that the old view of autonomy is based on this atomised, individualistic image
of competing individuals constituting a fragmented society; but they fail to recognise that
so too is ethics itself. A view of ethics grounded in the interpersonal actions of
individuals, and of the individualised assessment of those individuals and actions,
requires a self that is autonomous and knowably so. Without it all normative assessment
is open to charges of hypocrisy or nihilism, the denigration of one socially-constituted
subject by another according to norms or self-beliefs which have no graspable
independent standing. But, as I hope I have shown, or given some reason to believe,
society muddles the knowability of this autonomous self, and hence muddles autonomy
itself as a ground for normative judgement. This is especially true in a society as
oppressive and, we think, distorted as ours.
As Adorno argued, the contradiction between society and autonomy is an artefact
of this individualised view of ethics. While we retain this view, we are committed to
attempting to reconcile autonomy and society conceptually—and, given how bad society
is, this reconciliation strikes me as politically suspect. We ought, I think, properly
recognise that society as it currently stands makes its own ideological conception of
autonomy impossible, and use this as one critique to motivate the revolutionary
reworking of society into one that does not contradict freedom. The views currently
articulated in defence of autonomy could be very useful in this task, as they identify in
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the negative many of the ways in which society assaults the psyches of its most
vulnerable denizens: they are unable to determine the content of their own life-plans,
they make decisions that harm themselves, they feel morally and socially incompetent or
isolated, they are seen by others or by society at large as being so. They are, in short,
unable to self-determine, self-authorise, and self-govern: they are alienated and unfree. I
don’t think that any of the attempts to derive a theory of a currently-possible autonomy
from these harms succeeds. Worse than being conceptually fraught, such attempts to
find pockets of autonomy within an unfree society end up making that society seem more
free than it is, and they make the obvious need for radical change seem less pressing. But
the relational autonomists do give us a new and better image of heteronomy than the old
patriarchs, from which an internal critique of this society can be formulated, and
progress toward reshaping it can be made.
For Suchon, reshaping society involved turning it into one in which women were
not estranged from their essence and were hence able to realise it in their relation to
God. Obviously I do not share the same religious or metaphysical beliefs as Suchon, but
her case is instructive. If society renders freedom incoherent, it is not because we need to
rethink freedom but because we need to change society.
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3. Patriarchy, Beauty, and Revolution in the Work of Mary
Wollstonecraft

3.1 Introduction

In 1600, Lucrezia Marinella wrote in her polemical The Nobility and Excellence
of Women and the Defects and Vices of Men that “man needs to love beautiful things,
and what more beautiful thing adorns the world than woman?”1 Beauty, both that of
performance and adornment, the natural and affected, is contested ground for Marinella
as it had been for many other writers, misogynist and counter-misogynist: aesthetics as a
discursive realm has long structured and been structured by gender ideology, with the
common association of women with beauty serving to inform notions of the place,
function, and nature of beauty as well as those of women. Marinella, concerned to
counter Giuseppe Passi’s misogynist tract Dei donneschi difetti, released the previous
year, makes extensive use of beauty as both a social and natural phenomenon in her
defence—and exaltation—of women. In the process she produces a particular, heavily
theological aesthetics that defends a place for beauty and for women, configured as
beauty’s exemplary objects, within the social and divine order. In this way, Marinella’s
work at the very opening of the 17th century exemplifies the three-sided conflict that I
will discuss in this chapter: a network of complex interactions between beauty, gender,
and social and political power.
These three things, and their influences upon one another, are present in the
backgrounds of many of the writers—pro- and anti-woman—of the early modern period.
Writers may lean on particular ideas of women’s place or character—those ideas

1
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themselves influenced by women’s social position—to justify or explain aesthetic
theories. They might use those aesthetic theories in the service of existing power or in the
service of revolution. Or they might seek to change the position of women through a
cunning use of existing ideas on beauty.
This chapter is situated within the eighteenth century British context, and it
presents a reading of the work of Mary Wollstonecraft as seeing many of the contours of
this three-sided conflict and coming down decisively on its “power” side; that is,
Wollstonecraft argues that gender and aesthetic ideologies are both the products of
existing oppressive social orders, and that hence only major ‘on the ground’ political
change can go about shifting them in favour of women. In this way Wollstonecraft can be
presented as a torch-bearer within a materialist revolutionary tradition—albeit one
whose sympathies and faith lie firmly with the bourgeoisie of eighteenth century Britain.
To get to this point we will first have to see how Wollstonecraft sees beauty,
gender, and power interacting in her two Vindications of 1790 and 1792. We will also
have cause to examine the other intellectual currents of the time—here represented by
the third Earl of Shaftesbury, Edmund Burke, and Frances Reynolds. Before all that,
however, and by way of continuing this introduction, I will briefly sketch out how I see
the work of Marinella falling within the triangular contest that I have described.
Beauty does have a certain kind of power for Marinella, predicated on what
seems to be a fact about its nature—“man needs to love beautiful things.” This power is
explained earlier in the text with reference to the perceived power of women as objects
over presumed heterosexual male subjects: “men are obliged and forced to love women,”
she writes, and “women are not obliged to love them back, except merely from
courtesy.”2 Again, then, beauty and gender are intertwined, with the pleasure and appeal
of beauty referred back to the pleasure and appeal of women understood merely as
2
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objects. (“Everyone will be convinced of these matters one day,” she adds, “and the
obstinate oppressors of women who trample on their dignity with greater insolence each
day will be overcome.”)
Beauty has another power too, one that is—for Marinella—far more important
than any kind of appetitive inducement. Beauty leads to knowledge of God; and, again, it
is the beauty of women in particular that is of most significance here: “women’s beauty
leads to the knowledge of God the supernal intelligence, and shows the way to heaven.”3
She describes beauty as a “golden chain” upon whose links the soul progresses to heaven,
beginning with “corporeal beauty” but then quickly ascending to the second link that
“gazes with the internal eye at the soul that, adorned with celestial excellence, gives form
to the beautiful body.” From there - the beauty of the soul that shines through the body the soul then progresses further, to contemplate “the angelic spirits” and God himself.4
Reflecting on the beauty of women, then—again from the perspective of a presumed
heterosexual male subject—leads an adequately contemplative mind directly to
knowledge of God.
This theological picture has many consequences. Situating women within a divine
system is, of course, itself a strong defence of their significance and virtue; so, too, is
Marinella’s insistence that a more beautiful body is an indicator and consequence of a
more beautiful soul, which she lays out explicitly earlier:

Now, if we wished to apply the common reasoning, we would say that
women’s souls are equal to men’s. But the complete falseness of this
opinion will become apparent to everyone whose mind is not totally
committed to the opposite point of view if we consider the body, because
the nobility of the soul can be judged from the excellence of the body—
which is ornamented with the same character and beauty as the soul,
“which such a body manifests in itself.” The greater nobility and
3
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worthiness of a woman’s body is shown by its delicacy, its complexion,
and its temperate nature, as well as by its beauty, which is a grace of
splendor proceeding from the soul as well as from the body. Beauty is
without a doubt a ray of light from the soul that pervades the body in
which it finds itself, as the wise Plotinus writes …5
Through aesthetics and its attendant associations, then, Marinella claims for
women a superior personal virtue to that of men, as well as greater favour from God and
a divinely-ordained social, epistemological, and theological role within the natural order
of things.6 In a heavily religious society, this role—if taken seriously by men—would
translate to significant social and political power, with women, merely by virtue of their
beauty, acting as guarantors of the moral fabric of society itself (we will see a strange
mirror of this in the work of Frances Reynolds more than a century later). In Marinella’s
work, then, aesthetics lies in the heart of a complex of moral and political questions—
ones that surround not just the position and experience of women (seemingly inert
objects in all this, even on the counter-misogynist side), but the shape of the society in
which those women live.
Ideology surrounding women and beauty, itself a complex and interpenetrative
knot, has frequently served as a locus of sprawling political contexts. Marinella, writing
at the very beginning of the seventeenth century, mediates her arguments about the
political and moral value of women through an aesthetic and theological lens. Several
decades later, François Poulain de la Barre argued that women’s adherence to and
apparent obsession with the rituals of performative beauty was a result of their
oppression—it was a sort of palliative, and an illicit avenue toward an informal power
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that was the only form not denied to them.7 This shifts the ideology of beauty to a
different ground: the beauty of women and their participation in its practice is no longer
a natural given from which arguments of the kind Marinella made can proceed, but a
social fact in need of explanation. This in turn can lead to a reorientation of the political
aspect of beauty: rather than arguing alongside a known, established order—for
improvements within that order—beauty, its effects and fellow-travellers, can be made to
argue against that order. Hence the relationship between beauty and power - at least in
theory - needn’t always be unidirectional.
In this chapter, as I have said, I will focus on another knot of ideology
surrounding beauty, gender, and political power—this time in eighteenth century Britain.
I argue that the work of Mary Wollstonecraft, right at the end of that century, is able to
penetrate much of this fog, arguing as she does for a revolutionary reworking of society
that would change the bases of beauty and of the subject- and objecthood of women. This
argument is itself refracted through various lenses, not least that of the growing
economic and cultural power of the bourgeoisie as a class; these lenses, too, will need to
be scrutinised. But I begin by turning to how Wollstonecraft understood the interplay of
beauty and power to function within her society at large, and with regard to the
contested position of women in particular.

3. 2 Beauty and Social Power in the Thought of Mary Wollstonecraft

7
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Wollstonecraft sees the relation between beauty and power in much more
complex and dynamic terms than Marinella or Poulain. Like Poulain, she understands
that the dominance of performative beauty over the lives of women is a result of their
exclusion from the realms of institutional power: they are “confined … in cages like the
feathered race” with “nothing to do but to plume themselves and stalk with mock
majesty from perch to perch.”8 But unlike the relatively straightforward therapeutic role
that performative beauty plays in Poulain’s analysis, in Wollstonecraft’s works —in the
Vindications of the Rights of Men and Woman and in the Historical and Moral View of
the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution—beauty is situated in a dialectic with
power; a dialectic subjugatory of women which beauty actively advances. From this,
Wollstonecraft is able to combine the view of Poulain—that an emphasis on beauty is a
direct result of a lack of power—with a sort of corollary or consequence of that of
Marinella—that beauty grants its wielder a kind of social power—and show that both
conditions conspire to keep women in a state of spiritual, mental, moral, and physical
enervation. Only some kind of liberatory political effort can break this exhausting cycle.
This critique is formed alongside, within, and around Wollstonecraft’s critique of
the aristocracy. The attack on aristocracy takes centre stage in A Vindication of the
Rights of Men, an early rebuke to Edmund Burke’s counterrevolutionary Reflections on
the Revolution in France that participates in the discourse on gender, beauty, and power
of which Burke’s much earlier Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the
Sublime and the Beautiful is the paradigmatic text of eighteenth century Britain.9
Though with some significant differences—foremost among them being that aristocrats
have real power—Wollstonecraft sees the same process that degrades and enervates
women at work in the indolence and moral decay of the aristocracy, and uses this

8
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process’ corruption, not just of the aristocracy or of women but of society as a whole, to
justify French Revolution in 1789. The harm of this process to society in its entirety will
also justify the famous “revolution in female manners” for which Wollstonecraft calls in
the Vindication of the Rights of Woman.10
I will begin with the aristocracy, whose slovenly otium and the vanity that is its
effect Wollstonecraft decries throughout her work. As Claudia Johnson notes in
Equivocal Beings, Wollstonecraft’s first Vindication—the Rights of Men—“refutes the
Burkean axiom” that “to make us love our country, our country ought to be lovely.”11,12
Indeed, in his Reflections—whence the axiom comes—Burke mourns the loss of the
“mixed system of opinion and sentiment”of the European ancien régime, of which by
Burke’s lights the French Revolution is just the beginning of the end; a regime that
depended for its power not just on the bare light of reason, but on the “superadded ideas,
furnished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns and the
understanding ratifies.” The power of the old aristocratic regimes, Burke argues, comes
from such “pleasing illusions,” and from the incorporation into politics of “the
sentiments that beautify and soften private society”; the new revolution proposes to burn
all these traditional affects away, leaving us with our “naked shivering nature.”13
In sum, for Burke in the Reflections, aristocracy as a system of government is
justified by its beauty: that is, by its appeal, both sensuous and imaginative, to the
sentiments.14 As he wrote in the Enquiry, beauty for Burke is a “social quality,” because
the “sentiments of tenderness and affections towards [the] persons” of others that it
inspires causes us to enter “willingly” into relations with them.15 Hence the axiom that
10
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the institutions of power ought to inspire love rather than appeal merely to the
calculating strictures of reason so fêted by the archetypal French revolutionaries. In the
Rights of Man, published mere weeks after the Reflections in 1790, Wollstonecraft treats
this notion with unvarnished contempt:

If there is any thing like argument, or first principles, in your wild
declamation [i.e., the Reflections], behold the result:—that we are to
reverence the rust of antiquity, and term the unnatural customs, which
ignorance and mistaken self-interest have consolidated, the sage fruit of
experience: nay, that if we do discover some errors, our feelings should
lead us to excuse, with blind love, or unprincipled filial affection, the
venerable vestiges of ancient days. These are gothic notions of beauty—the
ivy is beautiful, but, when it insidiously destroys the trunk from which it
receives support, who would not grub it up?16
Throughout her work Wollstonecraft never tires of cataloguing the abject, rotten
condition of the ruling class, and she locates this condition precisely in the tendency of
the ruling class to derive its continued power from appeals to the sentiments—what she
so acidly calls “feelings” above—rather than to reason. Burke, in defending them, has
made himself an “adorer of the golden image which power has set up,”17 and this
adoration is poisonous both to society as a whole and to the characters of those idle
aristocrats. “Luxury and effeminacy” have introduced “much idiotism into the noble
families which form one of the pillars of our state”; “restless idleness, and its
concomitant, vice” have spread as a “contagion” through society.18
The spread of this contagion proceeds by, first, rendering the rich themselves
indolent, stupid, and shallow: placed in a “torrid zone, with the meridian sun of pleasure
darting directly upon them” they experience none of the wants and needs that
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Wollstonecraft sees as necessary for the development of solid virtues.19 With an
education that focuses on refinement and manners rather than the “practice of those
duties which dignify the human character,” the rich soon soon become conditioned as
“vain and helpless.” For Wollstonecraft, this social conditioning operates “by the same
law which in nature invariably produces certain effects”20: the characters and virtues of
the rich—like those of anyone else—are inevitably formed by the social structures in
which the rich are situated and the material conditions on which those social structures
supervene.
The arbitrary system of property and position that Burke considers so lovely thus
has a debilitating effect on the minds of the people it exalts:

The mewing babe in swaddling-clothes, who is treated like a superior
being, may perchance become a gentleman; but nature must have given
him uncommon faculties if, when pleasure hangs on every bough, he has
sufficient fortitude either to exercise his mind or body in order to acquire
personal merit. 21
Wollstonecraft consistently aestheticises this state as gaudy, deformed to the
point of putrescence and—in a sign of her participation in and (arguably) subversion of
the discourse of gender and beauty given zenithal expression in Burke’s Inquiry22—
effeminate. We will have cause to return to this aesthetic characterisation of the melting,
relaxing effects of power shortly.
Worse than the deformed state of the ruling class alone, however, is the effect
that this deformation has on wider society. Wollstonecraft (correctly) notes that the great
men of the nobility all achieved their status by some inaugural injustice or deceit— chiefs
“touching the most powerful springs of savage conduct, hope and fear”—rather than
19
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through any kind of natural right. Nevertheless these despots must make a “shew of
right,” and they must make ever greater shows of right as the progress of civilisation
expands the intellectual opportunities and capacities of their subjects. They are
“compelled to make covert corruption hold fast the power which was formerly snatched
by open force.”23 The power of the aristocracy cannot be grounded in reason or the
intellect. It is itself irrational and unjust: hereditary power “clash[es] with the mental
superiority that naturally raises a man above his fellows.”24 The best way, then, to grant a
legitimate sheen to the power of the aristocracy is to, as she puts it, make a great show of
pomp and circumstance, luxury, extravagance, superstition, and “the pestiferous
purple”25: that is, to generate the “pleasing illusions” masking despotism that Burke
explicitly celebrates. By gilding their power they make it temporarily tolerable, but they
make themselves stupid.
Worse yet, this power structure makes the contagion more virulent by creating
perverse incentives for those lower down the hierarchy. The pathetic creatures of the
ruling class warp the fabric of society around them such that the acquisition of true merit
pales as a method for social advancement compared to appealing to their own cramped
and shallow sentiments. Virtue, talent, and industry are neglected as the game of wealth
and rank is played with pride, flattery, and adornment—an immoderate obsession with
appealing to the sensuous:
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Have ye not heard that we cannot serve two masters? an immoderate
desire to please contracts the faculties, and immerges, to borrow the idea
of a great philosopher, the soul in matter, till it becomes unable to mount
on the wing of contemplation.26
For Wollstonecraft, this is a necessary consequence of the coincidence of that
which is appealing to the senses—beauty—with power: in this case, the very real power of
property and rank. A harmful cycle is therefore formed in which beauty and power each
feed off and structure the other: power grants access to the objects of beauty without any
need to first acquire virtue or talent, thus cramping the mind; these beauty-cramped
minds, easily appeased by frippery and flattery, then control access to power and
reputation, encouraging further vitiation of both themselves and others. This whole
process is based not on any principles but on sentiment and—as Todd puts it—
“mystification,” demanding “emotional acceptance” of the ruling class’ power “without
cause.”27 And in her Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution Wollstonecraft
makes clear that it is this dynamic of decay and degeneracy that leads to—and justifies—
the revolutionary break in which the industrious, soberly virtuous bourgeoisie seize
power from the luxuriant aristocracy in the name of reason and liberty:

The idle caprices of an effeminate court had long given the tone to the
awe-struck populace, who, stupidly admiring what they did not
understand, lived on a vive le roi, whilst his blood-sucking minions
drained every vein, that should have warmed their honest hearts.
But the irresistible energy of the moral and political sentiments of
half a century, at last kindled into a blaze the illuminating rays of truth,
which, throwing new light on the mental powers of man, and giving fresh
spring to his reasoning faculties, completely undermined the strong holds
of priestcraft and hypocrisy. 28
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With a rational social hierarchy in place—one structured by the “natural”
distinction of mental prowess rather than by arbitrary divisions of power—there is no
longer any reason for those in power or those seeking to gain it to indulge in their own
sentiments or others’.29 The self-evident justice of the system means it needn’t hide its
power behind awesome rituals of wealth or extravagance, and the holds of superstition
and sentiment over society are broken.30 Individuals rise on the true merits of their
virtues and capacities which, exercised now by necessity, are cultivated and expanded.31
This necessity of exercising ability and virtue is one that Wollstonecraft sees as already
holding over “the middle rank of life”—the men of that middle rank, that is—with the
consequence that “the middle rank contains most virtue and abilities.”32 With the
aristocracy deposed, the structures of beauty and sentiment that hold back others from
exercising their abilities are deposed too: the middle classes, then, are for Wollstonecraft
the subjects of revolution not just because their circumstances permit them to undertake
it but because the revolution forms a societal structure aligned with the values, as she
sees them, of the (current) middle class.33
Changing the deep structure of power, therefore, changes too the influence that
beauty holds over society. Wollstonecraft, however, would not allow for the exclusion
from this formula of the circumstances of women, whose oppression and enervation
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renders the hope of reform or revolution remote for everyone. And we can now turn
more specifically to the way that Wollstonecraft sees this dialectic of beauty and power
operating on the social position of women—a critique that Wollstonecraft makes
alongside that she makes of the aristocracy, rather than artificially separating them as I
have here—and the way that she responds to the gendered account of beauty given by
Burke. This will hopefully also temper, though probably not eradicate, any lingering
concern that Wollstonecraft’s contemptuous characterisation of the “effeminate” is itself
misogynist or antifeminist.
The vast majority of women, of course, did not enjoy the real power of wealth and
rank of the aristocracy. But Wollstonecraft does believe that, through beauty, women—at
least, women of the middle and upper classes—do become trapped in a similar cycle to
that of the aristocracy. In the case of women, however, it is not generated by plenitude
but by a lack of rational and virtuous paths to power and self-efficacy. The rich have no
incentive to expand their minds or virtues because they want for nothing and are
surrounded by idle pleasures; women have no opportunity to do so because they are
systematically denied any such opportunities by patriarchal institutions and traditions.34
The industry and necessity for and by which middle class men are cultivated is closed
away from almost all of their women counterparts (Wollstonecraft herself seeming to be
a rule-proving exception). Middle and upper class women receive only “a disorderly kind
of education”35 from which emerge “uncultivated understandings [that] make them
entirely dependent on their senses for employment and amusement.”36
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This forced dependence on the senses narrows the horizons of women’s activity,
and—because “the employment of the thoughts shapes the character both generally and
individually”—the effect is that women are constructed as objects and subjects of taste
and little else.37 That is, women are constructed both as beautiful bodies to be admired
and adorned and as beings in thrall to their own senses and sentiments, who can
participate in refined, pretty conversation on matters of taste. This significantly
demonstrates a slippage between the division of subject and object wherein being a
subject is itself objectified by the demand that opinions be appealing. Both sides are
thereby weaponised against women’s characters. As Wollstonecraft observes, the two
also participate in their own self-reinforcing cycle: being a beautiful object requires the
cultivation of the senses and faculties of sensuous taste; this devotion to the senses,
rather than to reason or truth, reduces one’s self-efficacy and makes the appeal to the
senses of others yet more necessary.
Wollstonecraft’s acerbic—and at times mournful—depiction of this condition
takes up much of the prose of her Vindications and even of the Historical and Moral
View, all of which are outstanding polemics. A couple of examples will suffice, though
there are many from which to choose:

Women are every where in this deplorable state; for, in order to preserve
their innocence, as ignorance is courteously termed, truth is hidden from
them, and they are made to assume an artificial character before their
faculties have acquired any strength. Taught from their infancy that
beauty is woman’s sceptre, the mind shapes itself to the body, and,
roaming around its gilt cage, only seeks to adorn its prison.38
Where is the dignity, the infallibility of sensibility, in the fair ladies,
whom, if the voice of rumour is to be credited, the captive negroes curse in
already seen, she believes that this working class virtue is insufficient to effect radical change, preferring,
it seems, the more abstract intellectual virtues of the bourgeoisie.
37
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all the agony of bodily pain, for the unheard of tortures they invent? It is
probable that some of them, after the sight of a flagellation, compose their
ruffled spirits and exercise their tender feelings by the perusal of the last
imported novel.—How true those tears are to nature, I leave you to
determine.39
As with the wealthy, this impoverishment of women’s intellectual and moral
faculties is both symptom and cause of their single-minded focus on the performances of
beauty and taste. For, again like the wealthy, the enervated state of refinement that is
cultivated in women really does work to grant women access to a form of power that
otherwise would—like all others—be closed off from them: “if women,” Wollstonecraft
writes, “are not permitted to enjoy legitimate rights, they will render both men and
themselves vicious, to obtain illicit privileges.”40 Women, shut out from political or
institutional power,41 adorn their bodies and refine their opinions to appeal to the base
sensualism of men, who—themselves vitiated by the moral malaise generated by the
pestiferous purples of aristocracy and patriarchy—find themselves taken in and setting
up women as despots. As Johnson puts it, for Wollstonecraft, “women’s weaknesses
render them imperious rather than docile … Men ought to resent in women the same
power they resent in kings”42: that is, an irrational and arbitrary power based on the
senses rather than reason.
So the “passions of men have thus placed women on thrones,” and while this
continues to be the only possible avenue for women’s access to power and self-efficacy it
will continue to be one frequently walked, and women will continue to cramp their
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intellects and spirits in the pursuit of these “illicit privileges.”43 The two conditions—
enervating beauty and illicit, sensual power—reinforce one another for women as they
do, in a different way, for the aristocracy. And of course, as well as being undesirable
from the point of view of its vicious effects on the mind, soul, and body, the arbitrary
power women gain through beauty is also exclusionary of the great many women who
are unable for whatever reason to meet the arbitrary demands of men’s desires. To be a
beautiful object or a refined subject is expensive and difficult; it excludes the poor, the
old, those whose appearance deviates from a societal norm. As the dialectic turns
between beauty and social power it leaves more and more women behind—the vast
majority of them, in fact. Even those women who can meet the demands of male lust are
excluded for most of their lives: “the usefulness of age, and the rational hopes of futurity,
are all to be sacrificed to render women an object of desire for a short time.”44
This dialectic is therefore in a dynamic of “patriarchal equilibrium,” as described
by the historian Judith Bennett: a historical dynamic distinguished by the plasticity of
patriarchal institutions, that is, their ability to persevere through time while
accommodating and adapting to apparent or superficial changes in the status and
condition of women.45 So despite—in fact because of—the despotic power of the
imperious beauty, women as a category remain subjugated. As Naomi Garner notes, “the
illusion of power through beauty that entices and entraps women is a manageable power
that does not threaten male superiority.”46 We will have cause to return to the
phenomenon of patriarchal equilibrium shortly.
As Johnson demonstrates, Wollstonecraft therefore constructs a sweeping
critique of a weak, ignorant, sensualist societal tendency: one that keeps the aristocracy
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in power, keeps women subjected, and “degrad[es]” men, whose own vicious sensualism
is also enflamed by a society structured according to their desires.47 It this same
sentimental aesthetic tendency that Burke celebrates (and whose passing he preemptively mourns) in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, using his idea of
beauty from the Enquiry: that quality which, “in bodies, [causes] love, or some passion
similar to it.”48 In the Enquiry Burke also explicitly links this notion of beauty with
women and with weakness:

[Beauty], where it is highest, in the female sex, almost always carries with
it an idea of weakness and imperfection. Women are very sensible of this;
for which reason they learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, to counterfeit
weakness, and even sickness. In all this they are guided by nature.49
Wollstonecraft references this passage in the Rights of Man, addressing Burke
directly:

Thus confining truth, fortitude, and humanity, within the rigid pale of
manly morals, they might justly argue, that to be loved, women’s high end
and great distinction! they should ‘learn to lisp, to totter in their walk, and
nick-name God’s creatures.’ Never, they might repeat after you, was any
man, much less a woman, rendered amiable by the force of those exalted
qualities, fortitude, justice, wisdom, and truth; and thus forewarned of the
sacrifice they must make to to those austere, unnatural virtues, they
would be authorized to turn all their intentions to their persons,
systematically neglecting morals to secure beauty.50
Wollstonecraft’s contempt for effeminacy or femininity, then, is predicated on the
Burkean ideology that yokes together femininity, beauty, weakness, and love, and on the
47
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dire social order that that ideology justifies and from which it emerged. As both Garner
and Johnson observe, in different ways, Wollstonecraft’s attack is against a femininity
understood (or “prescribed,” to use Garner’s more enlightening term) in the eighteenth
century as one that uses weakness and smallness to enflame the sentiments.51 Indeed,
her repeated invocation of the effeminacy of men—both in the otiose aristocracy and in
the middle class men that chase women’s beauty—stands as a rebuke to Burke and,
what’s more, to the notion that these aestheticised gender divisions really are “guided by
nature.”52 She attacks femininity throughout society and across genders, and in so doing
decouples “femininity” as an ideological construct born of the corruption of its times
from women as real beings. As she says in one of her most revolutionary passages, her
aim is nothing less than to “see the distinction of sex confounded in society.”53 And, as
both Garner and Johnson note, this distinction, and the effeminate society around it, was
created by men54: it was the intemperate libidinal social order created by effeminate men
that placed women upon enervating thrones.55

3. 3 Taste, Femininity, and Power in the Eighteenth Century
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Wollstonecraft’s anti-effeminate feminism and her republicanism are hence
intertwined: both aristocracy and patriarchy depend for their operation on a particular
gendered aesthetics that both hides and justifies the irrational power at their cores, and
to do away with the despotic aristocracy one must also do away with the despotic
patriarchy that shares its structural logic. We can thus begin to see the general shape of
Wollstonecraft’s intervention in the three-sided contest between beauty, gender, and
power that I identified in the introduction: the power of the aristocracy and of the
patriarchy operates through, and helps create, a particular aesthetic order that makes
use of ideological assumptions about gender that are themselves generated by existing
power relations. Attempts to decouple the bad parts of these assumptions from the good
or to rework the connection between beauty and women in a way that could be more
positive or pro-woman are fruitless while material social relations—the domination of
women by men, and of the lower classes by the aristocracy—are pushing back in the
opposite direction. The only solution is to reject such ideologies entirely and to work to
overthrow their bases within those material social relations.
This in itself is evidence of Wollstonecraft’s radicalism. But in this section I will
attempt to grant some particularity to the shape that Wollstonecraft’s radicalism can
take when read in the context of a wider discourse that took place in the eighteenth
century at the intersections of class, gender, and beauty. This discourse, according to
Robert W. Jones in Gender and the Formation of Taste in Eighteenth Century Britain,
sought to make the social function and meaning of taste accessible to the rising
bourgeoisie and amenable to their class interests, rather than just to the interests of the
aristocracy. Within this debate the role of women as arbiters of a private, domestic realm
and as subjects and objects of beauty was contested.56 Situated in this light,
Wollstonecraft’s introduction of the analysis of patriarchy into the debate can be read as
56
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a dialectical manoeuvre that both refutes the middle classes’ attempts to turn taste to
their own ends and uplifts or confirms their rejection of the aristocracy’s own claims for
it. To see how, we’ll examine the contours of this discourse by turning to two of the
eighteenth century writers analysed by Jones: Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of
Shaftesbury, and the artist Frances Reynolds. Both have work that encompasses and
interacts with, in various ways, all three sides of our triangular conflict between beauty,
power, and gender—and both bring particular, distorting class interests to bear upon it.
Shaftesbury, of course, is an aristocrat, and his Characteristicks of Men,
Manners, Opinions, Times of 1711 gives a depiction of the relation between aesthetics
and virtue that places virtue—and its attendant prestige and social power—firmly in the
hands of the aristocracy. An appreciation and understanding of beauty—a refined taste—
is vital for Shaftesbury as a motivator toward virtuous action; an understanding of virtue
in principle is hopelessly outmatched when it runs counter to the appetites and
sentiments:

Thus we see, after all, that ’tis not merely what we call Principle, but a
TASTE, which governs Men. They may think for certain “This is right, or
that wrong”: They may believe “This a Crime, or that a Sin; This
punishable by Man, or that by God!” Yet if the Savor of things lies cross to
HONESTY; if the Fancy be florid, and the Appetite high towards the
subaltern Beautys and lower Order of worldly Symmetrys and
Proportions; the Conduct will infallibly turn this latter way.57
This—that the mind will not turn to the good while it has idle fancies or
“subaltern Beautys” to keep it occupied—could have been written by Wollstonecraft. But
for Shaftesbury the cultivation of taste means much more than learning to resist the
temptations of those things which are charming but vicious. It means, too, an
appreciation and love of “Order, Harmony and Proportion,” which is not just “highly
57
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assistant to Virtue” but is constitutive of it: virtue “is itself no other than the Love of
Order and Beauty in Society.”58
For Shaftesbury, this social aspect of virtue and taste is extremely important: he
writes that “in this Case alone it is we call any Creature worthy or virtuous, when it can
have the Notion of a publick Interest, and can attain the Speculation or Science of what is
morally good or ill, admirable or blameable, right or wrong.”59 Virtue is expressed by the
extent to which one works for the public good; the public good is that which lends order,
harmony, and hence beauty to society. Indeed Shaftesbury argues later in
Characteristics that “a Creature” cannot “be good or useful to himself” apart from “as he
continues good to Society, and to that Whole of which he is himself a Part.”60 And it is
taste, an appreciation for the beauty of the just society, that moves the creature to act for
the good of that society and hence virtuously. Virtue, as Jones puts it, is defined for
Shaftesbury as “the ability to rise above particular concerns or personal interests,”61 and
the ideal life is that of an ideal citizen, one who—like the citizens of the old Greek and
Roman republics—is guided by taste and beauty in the fulfilment of his civic duty.62
And, as with the Greek and Roman republics, the characterisation of virtue as
tastefully and disinterestedly transcending the particular is both gendered and classed,
with the effect that truly virtuous citizens can only be drawn from the ranks of the male
landed gentry or aristocracy. The new middle classes, who owe their position to their
engagement in private commerce and industry (rather than land or heredity), are too
tied to their own self-interest and to the particularised realm of the commodity to be
truly virtuous: “aristocratic landowners,” writes Jones, “were thought to be above the
particular and divisive economic interests which debarred the East India merchant from
58
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the exercise of citizenship fully as much as the cobbler and the tallow-chandler.”63
Referencing JGA Pocock, Jones argues that the “ability to be a citizen was thought to rely
on the practices and principles of patrician landownership.”64 We can see this in
Shaftesbury’s frequent excoriation of idle luxury, which—unlike the similar tone in
Wollstonecraft—serves the interests of the old aristocracy, who needn’t purchase fame or
their entrance to the public: “Equipages, Titles, Precedencys, Staffs, Ribbons, and other
such glittering Ware, are taken in exchange for inward MERIT, HONOUR, and a
CHARACTER.”65
Like the Greeks and Romans of his model, Shaftesbury expects that the highest
quality characters of a society will “fight against Luxury and Corruption in times of
Prosperity and Peace,”66 imagining as Wollstonecraft does a link between access to
beautiful objects and corruption. While Wollstonecraft thinks that having to work for
such access is improving—and hence that the middle classes are in a better moral
position than the aristocracy—Shaftesbury thinks that such work is indicative of a
narrow, privatised self-interest alien to (or, at best, irrelevant to) a proper public virtue.
The “public” is thus for Shaftesbury very narrow, consisting only of the landed
aristocracy: those that, within the structures of the early eighteenth century, still hold
onto institutional and political power.
Shaftesbury thus takes a stand for a traditional civic virtue that finds beauty in
the order and harmony of a well-functioning society and rejects the love of luxuries and
pleasurable objects as a vicious, self-interested lack of taste. Hence it is important for
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Shaftesbury to delineate an understanding or image of the proper objects and subjects of
taste; and it is here that we can see the work that gender does in structuring his account.
Women appear throughout Characteristicks as both symbols of improper aesthetic
appreciation - an over-sensual, “effeminate” taste - and as concrete objects of that
improper appreciation that can drive otherwise virtuous men to distraction, indolence,
and irrationality. In a parable he writes approvingly of a prince who resists the urge to
gaze upon a beautiful woman (unknown to him, his own wife), believing that it will cause
him to abandon his duties67; later he argues that women are “the chief subject” of many
“civil turmoils” between “fine gentlemen.”68 The appreciation of women’s beauty hence
appears alongside the appreciation of the beauty of equipage, staffs, and ribbons: as
enervating indulgence in idle pleasures. And, traversing the subject-object distinction,
this bad aesthetic sense is itself frequently derided as “effeminate” or otherwise
associated with women.69 The acquisitiveness and commerce of the bourgeoisie is hence
excluded from the realm of virtuous taste by its association with a ‘womanly’ aesthetic
sense that is understood as too sensuous and too sensual.
Shaftesbury therefore links taste intimately to virtue, and then uses misogynist
associations to limit that taste to a particular kind: austere, aristocratic, and masculine.
The ‘correct’ kind of beauty is understood to inhere in the abstract qualities of harmony,
proportion, and order, and though for Shaftesbury a taste for such things is an “appetite”
it is still opposed to the “effeminate, indolent, and amorous Passions” that characterise
pleasure.70 Once again the three sides of our conflict—beauty, power, and gender—come
clearly into view, with a gendered aesthetics that grows from existing power relations
being leveraged to lend the lustre of virtue to those relations.
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Burke, as we have seen and by strong contrast, holds women up as the absolute
exemplars or ur-objects of beauty. Indeed he rejects the idea that proportion has
anything to do with beauty—as it does for Shaftesbury—using, as an example, the beauty
of a woman to a presumed heterosexual male reader:

If you assign any determinate proportions to the limbs of a man, and if
you limit human beauty to these proportions, when you find a woman
who differs in the make and measures of almost every part, you must
conclude her not to be beautiful, in spite of the suggestions of your
imagination; or, in obedience to your imagination, you must renounce
your rules; you must lay by the scale and compass, and look out for some
other cause of beauty. 71
As for Shaftesbury, the appreciation of beauty is appetitive for Burke (“the
suggestions of your imagination”) but in decoupling it from the ideas of proportion or
order he decouples it also from general principles that could be communicated and
shared between separate individuals within a public, and which might inspire those
individuals to virtuous social action. For Burke, the appreciation of beauty rests much
more upon that which privately gratifies the sentiments and inspires individualised
love—what Jones calls “an aesthetic of heterosexual excitement.”72 Nowhere is this
aesthetic more obvious than in Burke’s description of the beauty of “gradual variation,”
in which he expounds breathlessly upon the appeal of a woman’s décolletage:

Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most
beautiful, about the neck and breasts; the smoothness, the softness, the
easy and insensible swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the
smallest space the same; the deceitful maze through which the unsteady
eye slides giddily, without knowing where to fix, or whither it is carried. Is
not this a demonstration of that change of surface, continual, and yet
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hardly perceptible at any point, which forms one of the great constituents
of beauty?73
Jones’ discussion of Burke’s Enquiry dissects the ambivalence of his aesthetics
and its political corollaries; certainly, Burke was no libertine, and he cannot without
considerable violence be made to stand for a singular ethics of bourgeois
acquisitiveness.74 As we’ve already seen, the private, sensuous aesthetics that we’re here
contrasting with Shaftesbury’s aristocratic posture was nevertheless pressed into the
service of counterrevolution a few decades later. Nevertheless, for our purposes, it’s
enough to note the way gender ideology structures the aesthetic theory Burke outlines in
the Enquiry. As taste retreats from the public realm, the perspective of the heterosexual
male aesthetic subject on women as objects changes: from the dissolute and wanton
desire injurious to virtue warned against by Shaftesbury to a private appreciation that
acts as an exemplar or prototype through which the faculty of taste itself can be
understood. To put it another way, and as Jones demonstrates, as taste becomes more
private and more sensuous it becomes more closely associated with women—though the
perceived moral threat of the lascivious and libertine woman never entirely dissipates.75
This association between women and taste is demonstrated and positively
articulated by the artist Frances Reynolds in her short Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of Our Ideas of Beauty, &c., of 1785. Even more
so—and more explicitly—than Burke or Shaftesbury, Reynolds makes the gender division
the axle and origin of her entire aesthetic system:
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It is I imagine to the principles of the masculine and the feminine
character, that we owe the perception of beauty or taste, in any object
whatever, throughout all nature, and all art that imitates nature …76
For Reynolds, therefore, all our judgements regarding the beautiful and sublime
refer back, either directly or “symbolically,” to the aesthetic judgement of human beings
as objects, with the “feminine character” as the “sweetest, most interesting image of
beauty,” and the masculine “partak[ing]” of the sublime. “Thus it will be found,” she
writes, “that, in every object that is universally pleasing, there exist principles that are
analogous to those that constitute beauty in the human species.”77 And the “governing
principle” of beauty in humans—and hence, by analogy, in everything—is “the moral
sense.”78 That is, for Reynolds, that our apprehension of beauty in humans is an
apprehension of the “moral virtue” of the object: “the body charms,” she writes, “because
the soul is seen.” This ability to perceive virtue is a matter of cultivation: “the rustic” is
charmed by the physical, but “to a man of taste the physical pleases only through the
medium of the moral.”79 And in this schema it is only the “man” of taste that perceives
“the real charms of beauty,” which is hence always an appreciation of inner virtue—or, in
the case of non-human objects, a kind of anthropomorphism in which they are
symbolically imbued with human-like mental qualities:

Witness the charm of the infant innocence, of the snow-drop, of the soft
elegance of the hyacinth, &c. and on the contrary, our disrelish of the
gaudy tulip, the robust, unmeaning, masculine piony, hollyhock, &c. &c.80
This mediation of the moral by the physical in aesthetic judgement is again
explained by—and helps further justify—the gender binary; Reynolds yokes together the
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physical charms of the sexes with essentialised moral and mental qualities in considering
their forms of beauty, which exist distinctly from each other. “The beauty of each sex,”
she writes, “is seen only through the medium of the virtues belonging to each,” just as the
beauty of particular stages of human life (infancy, youth, “manhood,” etc) are seen only
through the virtues particular to that stage (innocence, compassion, fortitude, etc).81
Where there is an incongruity between physical appearance—no matter how formally
charming that appearance might be—and the correct or expected virtues of a particular
sex or age, Reynolds claims, we are disgusted: “without congruity, there could be no
virtue; without virtue, no beauty, no sentiment of taste.”

The softness and mildness of the feminine expression would be
displeasing in a man. The robust and determined expression of the rigid
virtues, justice, fortitude, &c. would be displeasing in a woman. However
perfect the form, if an incongruity that touches the well-being of humanity
mingles with the idea, the form will not afford the pleasing perception of
beauty, though the eye may be capable of feeling its regularity, &c. So far
is it from pleasing, that it is the more disgusting from its semblance to
virtue, because that that semblance is a contradiction to her laws.82
As we’ve already seen, Reynolds also says that the feminine is the “sweetest, most
interesting image of beauty”; with some more of her aesthetics in place we can now see
that this constitutes a moral claim about women that opens a significant gulf between
her and Shaftesbury (but, interestingly, brings her into a strange kind of alignment with
Marinella). Far from seeing the beauty of women as “subaltern” and as a threat to an
active masculine virtue, Reynolds forthrightly claims that the beauty of women is an
expression of important inner virtues that are at least on a par with the masculine
virtues. Indeed, later in the text she describes “woman” as “the most perfect existing
object of taste in the creation,” taking the idea of feminine beauty as the prototype of all
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beauty familiar from Burke and linking it with an explicit claim about the concomitant
moral excellence of women.83
This moral excellence is argued for even more strongly in Reynolds’ account of
taste; that is, in her account of the subjects, rather than objects, of beauty. Here too
Reynolds opposes the misogyny of Shaftesbury and stakes a claim for the significance
and centrality of women to the aesthetic realm. As we’ve already seen, for Reynolds taste
must be cultivated, and the true appreciation of beauty requires an appreciation of the
moral virtues of which beauty is an expression:

Taste is intellectual pleasure, an approving sense of truth, of good, and
beauty. The latter seems the visible or ostensible principle of the two
former: and is that, in which the universal idea of taste is comprised. All
are pleased with the sight of beauty; but all are by no means sensible, that
the principles that make it pleasing, that constitute a form beautiful, are
those, or to be more intelligible, relate to those, that constitute man’s
highest excellence, his first interest, his chief good!84
Somewhat vaguely, Reynolds identifies the “three co-existing principles of taste”
which “run through all its perceptions” as virtue, honour, and ornament. Honour and
ornament form the “public character” of taste, and virtue the “private and domestic.” Of
these three, private virtue is exalted as the most important: indeed, Reynolds writes
(again confusingly) that it is in virtue that, “though unperceived by the vulgar, to the eye
of taste she [taste] appears in her highest ornament, highest honour.”85
As they are the “public characters” of taste, honour and ornament are prone to
corruption by the social: by the enervating influences of wealth, or by the “false honour”
afforded to prevailing modes and fashions. Like Wollstonecraft, then (and like
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Shaftesbury, though for very different reasons), Reynolds is conscious of the risk posed
to true taste and virtue by extreme wealth:

In the progress of civilization, the polishing principle, which I call taste, is
chiefly found in the highest sphere of life, highest for both internal and
external advantages: wealth accelerates the last degree of cultivation, by
giving efficacy to the principles of true honour; but it also accelerates its
corruption, by giving efficacy to the principles of false honour, by which
the true loses its distinction, becomes less and less apparent, nay by
degrees less and less existent. Wealth becoming the object of honour,
every principle of taste must be reversed. Hence avarice, and profusion,
dissipation, luxurious banqueting, &c. supersede the love economy and
domestic comfort, the sweet reciprocation of the natural affections, &c.
hence the greatest evils of society, the sorrows of the virtuous poor, the
spurns that patient merit of the unworthy takes; in a word, the general
corruption of morals, and of course of true taste.86
In such circumstances, true people of taste are disgusted by the ornament and
honour incongruously afforded to unvirtuous things.87 Cultivating true taste therefore
requires cultivating an understanding and appreciation of virtue, and this can only be
achieved in the private and domestic sphere, where taste is insulated from the pernicious
social effects that might unworthily co-opt it. And this private, domestic sphere—as it
was for Shaftesbury, and more generally throughout the eighteenth century and
beyond—is associated by Reynolds with the feminine. Women hence appear for Reynolds
not as threats to taste and virtue but as their arbiters and cultivators—as they did,
through the theological lens, for Marinella.

The cultivation of the social moral affections is the cultivation of taste,
and the domestic sphere is the true and almost only one in which it can
appear in its highest dignity. It is peculiarly appropriated to feminine
taste; and I may say, it is absolutely the only one in which it can appear in
its true lustre. True taste, particularly the feminine, is retired, calm,
86
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modest; it is the private honour of the heart, and is, I imagine,
incompatible with the love of fame.88
Reynolds, then, can stand at the apex of the movement that Jones describes
taking place throughout the eighteenth century: one in which taste, and by association
with it virtue, is shifted from the public sphere to the private, with “private” here
referring both to the domestic realm—the interior of the home—and to the emotional
realm on the interior of a person. By both connotations taste and virtue also come to be
more closely associated with women, confined as they were to the domestic realm and
thought of as more sentimental and more sensuous.
Jones sees this change in the terms of the aesthetic debate in the eighteenth
century as a consequence of the growing economic power of the bourgeoisie: the shift
from the public, politicised and general taste represented by Shaftesbury to one more
closely associated with the private and the domestic is favourable to the rising middle
classes, who had plenty of money but did not yet have much access to formal political
power.89 With taste, as we have seen, comes virtue; and with it comes too a kind of social
and cultural power.90
Jones’ account is much subtler than the schematic provided here, and well
argued and evidenced. But the schematic will suffice for our purposes, which are to shed
light on a particular reading of Wollstonecraft that can be situated within this contested
aesthetic-political discourse. We have already seen foreshadows of her positions in the
Vindications in the work of Reynolds and—even—Shaftesbury, but I believe that
Wollstonecraft can be read as engaging with this discourse in a wholly different,
revolutionary way.
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3.4 Conclusion: Wollstonecraft’s Intervention

The work of Reynolds in 1785 might seem to herald a significant improvement in
the position of women when compared to that of Shaftesbury in 1711. After all, Reynolds
argues forcefully for the pre-eminence of women as both subjects and objects of taste,
and reiterates the significance and intimacy of the link between taste and virtue.
Undoubtedly, then, and expectedly, Reynolds’ Enquiry is more pro-woman than either
Burke’s one or the work of Shaftesbury. She puts an unquestionably positive spin on the
linkage between women and beauty expounded by Burke. She carves out a role for
women as important moral actors, participating in a long tradition of countermisogynistic cultural arguments that seek to exonerate or promote women’s virtue, and
she does it—if Jones’ history is right—within the newly-produced private space of
bourgeois virtue. Certainly, symbolically at least, there is a wide gulf between Reynolds’
opinion of women as aesthetic and moral subjects and Shaftesbury’s.
And perhaps, indeed, a longer timeline could be drawn that would situate
Reynolds’ moral-aesthetic arguments within a centuries-old discursive contest that leads
to the present day and that does seem to coincide with some improvements in some
aspects of some women’s lives. But cultural histories that locate the impetus for major
material change in fairly isolated intellectual arguments are tenuous at best.
Wollstonecraft, writing only a few years after Reynolds, already sees that the change in
women’s position that Reynolds articulates and defends is not going to undo—and in fact
participates in—women’s oppression.91
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Here we can again make use of Judith Bennett’s description of patriarchal
equilibrium. The cultural shift that occurs in the symbolic relation of women to taste and
virtue through the eighteenth century, metonymised in the shift from Shaftesbury to
Reynolds, leads to a change in the tenor or tone of women’s subjugation but not, for
Wollstonecraft, to any kind of weakening of that subjugation. Patriarchy adapts: the
centring of women as aesthetic subjects and objects—as people not just capable of but
important for understanding beauty—becomes another part of its mechanism. As we saw
in detail in the first section, the construction of women as exclusively or almostexclusively aesthetic subjects and objects—as people judged only by their beauty and
their aesthetic sense—creates conditions pernicious to the moral, spiritual, and
intellectual virtue, and thereby the freedom, of even those women able to meet the
exacting and arbitrary standards against which they are held.92
Further, Wollstonecraft explains the construction of women as primarily
aesthetic subjects—even ones that can in some circumstances be quite influential—as a
consequence of their lack of other forms of power. In this light Reynolds’ claim in favour
of women’s virtue, depending on under-explained and essentialised gender traits, can be
recast as a post-hoc rationalisation of already-existing oppressive relations ‘on the
ground,’ as described by Wollstonecraft. The structure that limits women to being merely
judged by their beauty and their aesthetic opinions is thereby justified, in a tendency we
can see in Burke as well as Reynolds, by an appeal to women’s innate and exceptional
suitability to that limited role. Even a justificatory account that exalts women on these
grounds is then reconfigured by patriarchy towards its own perpetuation. It attempts to
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spin and alter perceptions of beauty and of women while failing to take notice of the
final, and for Wollstonecraft most basic, side of the conflict: power itself.
What, then, of Wollstonecraft’s own proposed route out from the cycle? We might
expect that her “revolution in female manners” is as bound to the private realm and to
the symbolic and cultural position of women as Reynolds’ own lionisation of domesticity.
After all, both Reynolds and Wollstonecraft are suspicious of the effects that wealth and a
dissolute social life can have upon the attainment of virtue, and much of Wollstonecraft’s
polemic can be read as a pretty direct manifestation of the disgust that Reynolds declares
accompanies our apprehension of the incongruity between outer beauty and inner vice.
Reynolds argues that cultivation of the “social moral affections,” accomplished in private
and primarily by women—who are naturally more suited to such cultivation—is a
necessary defence against the moral dangers of unsuitable ornament and honour;
Wollstonecraft, similarly, stresses the significance of education in overcoming the
deceitful values of society at large,93 and often speaks glowingly of the virtues of domestic
women.94 Is the distinction between the two really as great as I have suggested here?
I think there is a significant political difference, one that places Wollstonecraft
within a particular revolutionary tradition, and I think that much of the ground for
understanding this difference has already been laid out. As we know, Reynolds believes
that women have a natural role to fulfil as educators because they are exemplar subjects
and objects of beauty, by virtue of their particular and essential characteristics as
women. Wollstonecraft, by contrast, is clear that no such essentially and peculiarly
aesthetic character exists in women; it is all the product of their construction by the
contingencies of a patriarchal and aristocratic society—that is, a society characterised by
the arbitrary and irrational exercise of power. Indeed, she goes so far as to say in the
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Rights of Woman that she “firmly wish[es] to see the distinction of sex confounded in
society,”95 and that

I here throw down my gauntlet, and deny the existence of sexual virtues,
not excepting modesty. For man and woman, truth, if I understand the
meaning of the word, must be the same; yet the fanciful character, so
prettily drawn by poets and novelists, demanding the sacrifice of truth
and sincerity, virtue becomes a relative idea, having no other foundation
than utility, and of that utility men pretend arbitrarily to judge, shaping it
to their own convenience.96
Hence for Wollstonecraft liberating women requires shifting the conditions in
which they are constructed: lionisation of their virtues will always be insufficient while
those virtues—if virtues they really are—are understood and formed within currentlyexisting oppressive structures. This determination to shift the conditions that create
attitudes is one of the basic principles of revolutionary politics.97
Wollstonecraft emphasises the importance of education in effecting this change;
in particular overcoming the “enervating style” of education to which women are
subjected that gives a “sexual character to the mind.”98 This acquired sexual character is
responsible for the lasciviousness, wantonness, or irrationality of which women are
frequently accused. With a manifestly Enlightenment tone, she invokes Reason—
capitalised—as that which will serve to liberate women from this false sexual character
that so many take to be inborn:
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… how carefully ought we to guard the mind from storing up vicious
associations; and equally careful should we be to cultivate the
understanding, to save the poor wight from the weak dependent state of
even harmless ignorance. For it is the right use of reason alone which
makes us independent of every thing—excepting unclouded Reason—
‘Whose service is perfect freedom.’99
As we’ve now seen multiple times, excessive concentration on oneself as an
aesthetic object or subject is a consequence—and cause—of a mind “not sufficiently
opened to take pleasure in reflection,” and hence an education that turns the mind
toward reflection is essential if women are ever to be free. Significantly, Wollstonecraft
presents this progress away from excessive ornamentation of the body and toward
abstract thought as a process of becoming ‘civilised’: she compares the position of
European women with that of men “in barbarous states” for whom the “savage desire of
admiration” is a “first inclination.” And further:

An immoderate fondness for dress, for pleasure, and for sway, are the
passions of savages; the passions that occupy those uncivilized beings who
have not yet extended the dominion of the mind, or even learned to think
with the energy necessary to concatenate the abstract train of thought
which produces principles.100
In arguing for the liberation of European women, then, and for their inclusion in
the community of the free and reflective, Wollstonecraft invokes—and helps construct—
the narrative that associates European civilisation with abstract thought and rational
progress; a narrative which the ascendant bourgeoisie used, and in the nineteenth
century will use yet further, to justify the brutality and rapine which they exported across
the globe.
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As I noted earlier, alongside this apparent belief in the bourgeois division of the
world into civilisation and barbarism, Wollstonecraft also has great faith in the
importance of mental and physical exertion—work—in constructing virtuous, useful
beings: she contrasts it with the pernicious effects that indolence has on the wealthy,
trapped forever in the torrid light of the meridian sun, never incentivised toward selfimprovement. These beliefs in a disconnected abstract Reason and in the work ethic
might seem reactionary in contemporary times—they are—but read in the context of
Wollstonecraft’s intertwined critiques of aristocracy and patriarchy they become more
explicitly revolutionary. This reading can be expounded in two ways.
First, for Wollstonecraft, liberating women requires making accessible to them
the values that were, at that time, only accessible to middle class men: the values of the
bourgeois merchant who rises or falls solely by virtue of his conscientiousness, grit, and
mental acuity. Abstractly declaring that such values should be made available to all is not
enough: in aristocracy and patriarchy Wollstonecraft recognises the twin snakes
constricting society, rewarding the uncivilised passions and undermining the possibility
of meritocracy. Hence the necessity of a bourgeois revolution that sweeps away those old
structures and replaces them with structures mirroring middle class values.
Wollstonecraft, perhaps uniquely, recognises that to truly fulfil its promise such a
revolution must overcome patriarchy as much as aristocracy.101 A revolution that failed
to liberate women, she saw, would also fail to liberate men: both would find themselves
still ensnared by an order that undeservingly rewards the sensuous pleasures and fails to
reward true virtue.
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Second, Wollstonecraft motivates the overthrow of the aristocracy by associating
an overly-feminine and indolent taste with them, rather than with the bourgeoisie as
Shaftesbury does. At the same time she refuses to allow the cultural manoeuvre
exemplified by Reynolds—the movement of the social sources of virtue from a realm
dominated by the aristocracy to one more open to the middle classes—to stand as the
middle classes’ only gambit in their war against entrenched power, recognising as she
does that this manoeuvre is only made possible by the essentialised “sexual characters”
for which Reynolds argued so firmly and which, in their current form, only help justify
patriarchal and aristocratic power. She advocates a revolution in values that would
render such manoeuvres unnecessary; and indeed, she motivates this revolution by, in a
neat dialectical reversal, claiming for the middle classes the austere, manly, and public
virtues whose inherence in the aristocracy was lionised by Shaftesbury. She thus,
mediated by her critique of patriarchy, completes a turn that took the whole eighteenth
century: at its beginning, public virtue was claimed for the aristocracy; later, in their
growing economic power, and making use of a patriarchal discourse on taste, the
bourgeoisie sought to move virtue into a private sphere more accessible to themselves;
and, finally, Wollstonecraft advocates the revolutionary expansion of that bourgeois
sphere to cover the whole of society, ‘re-publicising’ virtue and confounding the gender
division in the process.
The contrast with Shaftesbury and Reynolds helps us to see in starker relief the
revolutionary character of Wollstonecraft’s intervention in the contest between beauty,
gender, and power. Shaftesbury uses a misogynist aesthetics to justify existing power;
Reynolds presents a pro-woman aesthetics that serves the interests of the rising powers
of the bourgeoisie, but that fails to address the underlying patriarchal power structures
on which that aesthetics is based—in particular, the patriarchal ideology that sees
women as essentially, naturally beautiful and domestic. Wollstonecraft is able to
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excavate through these layers, in all their complexity and seeming-contradiction, and
find the subjugation at their bases. She recognises that the way we think about beauty,
the way we think about women, and how those two are intertwined, is always dependent
on power relations. Without altering those relations beauty can never be liberatory:
shifting attitudes toward beauty and gender, and thereby creating people free from the
dependence they generate, necessitates shifting—or destroying—the power structures on
which, like ivy, they grow.
Unfortunately, as we now know, and despite the significant involvement of many
women, the bourgeois revolutions that did occur failed to deliver on the promise that
Wollstonecraft saw for them. Kings were indeed swept away, and power placed in the
hands of a slightly-expanded community of free men; but those same bourgeois values in
which Wollstonecraft placed so much faith found, too, that—with the exception of
working class women, whose newfound freedom to work in factories was hardly
liberatory—maintaining the patriarchal order would also maintain the state of affairs in
which women were domesticated and their productive and reproductive labour provided
at no outside cost. Instead of an end to subjugation, new subjugations were formed, with
different characters and ideologies.102 Patriarchy reasserted its equilibrium. But while
it—and the other oppressive structures that it permeates and by which it is permeated—
continues to exist, Wollstonecraft’s more basic message keeps its hard core of revolution:
the world makes us badly, and so we must remake it.
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4. Women’s Militancy and Women’s Republicanism During
the French Revolution

4.1 Introduction
“It is these counter-revolutionary sluts,” declaimed François Chabot, at a session
of the Jacobin Club, by then the dominant republican debating society in Paris, on the
sixteenth of September 1793, “who cause all the riotous outbreaks, above all over bread.
They made a revolution over coffee and sugar, and they will make others if we don’t
watch out.”1 The women that Chabot insulted were those of the Society of Revolutionary
Republican Women (Société des républicaines révolutionnaires), a militantly radical allwomen political society, officially founded on May 10th of the same year and led by
Claire Lacombe, an actress from the southwest of France, and Pauline Léon, a Parisian
chocolatier.2 In the few months of their activity Lacombe, Léon, and the Society as a
whole had already made their names several times over; including, indeed, in riotous
outbreaks over bread (they were a ‘nucleus of potential mob-leaders, always ready and
eager to transmute economic grievances into political rebellion’, as R.B. Rose describes
them3). But the target of Chabot’s remark was not just the immediate one of the
Revolutionary Republican Women: in his contemptuous invocation of revolutions over
“coffee and sugar,” Chabot conjured the more diffuse, but no less concerning, spectre of
militant women in general—those working-class women of Paris that had, to be sure,
dragged the King out of Versailles in October 1789, but that had also rioted over sugar in
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early 1792.4 And these women, suddenly unbound by the rapid expansion of the horizon
of political possibility, were—as the appearance of the Revolutionary Republican Women
demonstrated—becoming a problem, even in nominally radical republican circles.
As Sandrine Bergès discusses in her paper “Women Political Philosophers of the
Eighteenth Century and Why They Matter,” this sudden boundlessness of political
potential lays fertile ground for philosophical investigation: during times, of which the
French Revolution is surely the paradigmatic example, when the assumptions
underpinning society are being questioned, the technocratic debates of ordinary politics
are supplemented or replaced by the contestation of bare and basic principles.
Philosophy, as it were, comes to permeate thoroughly the social and political life of the
people: during the Revolution, ‘any political writer was also a philosopher’ as Bergès
succinctly puts it.5 Without old prejudices or heuristics to fall back upon, the political
work of persuasion and power has to be tightly unified with the elucidation and defense
of foundational values. Hence, Bergès argues, the journalistic polemics of women like
Olympe de Gouges are properly read as philosophical texts, as they are participants in
this dynamic philosophical contest.
Bergès’s insight is significant and, I think, clearly correct both methodologically
and philosophically. In this chapter I will expand out from here to consider the politicalphilosophical values expressed in the demands and actions of other militant women of
the Revolution. In so doing, I hope to show how the women of Paris tried to carve out an
alternate vision of republicanism that was inclusive of them, their rights and their
concrete needs, and that rejected the austere masculinity with which republicanism is
sometimes associated now and that the men of that time were then in the process of
constructing.

4
5

“Parisian Women Protest via Taxation Populaire in February, 1792” in Levy et al 115-8
Bergès 7

163

In her paper, Bergès uses this first argument about what can constitute
philosophy in revolutionary times to give us an account of republicanism that is more
amenable to women and feminism through women’s own philosophical, political, and
journalistic writings. In particular, she discusses the relationship that these women saw
between republicanism and the private or domestic realm that was then—and is now—
most closely associated with women. In public, however, an alternate current played out.
This current was no less republican and no less one instantiated and worked-out by
women, but it had radically different goals and methods to those of the journalists.
Nevertheless, these two sides of women’s republicanism could often be complementary,
just as the texts of the Revolution often interacted dynamically with the on-the-ground
interventions of its political actors. By their very nature, these actions show the militant,
public side of women’s revolutionary republicanism. They also show us a possible way
toward new methodologies and metaphilosophical principles in the history of
philosophy.
This chapter is hence put together from two separate, but intertwining, strands.
The first of these strands follows the logic of Bergès’s argument for the inclusion in
philosophical study, alongside “traditional” genres like treatises and essays, of
pamphlets, speeches, and journalistic writings. By walking this path, I argue, we can
open up the philosophy—the dispute over basic principles—latent in the times
themselves, demonstrated not just in texts but in action: that is, in the deeds of those
people in Paris, especially women, who challenged the assumptions of social life right in
the process of living it. The Revolutionary Republican Women have texts: the club had
written rules, and there are accounts of their meetings and their petitions before the
National Convention—the first republican government of France—and the local Paris
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Commune.6 Such texts are, of course, important philosophical documents for the reasons
given by Bergès, in spite—or because—of the extra excavation that is necessary to find
the philosophical underpinnings of the practical and political concerns expressed
therein. But more important, I argue, are the actions of the Revolutionary Republican
Women and their sisters in the struggle behind and beyond these texts. It is by their
actions that they asserted their rights, argued their humanity, and attempted to delineate
a working-class republicanism with an equal or liberated place for women. I hence
propose searching for the philosophical expression to be found in these social
movements and incidents.
The second strand, then, attempts to sketch the philosophical contours of this
women-led republicanism of the street: the principles of the sugar rioters and the socalled furies of the guillotine. Work has already been done to elucidate the attitudes of
these women and the political meaning of those attitudes: here, then, I will focus on the
philosophical comparison of this militant women’s republicanism to more contemporary
forms. Of particular significance here is the role played by subsistence and broadly
economic concerns in the politics of the Parisian women; those concerns that are
invoked in Chabot’s venomous dismissal of the Revolutionary Republican Women. And
indeed there is a risk even today of dismissing an insurrection that is over bread as
unprincipled because of that very fact: of labelling the agitation of Paris’s women
regarding what, in the following century, would become the “social question” as
unserious or unphilosophical when compared to the reasoned debates on abstract
principles that—we imagine—occurred in the National Convention and the political
clubs. But in their actions the women of Paris challenged this strict division of economic
6
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and political or concrete and abstract. So I hope that the second strand can also, in some
sense, constitute a defence of making a revolution over coffee and sugar.

4.2 The Philosophy in Activism

I begin, then, with the methodological question, in whose exploration we will
have cause to reflect on much of the militancy of the Revolution’s republican women. Let
us return first to Bergès’s discussion of the philosophical value of journalistic writings
and speeches. She notes first that her subjects—Marie-Jeanne Philipon Roland, Olympe
de Gouges, and Sophie de Grouchy—contrary to some assumptions that they were too
concerned with activism, did produce a large corpus of philosophical texts, and that they
are not any the less philosophical for their participation in contemporary debates: they
constitute “applied philosophical reflection,” as Bergès puts it, referencing Quentin
Skinner.7 They are indeed interested in providing individual and particular answers to
the individual and particular questions then facing them, in much the way that Skinner
advocates we read the history of ideas in general.8 It can only be some noxious mixture of
parochialism, ahistoricism, and misogyny that would deny that this fact makes these
women’s writings unphilosophical. Quite the opposite: it is this groundedness in the
challenges and debates of the times that makes them philosophical.
Bergès’s second point on this matter is that the particular time that supplied their
questions—one of considerable social and political flux—led those questions, and their
answers, to be especially philosophically interesting and significant. This is in part
because in periods of revolution much of the structure of society is up for grabs, as it
were, and ideological assumptions that might seem fairly fixed at other times are open to
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challenge at their bases. “Applied philosophical reflection,” then, by virtue of the times to
which it is applied, allowed for considerable exploration and contestation of axiomatic
first principles: without, that is, a ready-made (to use Bergès’s term) supply of ideologies
and axioms on which to hang one’s actions and prejudices, just living one’s life—never
mind actually labouring to create a new republic—required philosophical work.9
During times of relative political stability, to illustrate, there might be political
debate on the correct proportional allocation of government resources to, say, education
as against arms, or police as against healthcare. The contours of the debate will be
shaped by considerations of efficiency and feasibility, loyalty and enmity, prejudice, fear,
party politics and electoral strategy, and more. First principles will be invoked, but those
voices that demand that those principles be shifted—for instance, by demanding that
governments ought as a matter of moral urgency provide healthcare for all their citizens
and not get involved in foreign wars—are by that very fact revolutionary voices, forever
trying to push debate toward axiomatic values. Those elements that reject the debate on
the grounds that, say, governments should not have the right to use force to collect tax or
that representative democracy is by its nature illegitimate will remain at best fringe
elements; fringe enough that it is questionable whether they are engaged in applied
philosophical reflection at all.
During times of revolution, however, and surely during some revolutions more
than others, these more basic questions surge forward into public view and public
scrutiny. The demand that particular governments legitimate their very existence
becomes less abstract, since it is entirely possible that those governments could be
dismantled; the question of the basis of the relationship between citizen and state
becomes live as the citizens assert a right to reshape the state as they see fit. There will
still be debates over allocations of resources—people cannot eat principled reflection—
9
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but those debates will be more malleable, more open to radical change: whether to fund
education or arms might rest on one group convincing another about what education is
for, or about what governments should do, or even about what governments are, rather
than on what represents a better return on investment. The underlying logic of the
particular order is laid bare and becomes an object of practical action. If philosophy is,
on some level, the excavation, clarification, expression, and contestation of principles,
and if practical action is at least partly guided by principles, then to do politics in such
times is, to paraphrase Bergès, to do philosophy.
Bergès is right, then, to say that the textual interventions of Olympe de Gouges
and Madame Roland are philosophical. They are so because they are engaged in
activism, because they aim to produce particular changes in their own times, and
because they are polemical. If one takes the (perhaps vulgar) materialist view that
principles follow practical reality, then, indeed, activism—practical action—is the only
way to do philosophy; if one thinks that sometimes principles come first, then, at the
very least, activism is one major constituent of philosophical work, and in times of
revolutionary change to do philosophical work is to engage in activism.
It is clear, I think, that these reflections need not only apply to textual
interventions; nor is all of the political and philosophical import of a textual intervention
to be found in the words themselves. A useful example is supplied to us by Olympe de
Gouges. In Only Paradoxes to Offer, Joan Wallach Scott describes how, for de Gouges,
publishing her texts—indeed, literally pasting them on the walls of Paris—was more than
making available a vehicle for her reflections:

For de Gouges, writing, signing, and publishing demonstrated, for her
contemporaries and posterity, what the law erased: the fact that women could be,
already were, authors. Under revolutionary legislation women did not have the
rights of authors, of individuals who possessed their intellectual property,
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because they did not have the rights of active citizens. To be recognized as an
author, then, meant for de Gouges recognition as an individual and a citizen.10
So not just the texts that she wrote—most prominently, of course, the
“Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Female Citizen”—but the act of writing,
signing, and publishing them expressed political, and hence philosophical, content. The
production and dissemination of the text was itself an assertion of rights and active
citizenship, and that the division of gender was no grounds for division between citizens.
That she had asserted this claim in her actions—though, not of course, its truth—was
even acknowledged in a contemptuous report of her death under the guillotine:

Olympe de Gouges, born with an exalted imagination, mistook her delirium for
an inspiration of nature. She wanted to be a man of state. She took up the
projects of the perfidious people who want to divide France. It seems the law has
punished this conspirator for having forgotten the virtues that belong to her sex. 11
Pierre Gaspard Chaumette, the president of the Paris Commune, also invoked
the spectre of this woman that had forgotten her place during his speech banning
women’s deputations from appearing before the local government’s sessions, hectoring
women citizens to

remember the impudent Olympe de Gouges, who was the first to set up women’s
societies, who abandoned the cares of her household to get mixed up in the
republic, and whose head fell beneath the avenging knife of the laws. Is it the
place of women to propose motions? Is it the place of women place themselves at
the head of our armies?12
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De Gouges asserted that it was the place of women to propose motions and
become mixed up in the republic by doing those very things; she philosophised in deed
as well as word, as even her opponents saw, and paid a heavy price for it.
There is not, then, anything particularly mysterious about the idea that one can
do philosophy by acting beyond text or even speech. But de Gouges was an individual,
and a writer, and even in her non-textual actions her intention is quite easy to interpret.
I wish to assert what is perhaps a step further: that even mass popular actions such as
the women’s march on Versailles in October 1789 or the insurrectional journées between
Germinal and Prairial Year III (early April to late May 1795) can be interpreted in this
way. Such actions have clear purposes and goals, and though—with a handful of
exceptions from police reports and the like—we cannot necessarily ascribe an explicit
goal to any one participating individual, we can nevertheless read the actions themselves
as expressions or manifestations of popular values; and if we do so, we gain access to the
principles and beliefs of those without institutional access to writing and publishing. We
miss the radicalism inherent in direct action if we limit ourselves to studying only those
values that are expressed in text or speech.
Mary Wollstonecraft, perhaps—and understandably, given the havoc it wrought
on her Parisian social circle—having soured on popular revolutionary justice by the time
of its writing, is contemptuously dismissive of the women’s march on Versailles in her
Historical and Moral View of the Origin and Progress of the French Revolution. In it
she sees little in the way of values or principles in the action:

The concourse, at first, consisted mostly of market women, and the lowest refuse
of the streets, women who had thrown off the virtues of one sex without having
power to assume more than the vices of the other. A number of men also followed
them, armed with pikes, bludgeons, and hatches; but they were strictly speaking
a mob, affixing all the odium to the appellation it can possibly import; and not to
be confounded with the honest multitude, who took the Bastille.—In fact, such a
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rabble has seldom been gathered together; and they quickly showed, that their
movement was not the effect of public spirit.13
It was “designing men,” writes Wollstonecraft, “lurk[ing] behind them as a kind
of safeguard, working them up to some desperate act” that were the cause of the
insurrection of October 1789, and not any kind of reasons based on the beliefs of the
women themselves regarding their relationship to the King and to the newly-formed
National Constituent Assembly, or those institutions’ duties toward them. “A scarcity of
bread,” she says, “the common grievance of the revolution, aggravated the vague fears of
the parisians [sic], and made the people so desperate, that it was not difficult to persuade
them to undertake any enterprize”14; and so are many of the women-led insurrections of
the Revolution characterised: as the random, thoughtless reflex of a hungry multitude,
reacting to any stimulus like a tapped knee. E.P. Thompson calls this the “spasmodic
view of popular history,” and, against it, he asks the important question: “being hungry
[...], what do people do? How is their behaviour modified by custom, culture, and
reason?”15
That is to say, to assert that a riot occurred due to a lack of bread might be true,
but it fails to explain the particular shape of a bread riot: its goals, its targets, its effects.
How a riot plays out will speak to the implicit assumptions and beliefs of those that take
part. A crowd is not a knee, and a six-hour march from Paris to Versailles is not an
involuntary kick. Being hungry, the women of Paris attacked the hôtel de ville,
demanding bread and arms, then—also offended by rumours that the King had
disrespected the new order through its symbol, the tricolour cockade16—walked to
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Versailles and demanded the same of the King and the Assembly17; these are not random
targets. Rather, these targets express a set of political claims: that the King and the new
governmental institutions have responsibilities and duties toward the people, including
the provision of subsistence; that the symbols of the new order were important and to be
respected; and, most significantly, that the people have the right to insurrection when
these responsibilities are abrogated. In his study on the English crowd in the eighteenth
century, Thompson speaks of a “consistent traditional view” held by the poor of England
“of social norms and obligations, [and] of the proper economic functions of several
parties within the community, which, taken together, can be said to constitute the moral
economy of the poor”; in their insurrections, the women of Paris defended and
demanded this moral economy from both old institutions of power and new.18
Their movement, then, was one of “public spirit,” if not the specific kind of public
spirit that Wollstonecraft presumably would have liked to see. “In deeds,” as Darline Gay
Levy and Harriet B Applewhite put it, “they shattered the traditional authority and
sovereignty of absolute kingship. They demonstrated how the people itself functioned as
sovereign legislator.”19 Their insurrection might have had economic bases, but it
expressed explicit political views about how different sections of society ought relate to
one another, and the rights and responsibilities of each; and at any rate, there cannot be
a more basic political question than that of who gets to eat. And if, despite that
philosophy is impossible without it, “I must have food” is not obviously a philosophical
principle, during a time of great flux those notions that underlie it—about the
commonweal, the duties of governmental institutions thereof, the right of insurrection—
the assertion. This is also why merely saying that the women were provoked by male agents provocateur
is insufficient to demonstrate that the insurrection was unprincipled; the women acted on their political
views, and even if lurking males provoked that action, they did not implant those views.
17
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surely are. Indeed, as we shall see in the following section, these notions could be based
on other, perhaps deeper views about the natural rights of all human beings; those views
too are expressed in insurrection.
To participate in these direct actions—and there were many led by women during
the revolution—is to lay a stake in philosophical ground. It is not just to attempt to gain
through force what one considers one is due; it is also to assert one’s belief that one is
due those things, and that the kind of person one is is due those things, just as de Gouges
asserted through publishing that she was due active citizenship as much as any man.
To limit ourselves to hearing only those voices that expressed themselves through
reasoned debate, that followed the subtlest rhetorical canons, is not just to miss out on
much that was being said: it is to miss out on a very particular section of what was said, a
section that was determined not by reason or philosophy but by an uneven and
oppressive distribution of power that persisted from then till now. The Revolution
emboldened many of the people—women—on the wrong end of that distribution to
declaim their own views and to hence assert their right to be heard. It also emboldened
many women to act, and hence assert their right to participate in the shaping of their
lives by state power. If, like the women that Wollstonecraft called the ‘lowest refuse of
the streets’, one cannot be heard through text or speech, direct action may be the only
way to have one’s own principles become those of society itself. We ought hear those
principles; but trying to hear them in the context of contemporary philosophy, or history
of philosophy, raises an interesting tangle of issues. It is to the metaphilosophical
outlines of the assertions of the women in Paris that I will turn next.

4.3 Rationality, Action, and the Use of Force
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There are therefore, I think, good reasons—methodological and political—to pay
attention to the viewpoints that underlay the insurrections and riots of the Revolution
and those that underlie activism and street action more generally. It not only broadens
the scope of analysis, but it broadens it in the particular direction of undervalued and
underheard voices that are, due to that very fact, more likely to be revolutionary ones.
Nevertheless, we might ask whether this method really does, or really ought, take these
insurrections to be philosophy. Might it not be the work of interpretation that constitutes
philosophy, rather than the events themselves? After all, not everything in the world is
philosophy, and nor should it be; does naming an insurrection as philosophy diminish
the specific character of philosophy or—arguably worse—improperly circumscribe the
nature of the event? In seeking to find what makes a riot philosophical, we oughtn’t lose
track of what makes it riotous.20
There are numerous tacks that might be taken in navigating these charges. In the
previous section, I followed Bergès in arguing that the events I labelled as philosophy, or
as philosophical, were so because they were concerned with providing answers to or
expressing opinions on a particular set of basic or fundamental questions that are
generally taken—though we might properly ask by whom—to be philosophical: questions
about what kinds of things governments are, how they should relate to their citizens or
subjects, whence their power comes, and what they should do. Even historical-contextual
readings that, after Skinner, situate these questions in the live debates of their times
nevertheless take them to be more basic, fundamental, or principled than, for instance,
questions on the allocation of budgets. It is partly for this reason that such questions are
taken to be philosophical; but more important, I think, is their simple resemblance to
questions that are already established within the dominant institutions and canons of
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political philosophy. In the previous section, I implicitly argued that the women of the
march on Versailles were doing philosophy because they were answering the kinds of
questions that Rawls and Locke answer.
This rhetorical strategy—the subject-matter approach—surely suffices in many
cases. Making philosophy more inclusive and open surely includes making more
available responses to its traditional questions that come from quarters that are
underrepresented due to systemic oppressions, and that might include responses that
are delivered through unusual media like insurrections. Nevertheless, on a broader scope
this strategy is methodologically unsatisfying: it defers the big question by pointing to
established traditions that mightn’t, themselves, have truly convincing bases. Perhaps
worse, this approach might improperly shift the site of philosophising from the event
itself to the later interpreter: if doing philosophy is merely a matter of providing
responses to established questions then we are left open to the charge that it is us,
contemporary historians of philosophy, that are really constructing these responses, and
that the lives of the women of the past are just so much raw material in that process. For
writings, even ‘non-philosophical’ ones, the risk here is lower; but for events, whose
explicit values are by and large not verbalised or written, it is great.
An alternative that skirts both of these issues is to argue that to do philosophy is
not to respond to particular questions, or particular kinds of questions, but to make use
of a particular method. This latter claim can arguably be drawn back to Plato, in whose
Gorgias Socrates differentiates himself from the eponymous sophist by pointing to the
difference in how the two convince their interlocutors or audiences: emotional
persuasion for Gorgias, true reason for Socrates.21 With this in mind we might therefore
say that to do philosophy is to aim to convince others about something by appeal to
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reason: it is a rational method. It can hence be differentiated from arational methods
that aim to convince by, for instance, emotion or force.
This approach does not rest philosophy on resemblance to established works, as
does the subject-matter approach. Nor does it confine philosophy, in non-verbal cases, to
those doing the interpretation rather than those doing the initial activist work. But in
avoiding these issues we may still have excluded the insurrections with which I am
concerned from being philosophy. On this new schema, it would appear, insurrections
and riots cannot be philosophy because they use force, which is arational, to achieve
their aims. Indeed, perhaps even journalistic writings or polemics which appeal to
emotion could be excluded from the realm of philosophy on these grounds. So in skirting
the problems of the subject-matter approach we have, from the point of view of this
chapter’s thesis, found ourselves in worse straits than we were before.
As I have said, I think we have good political and methodological reasons to
understand the street actions of the women of Paris as philosophy. We should therefore
not accept too readily the apparent restrictions of the rational-method approach. And,
happily, it does not stand up to much scrutiny.
First, against Plato, it is not clear that the rational-method approach really does
describe philosophy, even when philosophy is understood in narrow or traditional terms.
This is a large claim, much larger than can be dealt with adequately here; but it is, I
think, at least plausible that many arguments in canonical philosophy—especially in
ethics and politics—rely more on emotional persuasion than they care to admit. Many
intuition pumps, for instance, might use reason to convince us of the consequences of
our responses to particular situations, but those responses themselves needn’t be arrived
at by rational argument. This muddying of the rational waters mightn’t be a bad thing;
and to the extent that, from the rational-method approach’s own perspective, it is a bad
thing, we might ask whether it ought to be. One response we could give, then, is that if
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the rational-method approach excludes polemics or excludes insurrection, then so much
the worse for the approach.
Second, and I think of more concrete use to us here, we might argue that the use
of force is not as arational as it might seem. The intuition that the use of force is arational
might derive from the intuition that, for instance, if I am held at gunpoint and made to
concede that the Catholic God exists, I am not thereby rationally convinced that the
Catholic God exists. But the problem with this illustration, as the old Spanish inquisitors
themselves realised, is that it is not clear that I am convinced at all. I am just—perfectly
rationally, unless I believe in a paradise for martyrs—saying that the Catholic God exists
to avoid being shot; what I believe is a different matter. So this intuition pump doesn’t
quite work: the problem isn’t that I’m convinced arationally, but that I’m not convinced.
When we move to the political arena of groups and governments and power the
problem becomes murkier still. The separation between force and reason becomes less
clear. During the women’s march on Versailles, Marie-Rose Barré, a twenty-year-old
Parisian lace-worker, was one of four women taken to meet the king to ask him for
bread:

His Majesty answered them that he was suffering at least as much as they were,
to see them lacking it, and that so far as he was able he had taken care to prevent
them from experiencing a dearth. Upon the king’s response they begged him to
be so good as to arrange escorts for the flour transports intended for the
provisioning of Paris, because according to what they had been told at the bridge
in Sevres by the two young men of whom they spoke earlier, only two wagons out
of seventy intended for Paris actually arrived there. The king promised them to
have the flour escorted and said that if depended on him, they would have bread
then and there.22
With the previous example in mind, we might argue that, despite the apparent
cordiality of this interaction, the presence of a thousands-strong crowd of armed women
22
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immediately outside means that the king was not really convinced of the people’s need
for bread—or, more strongly, of their moral claim to it. At the very least, we might say, he
wasn’t rationally convinced of anything. He was just saying what needed to be said to
avoid violence.
Perhaps this interpretation would be true if what the king was forced to concede
was a bare factual claim such as “the Catholic God exists” or “two plus two equals five.”
But the demand of the women of Paris was a political one. And for such claims the
bringing to bear of force to convince does not automatically make that convincing
arational. This is because political claims are about power, and hence are partly about
the use of force: about who gets access to it, who gets to use it, when, and to what end. By
appearing in force, the women of Paris concretely illustrated the truth of their claims:
not, it must be conceded, necessarily the truth that they needed bread, but the truths that
they had power and that they had the right to use it when they saw fit regardless of the
wishes of the nominal authorities. The insurrection hence expressed truths beyond its
immediate goal, and, observing the insurrection, it would be rational to be convinced of
those truths. And if one were to accept those truths, it would be rational to accept the
truth of the insurrection’s goal after all: the people must have bread.
Indeed, in settling questions of who gets to use force and when, one can think of
fewer more convincing arguments for the oppressed classes of society than using force
when they see fit. In general the rulers of a society reserve for themselves the right to use
force to settle political contests and disputes.23 One can argue verbally against them that
they are not the true arbiters of the proper application of force; or one can assert the
falsity of their claim by using force oneself, by asserting one’s own right to bring force to
bear on issues where that right is denied by one’s rulers. As we shall see in the following

23

The claim that “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory” is Max Weber’s: Weber 4, emphasis original.

178

section, the articulation of this natural right of insurrection beyond the bounds of
existing powers, is, I think, an important part of the latent philosophy of the street
actions of the Revolution. And this articulation is rationally convincing because it is
made through force; much more so than if—as I do so here—it is merely expressed
through words. In this case, it is the force of the insurrection, not the work of later
interpreters like myself, that does the convincing. As Marx wrote, “the weapon of
criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be
overthrown by material force”24: to convince those more powerful takes power.
I do not hereby claim to have settled the big question of what, in the end,
philosophy is. And, as I said at the outset, I think the subject-matter approach works well
enough for my purposes here: the women of Paris were, I think, in their insurrections
engaged in the same kind of project as people that almost everyone would agree were
doing philosophy. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the approach’s limitations,
and especially important when in so doing we’re thereby able to see another sense in
which the women’s street actions really can be understood to be philosophy: they aimed,
rationally, to convince of the true existence of a natural right. It is to the excavation of
this right that I turn next. In the process of that excavation, we can also see a dynamic
interaction of philosophical texts and political action.

4.4 Militant Women’s Republicanism

Much changed between October 1789 and Germinal-Prairial Year III, not least
the calendar itself, but when women then rioted against the most recent iteration of the
First Republic—the more conservative National Directory—it was once again over bread,
as had been the earlier riots of 1789 and 1792; and, like those earlier riots, it was not only
24
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over bread. The insurrection of 1 Prairial (20 May 1795), again led by women, took as its
slogan “Bread and the Constitution of 1793,” succinctly combining economic and
political concerns into a single expression of the people’s demand for their rights.25 It is
from this slogan that I will begin to work out the outlines of the militant republicanism of
the women of the riots, using the tripartite characterisation of neo-republicanism given
by Bergès as a source of inspiration and comparison—with particular emphasis, in this
section, on the republican tenet of freedom as non-domination.26 In this way we can see,
alongside Bergès’s explication of the women-centred republicanism of de Gouges, de
Grouchy, and Roland, another attempt to work out a republicanism that worked for
women and that was made and expressed by women. In this case, that republicanism
focused on the rights of women to live free of domination by state institutions, and—
importantly—to participate in the creation of that non-dominative order.
The values expressed in the slogans of the insurrection, as well as in the
insurrection itself, can help us to understand this other republicanism that was formed
and reformed by the working-class and militant women of Paris throughout the period of
the Revolution, but it arguably reached its clearest manifestation in Prairial. At the same
time, the insurrection can help us to see how political practice and philosophical writing
interacted at a moment of particular foment: how texts and activism entered into a
reciprocal relationship of mutual reinforcement. Philosophy, then, both drove and was
driven by the direct actions of the street. With a little unpacking, “bread and the
Constitution of 1793” can show us this vividly as well as showing us, or at least guiding us
towards, the concrete values of the women that used it.
The Constitution of 1793 is the Montagnard Constitution, the first republican
constitution of France, written by the radical republican faction of the National
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Convention and containing a spate of democratic reforms, including universal manhood
suffrage and the abolition of slavery; it was never implemented.27 Its text was preceded
by a Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, similar to the more famous such
Declaration written by Lafayette, Jefferson, and Mirabeau at the very beginning of the
Revolution in 1789. But while the 1789 Declaration aimed to limit the absolute power of
the King and to do away with feudal privileges, the Declaration 1793 is more stridently
republican and egalitarian.28
Massimiliano Tomba argues that the 1793 Declaration signals a reconfiguration
of the relationship between the individual bearer of rights and the state: a shift from
what he calls the “juridical universalism” of 1789 to the “insurgent universality” of 1793.
“The tradition of the first declaration,” writes Tomba, “shows how individuals strip
themselves of their social characteristics in order to become ‘simple individuals’ and
therefore citizens of the state”: this is the tradition of the “abstract bearer of rights,” to
quote Tomba again, that has been one of the troubling legacies of liberalism and
republicanism for feminists and those in other radical liberatory movements, who have
frequently seen this abstract bearer of rights as implicitly white, propertied, and male.29
What’s more, the rights of the man and citizen of 1789 were seen as handed down
benevolently by governmental institutions, and in the same breath as their declamation
they were limited by strictures that the rights not be abused and not disturb public
order.30
Such a conception of rights, then, is doubly dominative, and thus doubly unfree:
on the one hand, it constitutes a bearer of rights that is individualised and abstracted
only insofar as they are not a woman, not a person of colour, not enslaved, and not poor;
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on the other, even the rights of that heavily circumscribed group are dependent on the
largesse of a government that can, at any point, invoke the expediency of public order to
circumscribe the rights themselves. In the republican tradition non-domination entails
not just non-interference but the absence of the possibility of arbitrary interference: not
just the presence of a kind-hearted or lackadaisical master, but no master at all.31 The
handful of abstract right-bearers of the 1789 Declaration, then, were not free in the
republican sense (nor, indeed, were they yet living in a republic).
The 1793 Declaration was written after three years of popular protest and
insurrection of women, the poor, and the enslaved people of the colonies. It, by contrast
to the more liberal 1789 Declaration, “announces” what Tomba calls “insurgent natural
rights’ that ‘express the political agency of human beings beyond the state.” That is to say
that, rather than emptying out individuals of their concrete features, making those whose
social position makes this operation possible “abstract,” and then bestowing them with
rights that are carefully limited by the state, the 1793 declaration—on Tomba’s reading,
at least—acknowledges that individuals have rights by virtue of their concrete features
and admits no possibility of their being limited by the state; rather, the state and
governmental institutions exist at the sufferance of a people who have a permanent right
to insurrection.32
Tomba sees the provenance and expression of this understanding of insurgent
natural rights in the insurrections, during the Revolution, of those people whose “nonabstract” features had disqualified them from rights under the older declaration: the
poor, the rebels of Saint-Domingue, and—of course—women33. By acting as citizens
despite their exclusion, and expressing their rights despite their disqualification, these
groups, Tomba argues, articulated the gap between the concrete human being and the
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abstract citizen rights-bearer of the 1789 Declaration, putting a whole dominative
political and social order into question; not with the end of admittance into that order
but with the far greater one of expressing and demanding one’s human agency in the face
of any order.34 In this, again, the insurrections of women, the poor, and the enlaved
people of the colonies can be seen as making demands outside of, but here also
alongside, philosophical texts.
One such text, as Tomba notes, is de Gouges’s Declaration of the Rights of
Woman and Female Citizen, written two years before the 1793 Declaration. It expresses
its own understanding of insurgent universality, rewriting Article 6 of the 1789
Declaration—“The law is the expression of the general will”—to “the law should be the
expression of the general will,” hence making the law “subject[..] to the judgment of the
people.”35
Here, then, is a thoroughgoing demand for freedom as non-domination; for
freedom as the non-possibility that one’s rights will be infringed, enshrined in a right of
insurrection that can be acknowledged, but never granted or circumscribed, by the state.
It is a demand made overwhelmingly by the participants in the popular politics of the
Revolution, the riots and actions of the street carried out by all those that saw the gap
being forged between human being and citizen: that is, by those human beings whose
citizenship was denied. Where bread, or indeed coffee or sugar, was a part of their
motivation, the demand is expressed only the more clearly, showing that gap in yet
starker terms: those of a state that would grant rights to abstract subjects while ignoring
the concrete needs of real human beings.
In taking the Constitution of 1793 as their slogan and model, the women of the
Prairial insurrection express their refusal of domination clearly. The insurrection is both
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sanctioned and granted political meaning through the invocation of the Constitution; at
the same time, the insurrection itself constitutes evidence for the the truth of the claims
in the Declaration that the rights of expression and assembly “cannot be forbidden” and
that “insurrection is for the people and for each of portion of the people the most sacred
of rights and the most indispensable of duties.”36 In a sense, then, by allowing for the fait
accompli of the people’s right to non-domination and by enshrining their right to
resistance, the Declaration—even though it was never put into law—generated its own
evidence. It philosophically justified political actions that themselves justified its
principles. The content of the insurrectionary claim—the demand not to be dominated—
is expressed in text, in action, and in the interaction of the two.
There is a further interesting wrinkle to this interplay, however. As noted, Tomba
argues that the 1793 Constitution was itself written in response to earlier insurrections of
the poor, of women, and of the enslaved (including the by then quasi-legendary march
on Versailles that we discussed in the previous section). Here the direction of influence is
reversed: rather than political action being justified by an earlier text, the pre-1793
insurrections are retroactively justified by a text that is written partly in their light. In
other words, political practice here generates its own philosophical justifications:
“applied philosophical reflection” taken to the extreme. The Declaration of 1793 here
acknowledges pre-existing facts on the ground: the women (and enslaved people, and
poor) of the Revolution have rights, including the right to insurrection, and they will not
be dominated. And in making that acknowledgement it creates the conditions for new
political actions and new on-the-ground insurrections—ones that make it into their
slogan.
All of this helps us to grasp the expression of freedom as non-domination—
republican freedom—in the insurrections and riots of the revolutionary period. The
36
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storming of the Bastille, the march on Versaille, the last gasps of the Germinal and
Prairial Days: all these can be said to express, instantiate, and demand a particular
variant of militant or insurgent republicanism. The women of Prairial Year III that cried
“bread and the Constitution of 1793” asserted their right not to be dominated, by hunger
or by unscrupulous flour merchants or by the state itself, and they asserted it by refusing
to be dominated and by taking their rights into their own hands. Their rights overspilled
the bounds set them by the state, and they demanded the ratification of the Constitution
that acknowledged this.

4.5 Public Participation and Public Virtue

Republicanism, however, is not just an understanding of freedom as nondomination. Its other two features, as identified by Bergès in her discussion of the
republican women writers, are its emphases on virtue-led politics and political
participation.37 As we have already seen several times, a part of the underlying logic of
the women-led insurrections and riots of the revolutionary era was the demand, and
indeed understanding, on the part of the women that they should participate in the
political process even as they were excluded from most governmental institutions. To be
sure, rioting over bread is not the form of participation that most of the great republican
men of the time are likely to have had in mind, but with no other options available
insurrection becomes a tool of both participation and non-domination.
There are, however, other ways that the militant republicanism of the women of
Paris was expressed, and it is to these that I wish to turn in this final section—to the ways
that the republican women of Paris emphasised their desire to participate and their
instantiation of civic virtue. It is here, then, that we can finally return to the Society of
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Revolutionary Republican Women, and, I think, to a vision of radical republicanism that
is more explicitly focused on the rights of women. This vision was also, significantly, one
that was expressed in public and made a demand for women’s inclusion in the public
sphere: the species of participation and civic virtue desired by the militant women of
Paris were ones that led beyond the domestic and private realm. Where they used texts,
the context of their dissemination helped support the texts’ content, and the content
helped support political action.
Pauline Léon was already making herself known in March of 1791, two years
before the official registration of the Society at the Commune, when she and three
hundred other women petitioned the National Assembly for the right of women to bear
arms:

We wish only to defend ourselves the same as you; you cannot refuse us, and
society cannot deny the right nature gives us, unless you pretend the Declaration
of Rights does not apply to women, and that they should let their throats be cut
like lambs, without the right to defend themselves. Can you believe the tyrants
would spare us? No, no—they remember October 5 and 6, 1789 [that is, the
march on Versailles] … But, you say, men are armed for your defense. Of course,
but we reply, why deprive us of the right to join that defense, and of the pleasure
of saving their days by using ours? [...] Why then not terrorize aristocracy and
tyranny with all the resources of civic effort and the purest zeal, zeal which cold
men can well call fanaticism and exaggeration, but which is only the natural
result of a heart burning with love for the public weal?38
In 1791, of course, France was still a monarchy of sorts. Nevertheless, Léon makes
no mention of the King and frequent references to civic virtue and citizenship. Here then,
in inchoate form, is the beginning of a specifically women’s form of resistance to
domination, what would in time become essential to republicanism; in this case to
domination by the enemies of the nation both interior and exterior. But Léon’s petition
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also lies direct claim to the ability of women to participate in the defence of the polity
and of the availability to them of the civic virtues of patriotism and sacrifice. Despite
their limited citizenship and limited rights, Léon and the other women expected not just
that they be granted their constitutional rights but that they could, and should,
participate in their creation and safeguarding as equal members of both polity and
ongoing project. “We are citoyennes,” Léon announced, “and we cannot be indifferent to
the fate of the fatherland.”39 The very fact of their petitioning, of course, just like in the
case of de Gouges, formed a part of their assertion of their right to participate. Their
300-strong presence provided force to their argument. As ever, they demonstrated their
willingness and desire to become citizens and to participate both in word and deed.
Nevertheless, the women desired more than just the right to appear and to
petition. In this it seems that their words, supported as they were by their presence and
their activism, would be insufficient: the petitioners demanded the right to participate
specifically in the armed defence of the new nation. The petition, by itself, is an act of
participation and a demonstration of civic virtue. But the ability to petition—which was
itself to be taken away from women in 1793—was not enough. Léon and her fellow
petitioners saw the right to bear arms as the route along which they could access all the
rights and responsibilities of republican citizenship: to be independent, women had to
participate in the armed defence and creation of the nation; to participate, they needed
the independent right to bear arms, still given only to active citizens; to access and
express their (soon to be) republican virtue they also needed the freedom to participate.
And so they were compelled—again by civic virtue—to participate directly in the creation
of a non-dominative state and to defend it from domination from abroad.
Again, these considerations were not made in abstraction but in the immediate
context of work then needing to be done. Léon here is beginning to form a republicanism
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that responds immediately to its circumstances and whose principles are created in the
process of political work.
The right of women to bear arms and form militias was a central preoccupation
of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women, of which Léon was a central member
and occasional president, during the short span between its official formation in May
1793 and its proscription along with all other women’s clubs by the Jacobins at the end of
October. The first article of the Society’s rules stated that “The Society’s purpose is to be
armed to rush to the defense of the fatherland; citoyennes are nonetheless free to arm
themselves or not.”40 They hence argued for their inclusion in public citizenship not
primarily through the vote, or through political representation, but through the right to
aid in the defence of the nation—to be a part of a civically virtuous, publicly visible corps
of patriots.
There were other means, however, by which the Society articulated—and worked
to produce—its vision of a militant female republicanism. They expressed strong support
for the implementation, and then vigorous enforcement of, the Terror and the repressive
Law of Suspects against aristocrats, speculators, and hoarders of grain, in another
petition made alongside the radical Cordeliers Club just after the Society’s formation in
May 1793:

Legislators, strike out at the speculators, the hoarders, and the egotistical
merchants. A horrible plot exists to cause the people to die of hunger by setting
an enormous price on goods. At the head of this plot is the mercantile aristocracy
of an insolent caste, which wants to assimilate itself to royalty and to hoard all
riches by forcing up the price of goods of prime necessity in order to satisfy its
cupidity. Exterminate all these scoundrels; the Fatherland will be rich enough if it
is left with the sans-culottes [that is, the urban poor] and their virtues.41

40

“The Regulations of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women,” in Levy et al 161
“The Society of Revolutionary Republican Women Joins the Cordeliers to Denounce Traitors,” in ibid
151
41

188

And then again in another petition to the National Convention in August:
No, it will not be said that the people, reduced to despair, were obliged to do
justice themselves; you are going to give it to them by ruining all guilty
administrators and by creating extraordinary tribunals in sufficient numbers so
that patriots will say, as they leave for the front: “We are calm about the fates of
our wives and children; we have seen all internal conspirators perish under the
sword of the law.”42
In these cases the women of the Society participated in the creation and
dissemination of radical, polemical text and speech that aimed both to show that they
could so participate and to steer the conditions of the Revolution in the direction they
desired. Their bloodthirsty rhetoric found expression in action and their actions
supported the seriousness of their rhetoric.
Extraordinary tribunals and swords of the law, of course could—and did—
severely impact the non-dominative freedom of those unfortunates who found
themselves on the wrong side of them. And the image of civic virtue here is a blooddrenched one. Yet for all that this is still a species of republicanism: in this case, nondomination, virtue, and participation are all brought together in the demand for
extraordinary violence, in both senses of the term “extraordinary.”
The Revolutionary Republican Women saw the formation of a republican ethic
and a republican society as an ongoing project, and not one that could only be theorised
about: to be undominated required a robust and terrifying participation in politics, a
bellicose expression of their virtuous commitment to the ideals of the republic. Joan
Landes describes how they “took to policing markets to root out hoarders’ and ‘engaged
actively in surveillance”43—another expression of their desire to participate in the public
sphere and shape what that sphere was like. These activities can be read philosophically
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too: to be undominated, the women asserted in their petitions and through their actions,
meant the forcible destruction of those that tried to dominate them. If we see a
deplorable contradiction here, they surely saw a hard-nosed practical response to
concrete circumstances.
Landes describes how the women of the Society also worked to express a
particular visible and public role for women, specifically, in the new republic. In
September they successfully petitioned the Convention to pass a law requiring women to
wear the republican tricolour cockade while in public.44 Here lies another tangle: the
quasi-feminist demand that women be able to participate in the public life of the
republic—that their citizenship and belonging be visibly represented—and that they be
able to demonstrate their civic virtue and commitment runs roughshod over the demand
for non-domination. Other women, especially market women at Les Halles, did not
appreciate this domination, and fought back—literally—against the women of the Society
that tried to enforce it.45 And so the expression of a women’s republicanism continues to
turn, contested at every moment through text, through speech, through force and
insurrection.

4.6 Conclusion

These alternate models of republicanism, then, are not universally positive or
admirable. They can be dark and violent. But still they represent how women of the
Revolution who could not frequently be heard by traditional or decorous means still, in
the public realm and with the tools they had, worked to produce a republicanism for
themselves, and in this I think there is much that can be learned.
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Philosophically and politically, the understanding of freedom as non-domination
that I have excavated here is one that takes freedom to be not a particular state of being,
and certainly not one whose boundaries are codified in law, but an ongoing, collective
project in which people must participate as full-fledged citizens. To be undominated on
the terms of the Revolutionary Republican Women requires vigilance, practical action,
and the means to defend oneself against threats: all these things can only be realised in
the coming-together of people as collectives or communities where they can protect one
another. The polity itself does not make people free: rather, the people’s capacity to
shape the polity, to be actively involved in the progress and direction of the society in
which they are part, is what grounds their freedom.
As I noted in my discussion of Tomba and the Constitution of 1793, this capacity
of the mass of the people to shape the state as they see fit is always there, latently, within
them. To this extent freedom would appear to be a metaphysical fact: that the
Declaration of 1789 pedantically circumscribed the cases in which political protest and
assembly were permissible had no bearing on what actually happened, because the law
had no relation to this capacity. A capacity, however, translates to nothing without
political work, and it is in this insistence that political work must be done to secure the
freedom of the people that the militant women of Paris are, I think, most instructive.
Certainly, securing the writing of a Constitution that made itself subservient to the
insurrectionary rights of the people was a victory—even if it was immediately suspended
in a state of emergency—but one of the primary ways that it was a victory was that it
could subsequently act as a locus and model for further political action. It was the action
itself that, however briefly, seemed to be pushing things in the direction of liberation.
Freedom, then, understood as the impossibility of one’s domination by another, is
something that people make for themselves.
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These political considerations can also inform the methodological turns that I
have made here. Of course, the insistence on the importance of political action can lead
us directly to the attempt to bring that action into the realm of philosophy—not to
denature action but, hopefully, to radicalise philosophy. The importance of collectives in
ensuring political change, I think, gives us a good reason to seek ways to understand how
intellectual currents can be expressed in the forms of social movements that exist beyond
texts, and especially beyond texts written by individuals. Understanding political thought
requires understanding all the things that drove it, and in many instances it was driven
by the forceful action of groups of ordinary people, who used texts as justifications and
models, retroactively and proactively. In finding a methodology that can adapt to this, I
have only started to chart new paths forward. As always, there is more work to be done.
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5. Conclusion

In my introduction, I said that one of my aims in this dissertation was to
contribute to an ongoing attempt at destabilising the so-called “standard narrative” of
early modern philosophy: that narrative, familiar to every philosophy undergraduate, of
the development from rationalism, through empiricism, to Kantianism. To do this means
not just that we ought search for the overlooked philosophers of the past—though this is
a valuable aspect of the trend, and especially when those new figures frustrate previous
assumptions about who can be philosophers. It also means that we critically interrogate
the questions and methods that have contributed to the narrative’s longevity and—until
recently—seeming unassailability, not with the goal of declaring those questions and
methods illegitimate but, more modestly, with the goal of finding alternate routes that
were previously hidden. To understand the methodological and political architecture of
the standard narrative is to understand what could now be otherwise.
In the preceding chapters I have presented several ways of engaging with the
philosophy of the early modern period outside of this Kantian narrative. In my
introduction I noted that I would do this in part by constructing a “separate, newer
narrative” about the relations between people and societies from the perspective of those
that were marginalised. Here at the end, we can see that narrative with more clarity.
By focusing on women, and in particular on their responses to their subjugation
throughout the period, I have crafted a narrative that shows the relation of individuals to
wider groups, as it is considered philosophically, becoming increasingly a political
question: that is to say, the philosophers on which I have focused increasingly turned to
the matters of social organisation and the distribution of power to find solutions to the
ethical, aesthetic, and more broadly philosophical problems that they faced. Each
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chapter gives a political response to its individual concerns, but over the arc of all of
them politics as a practice grows to swallow metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and then
philosophy itself. This, I hope, gives us a new way to think through early modern
philosophy outside of the standard story—and as such thinking is itself a political project,
the work of the philosophers I discuss can also provide a model for us in bringing
political commitments into the history of philosophy.
This new narrative of the growth of the political has been a convenient way for
the structure of the dissertation to mirror its methodological and philosophical
preoccupations regarding the primacy of the political in reconstructing past thought in
forms that are helpful to contemporary concerns. And this growing primacy of the
political might even be persuasive as one way that the period can be read: a period that
began with witch-trials and weapon-salves and that ended in secular revolution, with the
materialism of Marx and realpolitik on the horizon. But I have not presented this
narrative with the aim of encapsulating, representing, or even describing the contours of
the political thought of the women of early modern Europe. I do not think, ultimately,
that destabilising the standard narrative means setting up something new to take its
place—though perhaps if we were to say many things should take its place we would be
on firmer ground.
Rather, I have presented four chapters that each seek to understand the
philosophy of the early modern period beyond the standard narrative—that is, that take
steps on a number of routes forward. Here at the close I will draw out those routes more
explicitly and then suggest further research to be undertaken in the same vein in future.

5.1 New Routes
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Firstly, then, and most obviously, by focusing on the work of women
philosophers, writers, and activists of the early modern period we can immediately effect
a radical break from the exclusively male canon handed to us by tradition. New faces
with new perspectives can be added to the canon even without significantly altering the
canon’s biases in terms of content and genre. Cavendish, as we saw, was as concerned to
describe the deep structure of the universe—what is in it and how it works—as any male
metaphysician, and in her Philosophical letters she sets herself up as responding directly
on such matters to Hobbes, Descartes, More, and Van Helmont.1 We might also include
Anne Conway, whose Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy developed
a monist metaphysics against Descartes that seems to have strongly influenced Leibniz.2
And though the standard narrative has traditionally overlooked ethics, aesthetics, and
politics in its reconstruction of the early modern period, this dissertation has presented
women working on those issues too, which are after all now very much in the
mainstream of philosophy: Suchon on freedom, de Grouchy on moral sentiments and
political rights, Reynolds on aesthetics, Wollstonecraft on aesthetics and republicanism,
de Gouges and the Revolutionary Republican Women on republicanism, political rights,
and economic rights.
Though matters have been changing in recent decades, these writers and activists
were for a long time stranded on the outside of the institutionalised history of
philosophy. Even if we hold fairly conservative views of what constitutes or ought to
constitute philosophy, these women—and many more—can help us to construct a
narrative or picture of early modern philosophy that is far closer to the true intellectual
complexion of the era than that of seven men stretched over two hundred years.
Uncovering and engaging with the work of early modern women is hence one way of
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progressing beyond the standard narrative.3 That project is very much ongoing, and I
hope this dissertation can serve as one small part of it.
There are other ways that I have sought to progress beyond the traditional
Kantian narrative, however. As I previously noted, throughout the dissertation I have
tried to show how close political concerns are to each philosopher’s treatment of their
particular issues. The way that politics emerges as a primary concern differs in each
chapter: for Cavendish the primacy of politics is an artefact of her belief that all things
are living individuals who must therefore be socially organised in some way, while for the
republican women of Chapter Four politics is front and centre as the method by which
they will take control of their lives. In all cases, however, politics is inextricable from
each woman’s writing. In the process of thinking through the answers to questions in
metaphysics, aesthetics, or ethics, we find ourselves thinking along the lines of social
organisation: how societies can be organised; how different forms of organisation affect
the individuals within them; how power can be distributed across them; how individuals
can relate to that power; and, importantly, how the contestation of that power can
generate new ways of thinking and relating.
Such thinking is alien to the early modern period of the standard narrative, which
has tended to view its canonical figures as grappling alone with stable and permanent
universal questions—what kinds of things exist? how do we know?—that are not sensitive
to social circumstances. This might be a consequence of the homogeneity of the
narrative’s canon: as men, mostly of independent means, the seven great sages are less
likely to have been subject to, or cognisant of, the psychic turbulences or material
restrictions of patriarchal social structures than the likes of Suchon or Wollstonecraft,
both of whom demonstrate a clear sensitivity to how thought can be bound up by
3
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politics. And so another way that I have sought to move beyond the canonical narrative is
by bringing such concerns, and the people that wrote about them, to the forefront of my
engagement with early modern philosophy.
Finally, I have also tried to give political readings of the texts that I discuss
throughout the dissertation. “Reading politically” can mean many things, and I briefly
covered what I meant by it in the introduction: situating texts in the power structures
they assume, and excavating those that they attack; understanding both the narratives
that they place themselves in and those narratives in which they have come,
subsequently, to be placed; testing out how texts might be placed in newer narratives,
including contemporary ones for our own use. It is clear, I think, how such methodology
seeks to move beyond the standard narrative—for one thing, it assumes that there are
other narratives to be had, and actively searches for them. It also seeks to keep ideas
closely in their immediate contexts, and in the contexts that they have accrued over the
years, rather than treating them as abstract or timeless. It tries to understand how the
answers to philosophical questions—and the questions themselves—are formed not just
in the minds of individuals, or even of individuals in dialogue with one another, but in
the structural conditions in which those individuals involuntarily find themselves. In this
again I have tried to work in opposition to the image of the hermetic and heroic “great
man” philosopher of the standard narrative.

5.2 Future Routes

To bring the dissertation to an end, then, I will here briefly identify a few avenues
for research to be undertaken in future, following some of the routes I have mentioned
above or forging new ones. I will begin with content questions that have emerged during

199

the process of writing the dissertation, and then turn to new possibilities in
methodology.
First, an underlying concern of many of the writers and activists of the
dissertation that could fruitfully be the object of further study is that of the distinction
between the masculinised public realm of political reason, abstract right, and civil
participation, and the feminised private realm of domestic duty, personal ethics, and
maternal care. The relation of these two realms to one another, and the relation of
women to them, was complicated throughout the early modern period. Some of this
complexity can be seen in Chapter Three, where I noted a distinction between two
understandings of good aesthetic taste in the work of the Earl of Shaftesbury and Frances
Reynolds: Shaftesbury argued for a masculinised, aristocratic taste that translated to
virtue in the public realm, while Reynolds described taste as a matter of private feelings
incubated by women in the private realm. Between and beyond these two opposed views
was that of Wollstonecraft herself, who in rejecting the association—positive or
negative—between women and taste also sought to move beyond that association that
kept women tied to domestic life. To complicate matters further, Wollstonecraft
associated the aristocracy—the constituents of “the public” for Shaftesbury, and the
bearers of public virtue—with the same indolent and feminised aesthetic forms that
Shaftesbury decried. For Wollstonecraft, perhaps, the public and private realms are best
muddled together, their distinctions abandoned, with both men and women able to
participate in public and to have rational domestic lives.
In Chapter Four the gendered contestation of the public realm is seen more
explicitly. The women’s requests to form armed militias, de Gouges’ demand for political
rights, and the direct actions of insurrection or revolt themselves were all attempts to
seize control of the public and to make a presence there known. The men of the Parisian
and French legislatures responded aggressively to ban women from public political
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participation—from petitioning the assemblies and from forming their own political
clubs.4 In this case, then, the public realm is something that has to be created and
defended, its boundaries policed. For women to act in public was to overrun these
boundaries, to declare their full citizenship, and to reject the gender binaries that were
just then being coded into the new republic.
In the seventeenth century the distinction is more inchoate. But there are
promising avenues in the work of—for instance—the Venetian nun Arcangela Tarabotti,
who wrote fervently against the practice of imprisoning unwanted daughters in convents
but whose solution to the practice, rather than a more thoroughgoing liberation of
women, was to allow daughters to “enjoy a true Christian education at home
accompanied by modest retirement from the world.”5 The idea that women should or
could be of the world seems remote. More complicated still are Suchon’s arguments for
the “Neutralist” life in The Celibate Life Freely Chosen, which arguably blend together
elements of public and private life.6 Drawing together these disparate threads from the
seventeenth century, and following them to the great contests over the public realm at
the end of the eighteenth, requires a great deal more study.
A related avenue for further research concerns the role that social class plays in
the work of the women writers of the early modern period. As we already saw,
Shaftesbury linked the public realm directly to the aristocracy; Wollstonecraft, by
contrast, attacked the aristocracy and instead defended a robust, austere rationalism that
4
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she associated with the middle classes. Her innovation in both her anti-aristocracy and
anti-patriarchal polemics was to break apart the naturalised association of women and
the middle class, defended with different moral valences by both Shaftesbury and
Reynolds: this allowed her to claim that the middle classes were the true bearers of
“masculine” Enlightenment values and that such values were in principle open to women
as well. As I noted in Chapter Three, the revolutionary change she foresaw for society
was one in which the rational virtue of middle class men was open to everyone, and the
irrational sentiment of the aristocracy—which had the effect, Wollstonecraft thought, of
bewitching the working class, making them impotent to affect change7—was done away
with.
Middle class virtue was hence the route to women’s liberation for Wollstonecraft.
For the working class Revolutionary Republican Women, however, this proved
insufficient. As we saw in Chapter Four, their coupling together of economic and political
concerns—in the bread riots, for instance, but also in their demand that the Terror be
enforced against “speculators, hoarders, and [...] egotistical merchants”8—was decried as
counter-revolutionary in the Jacobin Club.9 But for the radical women of the Revolution
the institution of a liberal capitalist democracy did not go far enough: they saw, from the
position of people that had to work for the food of themselves and their families, that to
really ensure their new rights meant a reorganisation of the class structure of society as
much as of the government. And this classed element of their resistance was part of their
downfall.
These are just the beginnings of an attempt to tease out the intricacies of the
relation between class politics and pro-women politics in the early modern period. Such

7

See, for example, Wollstonecraft 59-60
“The Society of Revolutionary Republican Women Joins the Cordeliers to Denounce Traitors,” in Levy et
al 151
9
Journal historique et politique, no. 69, 18 September 1793. Cited in Rose 60 note 28
8
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a project would also have to look back to the seventeenth century, to see how class
conflict and women’s liberation interacted in thought then too. Much work could yet be
done.
Finally, a quick look toward future methodologies. In Chapter Four, I argued for a
methodology in the history of philosophy away from the “great man” view of the
standard narrative. There are, I think, good political and moral reasons for abandoning,
or at least looking beyond, this way of structuring our history: as I said in Chapter Two,
the construction of the individual as an asocial singularity is often criticised as implicitly
masculine, and even if this image is a little caricatured we might do well to use such
critiques as a route toward thinking differently. This desire to move beyond the “great
man” helped motivate the move toward a philosophy of crowds and revolt in Chapter
Four, but it also affords us new opportunities in how we engage with the named
philosophers of the past.
Rather than treat such philosophers as hermetic, sui generis figures, whose
thought was shaped only by their engagement with the deep structures of the universe,
the view—expressed throughout the dissertation—that individuals and their work are
complicated assemblages, sensitive to social and political circumstance, could lead us in
new directions. We might, where possible, want to move yet deeper into the archives to
find the ways that the seemingly abstracted thoughts in philosophical texts might have
been influenced by more practical day-to-day concerns and relationships. There are
multiple good examples of such work in recent scholarship on Emilie du Châtelet, among
others.10

10

For contextual studies of du Châtelet see, for example, Nagel 97-112, Hutton 515-31, and Winter 173206, especially 186-90; Larsen 105-26 for an analysis of the epistolary relationship between Marie de
Gournay and Anna Maria van Schurman; and Bergès 386-9 on the exigencies of women’s publication and
intellectual activity in the early modern period.
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Alongside this opportunity, however, we are afforded another chance for
pluralism. Abandoning the hermetic “great man” philosopher also allows us to be less
beholden to authorial intention in our interpretations of the works of the past. In
Chapter Three, for instance, I sought not to give a fulsome account of Wollstonecraft’s
views on aesthetics but to situate the views I found in the Vindications in their
intellectual and political contexts. Though Wollstonecraft surely would deserve a place in
a true monumentalist survey of the intellectual history of the period, my intention in the
chapter was not to treat her as an honorary female “great man” but as a political actor
and a producer of political texts: texts that can even, perhaps, have meanings in their
contexts or ours that are beyond their authorship. Remaining open to this possibility
might radically change how we read the texts of the past. The interpretations I presented
throughout this dissertation only tentatively begin down this path.
Of course, as I already noted, the move away from “great man” history of
philosophy is most radically made in Chapter Four, which not only does away with the
“man” side of the formula but also searches for philosophical ideas beyond
individualised greatness. In part this is because of necessity: one cannot easily get a fix
on the intentions or beliefs of the great majority of the radical women of the French
Revolution. But it is also reflective of an attempt on my part to do philosophy, or the
history of philosophy, at a remove from not just the content of the standard narrative—
its preoccupation with particular figures and particular questions—but also its form. Due
to the work of recent decades to move away from the standard narrative, we need no
longer feel bound to interpret only individuals, or only scholars in particular lines of
lineage, or only texts.
This has the advantage of not just replacing the standard narrative with another
that changes its faces but keeps its methods and commitments. But though I think such a
radical break is necessary I do not think it needs to be destructive. We have all learned
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and will continue to learn much from the standard narrative; and though I have been
guided by a new methodology I think that my interpretations are plausible enough on
their own or by conventional lights. Moving forward, however, we are afforded an
opportunity to approach the history of the early modern period with more pluralism,
more collectivity, and more politics. I think this will help us to produce more interesting
and even more accurate narratives of the history of thought. And it shows us that like the
societies and governments I have discussed, the history of our discipline is the product of
collective, politically-engaged, and practical action. Shifting the standard narrative
means in part allowing that we are free to do so.
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